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THE EXORBITANT COST OF REDISTRIBUTING
INJUSTICE: A CRITICAL VIEW OF
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V. WEBER
AND THE MISGUIDED POLICY OF
NUMERICAL EMPLOYMENTt
RICHARD K. WALKER*
Noble enthusiasm is no less prone to distort the vision than vulgar
prejudice. In evaluating the historical facts we do well to bear in
mind Flaubert's view that "personal sympathy, genuine emotion,
twitching nerves and teat--filled eyes only impair the sharpness of the
artist's vision."'
I . INTRODUCTION
June 27, 1979, the date the Supreme Conn. announced its decision in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 2
 was an historic occasion. Almost a year
to the day after its much heralded decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke," in which the Court struck down a racially preferential
medical school admissions program, the Court bestowed its imprimatur on the
use of a racial quota in the employment. context. Hailed immediately as a
"sweeping endorsement of voluntary affirmative action," 4 the decision un-
leashed a torrent of accolades from those who favor numerical preferences as
the means for responding to this country's unhappy history of discrimination.
Copyright © 1980 by Richard K. Walker.
This article was originally conceived and prepared as one side of a forum
on the United Steelworkers q. America v. Weber decision and it was understood that the
other side was to be presented by Professor Alfred Blumrosen. Shortly prior to
scheduled publication, however, Professor Blumrosen withdrew his article.
* 1970, J.D., 1975, University of Kansas; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of South Carolina. 1 am grateful to my colleagues, Professor R. Randall
Brid•ell and Professor Thomas R. Haggard, who reviewed earlier drafts of this article
and provided much helpful criticism.
' R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R. BERCERI, quoting 4 A.
HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 76 (Vintage Books, undated).
2
 433 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4 BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT No. 125. AA-1 (June 27, 1979); see (Aso Ad-
dress by Professor Alfred Blumrosen (June 29, 1979), reprinted in BNA DAILY LABOR
REPORT No. 128, F-1 (July 2, 1979).
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In one such endorsement, Daniel Leach, recently appointed Vice Chairman of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), enthusiastically as-
sessed the decision as "[a] triumph of reasonableness."' A comparably jubi-
lant writer in the Village Voice, however, offered the following more candid
and revealing description of the import of the occasion:
Brian Weber's somewhat myopic view of bruised feelings should not
lure us into a callous disregard for the tragedy of disappointment
which will be the result of any selection process. But programs like
the one in Gramercy, Louisiana, do more than provide job oppor-
tunities. They reduce the monopoly on shattered dreams that blacks
have long held in this country."
As this writer suggests, the Weber decision and the policy of numerical
employment that it enshrines accomplish nothing so well as they accomplish
the redistribution of injustice. In place of the groups that have been the tradi-
tional victims of race and sex discrimination are substituted individuals, sin-
gled out for the fortuity of their not having been born into one of the previ-
ously disadvantaged groups. These individuals may themselves come from
backgrounds with 'inherent social, ethnic or economic disadvantages but their
interests are sacrificed to the newly institutionalized concept of "Intergenera-
tional Bookkeeping."' If there be cause for celebration in this, I must confess
an inability to see it. Like many others who found the arbitrary denial of
opportunity on the basis of race and sex deplorable and who have worked for
its eradication, I must agree that if we could identify an affordable means by
which we could eliminate overnight every vestige of historical discrimination
and obliterate its very memory from the mind of humankind, that would
surely be the course of choice. That such a miracle cure likely does not exist
was accepted by most of us long ago. But failing such a solution, one must
wonder whether "race-conscious affirmative action" 8 is really the best we can
do.
Address of Daniel E. Leach (July 19, 1979), reprinted in The Legal Times
of Washington, July 23, 1979, at 23.
" Dreyfuss, Breaking the Monopoly on Shattered Dreams, The Village Voice, July
23, 1979, at 24.
7
 This term is taken from Daniel Boorstin's parody of "affirmative action",
THE SOCIOLOGY or THE ABSURD (1970). As this article will suggest, much of what was
taken at the time of the book's publication as satire has since come to be taken quite
seriously by federal officials.
" The phrase, "race-conscious affirmative action" is borrowed from Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Weber. See, 99 S. Ct. at 2725. As will be seen, the mean-
ing of "affirmative action" has been greatly corrupted since its inception during the
Kennedy administration. See Section II herein. Because both the origins and the
sound of "affirmative action" impart to it a rather misleadingly innocuous air, some
have understandably preferred to employ arguably more descriptive terms such as
"preferential treatment," "the New Racism," "positive discrimination," "reverse dis-
crimination," or "affirmative discrimination." See L. Lows, THE New RACISM: REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as L. Loxos]; see generally N.
GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975)
[hereinafter cited as N. GLAZER]. The Amicus Brief filed in Weber on behalf of the
Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity made the following signifi-
cant point:
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There is much to this matter that warrants deliberate reflection. Many
people assume that the national policy of numerical employment is a product
of "liberal" ideals that have as their first and only aim the lifting up of the
down-trodden. As the historical section of this article suggests, however, there
is evidence that this policy may well have sprung from quite different, and
less acceptable, ideals and motivations—a point that, itself, mandates careful
review of the policy's underlying premises.
In the process by which "affirmative action" as we know it developed and
in the judicial methods employed in the Weber decision, there are some dis-
turbing indications about the current status of certain constitutional values
and fundamental notions of consensual government. The Supreme Court's
expansive approach to judicial power in the Weber decision is, to be sure,
hardly an isolated instance. For another disturbing example, one need turn
no• further than to the decisions of the Court in its fourteenth amendment
cases, which have been ably analyzed and indicted in Professor Raoul Berger's
thoughtful work. 9
 But the fact that transgression is commonplace only mili-
tates the more urgently in favor of its revelation and condemnation, lest we
come to mistake our own callousness for the usurper's legitimacy. Moreover,
careful examination of Weber in the context of the numerical employment
policy reveals a microcosmic view of an ominous symbiotic parasitism among
the branches of government, by which they have come to feed upon the il-
legitimate acts of one another, appropriating them for their own unconstitu-
tional purposes. It was Hamilton who warned us that "liberty can have no-
thing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from
its union with either of the other departments ...."" It therefore must be
asked whether, even assuming the ultimate desirability of the numerical pol-
icy, the means employed in its development and implementation did not exact
too high a price in terms of democratic values. Finally, there is substantial
evidence that "affirmative action" is counterproductive of even its own pre-
[A]lthough this Brief, of necessity, frequently uses the phrase "reverse
discrimination," that term is a misnomer, for what it really refers to is one
species of discrimination itself, not the reverse of it. Nonetheless, along
with "preferential treatment," the phrase must perforce be used for want
of a generally accepted better appellation.
Brief for Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity as Amicus Curiae
at 9.
Rhetoric always exerts a subtle influence, but this is especially so where, as in the
discrimination area, the issues and policies under consideration are themselves fraught
with complexity and nuance. One should choose one's words with care and be ever
mindful of the fact that the antiseptic understatement has often been employed to
cloak that which fears the light of day. It seems to me that "race-conscious affirmative
action" is a phrase of that variety. Throughout this Article, I shall manifest a predilec-
tion for "numerical employment," which I feel suggests something of the dehumaniz-
ing effect of the phenomenon it describes. Nevertheless, not being convinced that this
phrase fully captures the spirit of the thing, I shall also occasionally revert to and use
interchangeably "race-conscious affirmative action," "reverse discrimination," "prefer-
ential treatment," etc.
R. BERGER, SUIffel note 1.
" THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. HAMILTON), reprinted in, THE ENDURING
FEDERALIST 331, 333 (C. Beard ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as FEDERALIST).
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sumed objectives. in this regard, the social and economic costs of the policy
become extremely relevant, but have not, 1 submit, been heretofore given the
consideration they deserve.
It is the principal purpose of this article to examine each of these issues
in turn and 10 show that the costs of Weber and "race-conscious affirmative
action" arc very high indeed. Along the way, I shall also attempt to throw
light upon the underlying philosophy of government that provides the foun-
dation fOr governmental actions in this area.
I. THE TRANSMUTATION FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT: A REVEALING RETROSPECTIVE ON THE DESULTORY
DEVOLUTION Or "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION."
The Weber case is most meaningftilly studied in its historical context. In-
terestingly enough, however, although the literature fairly abounds in ac-
counts of the development of "affirmative action,"" it does not appear that an
effOrt. has been made as yet to link the assortment of major events in all three
branches of the Government with the political context that gave shape to the
creature we confront today. This omission, in itself, may have some signifi-
cance, for it is only after this process has been traced along its twisting path
that, an accurate picture of some of its more ominous implications emerge.
The term "affirmative action" first appeared in Executive Order No.
10925, 15 promulgated by President. Kennedy in 1961. Essentially, Executive
Order 10925, like a number of executive orders issued before it, required that.
federal contractors refrain from discrimination in their employment practices.
President Kennedy's Order differed from its predecessors, however, in its ad-
dition of a new requirement providing that:
The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such
action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employ-
ment., upgrading, demoting or transfer; recruitment or recruitment.
" The best of these is probably EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL,
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN EMPLOYMENT'—AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OR REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION: 11-59 (K. McGuiness ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as EEAC]. See also
Manning & Domesick. Title VII: Relationship and Effect on Executive Order 11246, 7 B.C.
IND. & Coat. 1.. REV. 561, 561-63 (1965); Comment, Executive Order 11246: Presidential
Power to Regulate Employment Discrimination, 43 Mo. L. REV, 451, 453-56 (1978).
' 2
 3 C.E.R. 448 (1961). Executive Order No. 10925 was actually only one of a
rather long line of executive orders that had sought to prevent racial discrimination
among federal contractors. The first. of this line was Executive Order No. 8802, issued
by President Roosevelt in 1941. 3 C.E.R. 957 (1941). Other executive orders that dealt
with anti-discrimination obligations between 1941 and 1961 included: Exec. Order No.
9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1943); Exec. Order No. 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1951); Exec. Order
No. 10479, 3 C.E.R. 976 (1953); Exec. Order No. 10557, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1954). For a
good discussion of the historical origins, theoretical underpinnings, and constitutional
implications of the executive order concept, see Neighbors, Presidential Legislation By
Executive Order, in 1 C. SANDS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 219-34 (4th ed. 1972) (a
revision of the Third Edition Of SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION).
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advertising; layoff or termination; rates of .pay or other forms of
compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship."
Nowhere in Executive Order 10925 was the term 'affirmative action" further
defined or explained. The rules promulgated by the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), created to administer Executive
Order 10925, also failed to provide any elaboration." In an opinion consid-
ering the legality of the requirement that the non-discrimination clause (in-
cluding the above-quoted reference to "affirmative action") be included in
federal contracts and the sanctions for noncompliance, then Attorney General
Robert Kennedy did not even mention the affirmative action clause, though
he referred repeatedly to the "fundamental policy that the powers of Gov-
ernment not be used to promote or perpetuate discrimination." 1 '
It has been said that the original intended meaning of "affirmative ac-
tion" is "strictly a matter of conjecture,"" but there is ample evidence in the
means employed by the PCEEO to carry out the mandate of Executive Order
10925 by which a clear impression can be formed. In its program "Plans for
Progress," PCEEO exerted itself most agressively to fulfill its mission. Pur-
suant to this program, employers were asked to commit themselves voluntarily
to "taking affirmative steps above and beyond the Executive order.' Com-
panies accepting this invitation" consulted with a representative of the
PCEEO to draw up a "Plan for Progress," which then was signed by a high-
13 Exec. Order No. 10925, 301 (1), 3:C.F.R. at 450 (emphasis added). This
Executive Order abolished the Committee on Government Employment Policy, which
had administered the anti-discrimination program for federal contractors since Presi-
dent. Truman's administration, and established in its place the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO): Id. § 204, 3 C.F.R. at 449. Another
important aspect of Exec. Order No. 10925 was its introduction of the power to im-
pose very tough sanctions against "non-complying" contractors. These included sus-
pension or cancellation of existing contracts, blacklisting, and debarment from eligibil-
ity for future contracts. Id. § 312, 3 C.F.R. at 452. The utilization of such sanctions
had been advocated by the last Chairman of the Committee on Government Contract
Compliance, Richard M. Nixon, but the Eisenhower administration apparently rejected
the idea, continuing to rely exclusively upon persuasion and mediation. EEAC, supra
note 11, at 16.
1 4 See 26 Fed. Reg. 6585 (1961); 28 Fed. Reg. 9812 (1963); 28 Fed. Reg.
11305 (1963).
" 40 OP. ATVY GEN. 97, 103-06 (1961).
Note, Executive Order 11246; Anti-Discrimination Obligations In Government
Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. I.. REv. 590, 593 (1969).
" Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding The Civil Rights Of Persons Within the Juris-
diction Of the United Stales: Hearings Before Suhcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. Part II at 1118 (1963) (statement of Hobart Taylor,
Executive Vice Chairman, President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings On Miscellaneous Proposals].
'" There were well over 200 major corporations, with an aggregate work
force of 8 million workers, that had been enlisted in this program by August, 1964. M.
SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 117 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as M. SovERN].
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level company executive and the Vice President of the United States." The
content of the plans, however, was what has been described as "little more
than letters of intent not to discriminate." 2" Thus, although "Plans for Prog-
ress" actually may have involved some "steps above and beyond" those re-
quired by the Executive Order, it is at least clear from the very limited scope
of the plans what "affirmative action," as originally conceived, did not mean. It
did not mean preferential treatment of minorities and it did not require
employers to strive for a preconceived numerical breakdown in their work
forces. 2 '
The next major development in this area was the passage by Congress of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, broadly proscribing discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 22
Although the Act and its legislative history will receive considerable attention
in the ensuing discussion of the Weber case, a few major points warrant em-
phasis here. First, the structure of the statute as enacted manifests no con-
gressional approval of a preferential treatment or numerical approach to
resolving the problem of discrimination. Indeed, if anything, precisely the
contrary conclusion is suggested. In section 703, 23 Congress forbade in un-
equivocal terms discrimination against "any individual" in the terms and con-
ditions of employment, 24
 the classification of employees in such a way as to
19 Id. When President Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Johnson suc-
ceeded to the presidency leaving the vice presidency vacant, Johnson continued to sign
"Plans for Progress" on behalf of the United States. Id.
2"
 Professor Michael Sovern described the Plans as follows:
The plans vary considerably in detail, with a few constituting link
more than letters of intent not to discriminate, but most follow the basic
pattern established by Lockheed. In brief, that pattern entails forswearing
discrimination in all phases of the company's personnel policies, with spe-
cial emphasis on training and education programs; affirming the com-
pany's intention to take positive action to recruit minority group applicants
for employment, training, and promotion; promising thorough dissemina-
tion of the company's equal opportunity policies to company personnel,
recruitment sources, and minority groups; spelling out in some detail how
these pledges are to be implemented; and undertaking to file progress re-
ports at regular intervals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
21
 This conclusion is buttressed by an examination of the information re-
quested of construction contractors in the PCEEO's "Compliance Report" form 41-101.
In that form, the contractor was asked only such things as whether there was a "com-
pany wide policy to assure ... equal opportunity;" whether such policy had been
communicated in writing to all departments, offices and facilities; whether someone
had been assigned to see that the policy was understood and implemented; whether
educational and training opportunities were made available on a non-discriminatory
basis; and whether the policy against discrimination had been communicated to re-
cruiting sources and through recruiting advertising. Form 41-101 is reproduced in
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 401-04 (BNA 1964) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT].
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1976).
23
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255.
24 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 255.
Sec. 703. (a) It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
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deprive "any individual" of employment opportunities, 25 and discrimination
against "any individual" with'respect to training opportunities." In the same
section, the Congress provided certain narrowly circumscribed exceptions to
its broad anti-discrimination rule. These were, principally, employment situa-
tions wherein religion, sex or national origin (but not race) would constitute a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business," 27
 religious institutions concerned with the
propagation of their religion and desiring to hire employees of like faith to
further this objective," employment situations involving national security, 2 "
"bona fide seniority or merit system[s]," 3 " and businesses on or near Indian
reservations that wished to give a preference in employment to Indians. 3 '
Significantly, the statute contained two references to "preferential treat-
ment." The first was in section 703 (i) 32 which created the above-mentioned
express exception to the general rule against discrimination for preferential
treatment accorded Indians under specifically limited circumstances. The sec-
ond was in section 703 (j), 33 which made it. clear that Title VII was not in-
tended to require employers to give preferences to any groups because of a
statistical "imbalance" that might appear when the employer's work force was
compared to "the available work force." 4
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms. conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religiOn, sex, or national origin.
25
 Pub, I., No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 255.
Sec. 703. (a) It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
* * *
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or lend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his slaws as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2"
 Pub, L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(d), 78 Stat. 256.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
labor organization, or joint lab(ir-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
Pub.  I.. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 256.
28 id
2 " Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(g), 78 Stat. 256.
11
 Pub. I.. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257.
31
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(i), 78 Stat. '257.
32
 Id.
' 3 Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VIL § 703(i), 78 Stat. 257.
" Id. This provision reads in full as follows:
(j) Nothing contained in this title shall he interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this title to gram preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
S
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Similarly, the term "affirmative action" received only a single mention in
the Act, and that not in the context of an exception to the broad proscription
of discrimination against "any individual," but rather in a remedial provision.
Section 706(g) of the Act, as enacted in 1964, provided in relevant part:
If the'court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice)."
Although this language does suggest some identity of "affirmative action" with
preferential treatment, Congress limited its use to those situations in which a
court found that an employer had "intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging" in unlawful discrimination. Even then, any such affirmative relief
which may exist. with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by arty
labor organization, or admitted to. or employed in, any apprenticeship or
other training program, in comparison with the total number or percen-
tage of persons of such race, color. religion, sex, or national origin in any
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work three in
any community, State, section, or other area.
Id.
35 Pub. I.. No. 88-352, Title VII,	 706(g), 78 Stat.. 261 (emphasis added).
This section was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
No. 92-261,	 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 107, and now reads as follows:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin [he respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employ-
ment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years
prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order
of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual
as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an
individual as an employee, or the payment. to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any,
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin or in violation of section 704(a).
(Emphasis added to highlight new language incorporated into the provision via the
1972 amendment.)
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was to be limited to the actual victims of proven discrimination.' justice
Brennan later compared the purpose of section 706(g) to that of section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act 'and asserted that, for both provisions,
"the thrust. of 'affirmative action' redressing the wrong incurred by an unfair
labor practice is to make 'the employees whole, and thus restore] the
economic status quo that would have obtained but for the company's wrongful
[act"' - " 8
Those who seek retrospective justification for the policy of numerical
employment, however, point to section 709(d), which provided in pertinent.
part:
Where an employer is required by Executive Order 10925, issued
March 6, 1961, or by any other Executive order prescribing fair
employment practices for Government contractors and subcontrac-
tors, or by rules or regulations issued thereunder, to file reports re-
lating to his employment practices with any Federal agency or com-
mittee, and he is substantially in compliance with such requirements,
the Commission shall not require him to file additional reports pur-
suant. to subsection (c) of this section.""
In this language the proponents of numerical employment would find tacit
congressional approval of "affirmative action" and hence preferential treat-
ment under the executive order programs. There are, however, two flaws in
this argument. First, it must. be
 remembered that "affirmative action" had not
been construed by the executive branch as requiring or condoning preferen-
tial treatment. or numerical representation at the time Title VII was
passed.'" Moreover, the legislative history reveals that H.R. 7152 (the bill
" The last sentence of § 706(g), which has not been altered since its enact-
ment in 1964, makes clear this limitation on the affirmative action contemplated. See
note 35 supra.
117 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
"" Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co„ 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976).
3" Pub.  I.. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 709(d), 78 Stat. 263. Section 709 was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Pub. 1.. No. 92-261, § 6,
86 Stat. 107 (1972), and the language quoted in the text was stricken.
4" See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, testifying in behalf of the original version of
Title VII which would have done little more than legitimize the PCEEO and Executive
Order 10925, see note 41 iqra , emphasized that he and the President had no intention
of resorting to a numerical or preferential remedy:
Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Attorney General, there certainly is
no intent upon your part to grant any preferential treatment to Negroes, is
there?
Attorney General KENNEDY. No.
Mr. KING. And you certainly do not want to grant them any rights
that would infringe upon the rights of others.
Attorney General KENNEDY. That's correct.
Mr. KING. So if I made a statement to that effect in my district, I
should not be criticized for it. by the NAACP.
Attorney General KENNEDY. As far as I'm concerned, I think that is
absolutely right. A group of Negroes came down about the employment
practices at the Department of Justice and I stated at that time that we hire
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that., as amended, ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of 1964), as intro-
duced on the floor of' the House, contained a section 711(b) that would have
authorized the President "to take such action as may be appropriate to pre-
vent the committing or continuing of an unlawful employment practice by a
person in connection with the performance of a contract with an agency or
instrumentality of the United States."' The fact that. section 711(h) was
stricken from the statute as enacted clearly negates any inference of an inten-
tion to sanction an expansion of executive authority beyond then existing
bounds. 42
people based on their ability and on their integrity, and that nobody was
going to be hired in the Department of justice just because they were Ne-
groes. And I think also that the President said publicly that he was against
a quota system—so many Negroes in a particular area, so therefore, they
should have a certain percentage of the jobs. 1 think it is quite a clear
public statement.
Civil Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 7152, As Amended by Subcommittee No. 5, Before House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 881h Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1963).
In a later opinion on the legality of the Philadelphia Plan, the Comptroller Gen-
eral confirmed the absence of a numerical policy in either the Kennedy or early
Johnson Administration:
In this connection, it should be noted that, while the phrase "affirma-
tive action' . was included in the Executive Order.(10925) which was in ef-
fect at the time Congress was debating the hills which were subsequently
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, no specific affirmative action re-
quirements of the kind here involved had been imposed upon contractors
under authority of that Executive order at that time, and we therefore do
not think it can be successfully contended that Congress, in recognizing the
existence of the Executive order and in failing to specifically legislate
against it. was approving or ratifying the type or method of affirmative
action which [the Labor] Department now proposes to impose on contrac-
tors.
49 Comp. Gen. 59, 70-71 (1969). For further discussion of the Comptroller General's
opinion and the response it evoked, see notes 66-96 supra and the accompanying text.
Indeed, in regulations regarding federally registered apprenticeship programs, pro-
mulgated a little less than seven months before the passage of Title VII, the Secretary
of Labor had expressly disavowed any intention "to require any program sponsor or
employer to select or employ apprentices in the proportion which their race. color,
religion, or national origin bears to the total population. - Fed. Reg. , reprinted
in CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. SUM?? note 21, at 415.
4 ' H.R. REF'. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (judiciary Comm. 1963),
reprinted in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm), Leg. Hist. of Titles VII and XI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2014. An amendment offered by Senator Tower while the
bill was in the Senate would have made Title VII the "exclusive 111(221/IS - for redressing
employment discrimination. 110 CONC. REC. 13,650 (1964). The amendment was re-
jected. Id. at 13,652. Taken together, the 1-louse action in striking § 711(b) and the
Senate action in rejecting the Tower amendment support the conclusion that Congress
intended neither to remove executive power then being exercised nor to permit any
significant expansion of such power.
' 2 This conclusion is borne out by an examination of those portions of the
debates ill the House fOcusing on the amendment that was to become § 711(b) and
that had been offered by Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee and floor manager of the bill in the House. At one point Representative
Grass inquired of Representative Celler what impact the latter foresaw the bill would
have on the PCEEO:
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On September 24, 1965, less than three months after the effective date
of Title VII, President Johnson promulgated Executive Order No. 1l246. 93
Superficially, Johnson's Order did not appear to change much of substance in
the earlier Kennedy Orders. Executive Order 11246 required federal contrac-
tors to undertake essentially the same obligations with respect to non-
discrimination and "affirmative action" as had been required under Executive
Order 10925. 44 "Affirmative action" was again left undefined. Much of the
significance of Executive Order 11246, however, lay in the fact that it
abolished the PCEEO and transferred to the Secretary of Labor, who had
always served as Vice Chairman of the PCEEO, the responsibility for adminis-
tering the Order. 4 ' Perhaps most significantly, the President conferred on
Mr. CROSS. * * *
Perhaps the gentleman front New York can give me an answer to this
question. You have a Civil Rights Commission, and you have embedded in
this bill a section creating a brand new Equal Opportunity Commission.
There is also in existence, and has been, headed for years by one Lyndon
B. Johnson, when he was the Vice President, the President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity. Is that to be abolished in favor of the
new Commission or will it, like Topsy, just keep on growing forever?
Mr. CELLER. This bill has nothing whatsoever to do with the Presi-
dential Commission on Equal Opportunity. That is in existence, and it will
continue in existence. We do not acid or subtract anything with respect to
that Commission.
110 CONG. REc. 2569 (1964). Later, just before the vote was taken on the amendment
striking § 71 i(b), the same point was raised in a colloquy between Representatives
Celler and Pal:
Mr. CELLER. And will the gentlemen not also say that the deletion of
the language by the amendment does not have any effect upon existing
Presidential power?
Mr. POFF. Of course, the striking of language from a bill could not in
any way impair existing law.
Mr. CELLER. And it does not limit it and it does not broaden it. It
remains intact as it is now.
Mr. POFF. That is true.
Mr. Chairman. I join in support of this amendment.
Id. at 2575. It should also be remembered that, as one contemporary observer of the
process by which Title VII took shape has written:
Title VII of H.R. 7152, as first introduced in Congress, merely authorized
the President to establish another commission, to he known as the "Com-
mission on Equal Employment Opportunity." The purpose of the proposal
was to give a statutory basis for the Commission on Equal Employment
Opportunity, which had first been established in 1961 pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 10925. The primary function of the new statutory commis-
sion would have been to prevent discrimination by government contractors
and subcontractors and in federally financed or assisted programs.
Vacs, Title VII: Legislative Histor, 7 B.C. INDUS & Cont. L. REV. 431, 434 (1966) (foot-
note omitted).
4" 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e at 1232 (1976).
Id. The contract provision in Exec. Order No. 11246 differed materially
From that in Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000c at 1233 (1976) only in its substitution of references to the Secretary of Labor in
the place of references to the PC:EEO.
45 Exec, Order No. 11246, §§ 201, 403, 3 C.F.R. 340, 347, reprinted in 42
U S.C. § 2000e at 1233, 1236 (1965). The responsibility for redressing discrimination
in the federal government itself was given to the Civil Service Commission.
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the Secretary of Labor the power to "adopt such rules and regulations and
issue such orders as he deems necessary and appropriate to achieve the pur-
poses [of' the Executive Order]." The Secretary also was specifically au-
thorized to require of construction contractors, in addition to compliance with
the general non-discrimination and "affirmative action" provision, compliance
with "such additional provisions as the Secretary deems appropriate to estab-
lish and protect the interest of the United States in the enforcement of those
obligations." 4 ' Coming, as they did, on the heels of a congressional refusal to
authorize the President "to take such action as may be appropriate," 48 these
provisions in Executive Order 11246 might well have been seen as ominous
signs of things to come.
Still, there was a great deal of evidence that nothing much had changed.
Not only did Executive Order 11246 not give any further content to "affirma-
tive action," but the term remained undefined in 1966 when the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was established by the Secretary of
Labor to administer the federal contractors program.'• It also was not de-
fined when Executive Order 11375 5 " rectified the omission of sex from
Executive Order I1246's list of proscribed discrimination categories. Indeed,
as late as January of 1967, the then Director of the OFCC, Edward C. Sylves-
ter, Jr., stated: "I would say that in a general way, affirmative action is any-
thing that you have to do to get results. But. this does not necessarily include
preferential treatment. The key word here is 'results.' " 51
 Thus, definitive
speculation continued to be fostered by the vague record reflecting the cre-
ation and development of "affirmative action."
In the waning clays of the Johnson administration, however, the federal
contractors program began to take on a somewhat different air. On May 21,
1968, two months after President Johnson announced that he would not seek
re-election, the Department. of Labor issued a new set. of regulations under
Executive Order. 11246." Under these regulations, contractors with 50 or
more employees and a federal contract of $50,000 or more were required to
file a written affirmative action plan including an "identification and analysis.
of problem areas" and provision "in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal
employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs of members of
minority groups, including, when there are deficiencies, the development of
specific goals and timetables for the prompt achievement of full and equal
employment opportunity.' Although the introduction of terms such as
4 " Id. at § 201, 3 C.F.R. at 340, reprinled in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e at 1233.
" Id. at § 301, 3 C.F.R. at 346, n'prinled in 42 U.S.C.	 2000e at 1235.
Sec text and note at note 41 supra.
4" 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966). The OFCC is now known as the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFC:CP).
5" Exce. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1967).
'' R. NATHAN, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL. GOVERN-
MENT IN PROMOTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, U.S. COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RiGirrs 93 (1969), (poled iu EEAC, Aupro note 11, at I 9.
52 33 Fed. Reg. 7804 (1969).
" Id. at 7811. The full text of that portion of the regulations relating to af-
firmative action read as follows:
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Id.
"deficiencies" and "goals and timetables" arguably set the stage for the numer-
ical employment policy, it remained for the Nixon administration to give the
§ 60-1.40. Affirmative action compliance programs.
(a) Requirements of programs. Each agency or applicant shall require
each prime contractor who has 50 or more employees and a contract of
$50,000 or more and each prime contractor and subcontractor shall re-
quire each suhcontractor who has 50 or more employees and a subcontract
of $50,000 or more to develop a written affirmative action compliance
program for each of its establishments. A necessary prerequisite to the de-
velopment of a satisfactory affirmative action program is the identification
and analysis of problem areas inherent in minority employment and an
evaluation of opportunities for utilization of minority group personnel.
The contractor's program shall provide in detail for specific steps to
guarantee equal employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs
of members of minority groups, including, when there are deficiencies, the
development of specific goals and lime tables for the prompt achievement
of full and equal employment opportunity. Each contractor shall include in
his affirmative action compliance programs a table of job classifications.
This table should include but need not be limited to job titles, principal
duties (and auxiliary duties, if any), rates of pay, and where more than one
rate of pay applies (because of length of' time in the job or other factors)
the applicable rates. The affirmative action compliance program shall be
signed by an executive official of the contractor'.
(b) Utilization evaluation. The evaluation of utilization of minority
group personnel shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of minority group representation in all job categories.
(2) An analysis of hiring practices for the past year, including recruit-
ment sources and testing, to determine whether equal employment oppor-
tunity is being afforded in all job categories.
(3) An analysis of upgrading, transfer and promotion for the past year
 determine whether equal employment opportunity is being afforded.
(c) Maintenance of programs, Within 120 days from the commencement
of the contract, each contractor shall maintain a copy of separate affirma-
tive action compliance programs for each establishment, including evalua-
tions of utilization of minority group personnel and the job classification
tables, at each local office responsible for the personnel matters of such
establishment. An affirmative action compliance program shall be part of
the manpower and training plans fit. each new establishment and shall be
developed and made available prior to the staffing of such establishment.
A report of the results of such program shall be compiled annually and the
program shall be updated at that time. This information shall be made
available to representatives of the agency or Director upon request and the
contractor's affirmative action program and the result it produces shall be
evaluated as part of compliance review activities.
Although the regulations provided for slightly different antidiscrimination clauses
for federally assisted construction contracts, the above-quoted affirmative action provi-
sions applied equally to both construction and non-construction contractors. The regu-
lations were not published until May 28, but they had been signed by Secretary Wirtz
on May 21, 1969. Id. at 7812. On the day after the regulations were signed, May 22,
the Comptroller General issued an opinion in which the application of such a re-
quirement to contractors working on highway projects receiving federal aid was
considered. 47 Comp. Gen. 666 (1968), The Comptroller General held the affirmative
action requirement to be incompatible with competitive bidding requirements because
it failed to set forth "a statement of definite minimum requirements 10 be met by the
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terms specific content, to vastly expand the concept, and to shift the emphasis
away from equal employment opportunity. As with so many other well-meant
policies of the Johnson years, the infusion of Nixonian logic was to prove
disastrous. '`
About this time, the courts began to play a significant. role in the formu-
lation of the numerical employment. policy. There were a number of cases"
in which the courts proscribed the use of' union membership as a criterion for
job referral or ordered that minorities be permitted to bid for more desirable
jobs on the basis of plant-wide seniority. In some of these cases, the relief -
provided was expressly limited to those who were actual victims of the unlaw-
ful practice that had occasioned judicial intervention." Other decisions con-
tained decrees that foreseeably might. have benefited persons who had never
suffered discrimination, but they expressly limited the opportunities they pro-
vided to those who were qualified and had greater bona fide seniority than
otherwise qualified white employees." Perhaps the most extreme of these
cases was Local 53, International ASS .11 of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,"
which endorsed the imposition of quota referrals upon a defendant union
until objective criteria for admission to union membership could be de-
veloped." Although each of these cases had been carefully reasoned and
represented a cautious approach to the problem of providing an adequate
remedy for Title VII violations, their resort to quota-type relief' paved the way
for the next quantum leap by the executive branch.""
Seizing upon this concept, the Department of Labor conceived and gave
birth to the Philadelphia Plan, the first "affirmative action" mutant with an
unmistakably numerical quality. The version of the Plan that was sent to all
bidder's [affirmative action] program, and any other standards or criteria by which the
acceptability of such a program will be judged." Id. at 670.
51
 For another example, the Nixon administration's pursuit of executive
hegemony at the expense of congressional purpose made a victim of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, also a child of the Johnson era. See, I SCHELL. THE TIME OF
ILLUSION 298-301 (1970) thereinafter cited as J. SCHELL].
55
 See, e.g., Dobbins v. Local 212, 1BEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969), eerl. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
" See, e.g., Quarks v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519-20 (E.D.Va.
1968).
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969),
5" Id. at 1053.
"" A Labor Department official who participated in that jump described the
influence of these decisions as follows:
Federal courts already had begun to fashion orders in employment dis-
crimination cases which went beyond relief for those specifically discrimi-
nated against. The orders required employers found guilty of discrimina-
tion to hire in accordance with a set ratio of whites to blacks, whether or
not new black applicants had suffered discrimination. Thus was introduced
a group rights concept antithetical to traditional notions of individual merit
and responsibility.
Silberman, The Road To Racial Quotas, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1977, at 12, col. 4 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Silberman].-
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agency heads on June 27, 1169,"' required construction contractors wishing
to bid on federally-assisted projects in the Philadelphia area to submit an "ac-
ceptable affirmative action program which shall include specific goals of
minority manpower utilization, meeting the standards included in the invita-
tion or other solicitation for bids."" The Plan incorporated findings of dis-
crimination by Philadelphia area building trade unions in admission and re-
ferral of minorities which had resulted in low minority representation in
seven crafts." To remedy this discrimination by unions, the Department of
Labor planned to develop "definite standards" that would "specify the range
of minority manpower utilization expected for each of the designated trades,"
which the "specific goals" of the contractors' affirmative action plans would
have to meet if the contractors wished to he eligible for the award of a con-
tract."' The Plan further provided that it was "no excuse" if the union with
"' The complete text of the Memorandum setting forth the revised Philadel-
phia Plan is reprinted at 1 15 Cow.. REC. 39951 (1969).
112 Id
" 3
 The seven crafts were iron workers, plumbers/pipefitters, steamfitters,
sheet metal workers, electrical workers, roofers/water proofers, and elevator construc-
tion workers. The unions in these trades were found to have had "about 1.6 percent
minority group membership." Id.
"4 Id. The full text of section 6 of the Plan, which dealt with "specific goals"
and "definite standards" provided as follows:
6. Specific Goals and Definite Standards:
a. General. The OFCC Area Coordinator, in cooperation with the
Federal contracting or administering agencies in the Philadelphia area, will
determine the definite standards to be included in the invitation for bids or
other solicitation used for every Federally-involved construction contract in
the Philadelphia area, when the estimated total cost of the construction
project exceeds $500,000. Such definite standards shall specify the range of
minority manpower utilization expected for each of the designated trades
to he used during the performance of the construction contract. To be
eligible for the award of the contract, the bidder must, in the affirmative
action program submitted with his bid, set specific goals of minority man-
power utilization which meet the definite standard included in the invita-
tion or other solicitation for bids unless the bidder participates in an
affirmative action program approved by OFCC.
h. Specific Goals.
(1) The setting of goals by contractors to provide equal employment
opportunity is required by Section 60-1.40 of the Regulations of this Office
(41 CFR	 60-1.40). Further, such voluntary organization of' businessmen
• as Plans for Progress have adopted this sound approach to equal opportu-
nity just as they have used goals and targets for guiding their other busi-
ness decisions. (See the Plans for Progress booklet Affirmative Action
Guidelines on page 6.)
(2) 'The purpose of the contractor's commitment to specific goals is to
meet the contractor's affirmative action obligations and is not intended and
shall not be - used to discriminate against any qualified applicant or
employee.
c. Factors Used in Determining Definite Standards. A determination of the
definite standard of the range of minority manpower utilization shall be
made for each better-paid trade to be used in the performance of the con-
tract. In determining the range of minority manpower utilization that
should result from an effective affirmative action program, the factors to
be considered will include, among others, the following:
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which the contractor had a collective bargaining agreement failed or refused
to refer minorities and that non-complying contractors would be subject to the
full range of sanctions under Executive Order 11246.' 5
On August 5, 1969, the Comptroller General issued an opinion to the
Secretary of Labor in which he found that the Philadelphia Plan contravened
Title VII by requiring contractors to select employees solely on the basis of
race or national origin. 66 In so finding, the Comptroller General expressly
considered and rejected arguments that Congress had implicitly approved this
sort of "affirmative action" in Title VII" and that the Philadelphia Plan was
consistent. with the remedial measures that had been approved in recent court
decisions." In short, the opinion concluded that the Plan required of federal
contractors precisely the sort of discrimination that Title VII had been in-
tended to prohibit.""
(1) The current extent of' minority group participation in the trade.
(2) The availability of minority group persons for employment in
such trade.
(3) The need for training programs in the area and/or the need to
assure demand for those in or from existing training programs.
(4) The impact of the program upon the existing labor force.
Id.
" Id. at 39952. These included suspension or cancellation of existing con-
tracts, blacklisting, and debarment. Exec, Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 343 (1965),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 1234 (1976).
"" 49 Comp, Gen. 59 (1969).
" 7 Id. at 70-71.
"' Id. at 70.
"" The Comptroller General, it is also worth noting, made short work of the
specious distinction sought to he drawn between "goals" and "quotas":
The recital in section 6b.2 of the order (and in the prescribed form of
notice to he included in the invitation) that the contractor's commitment "is
not intended and shall not be used to discriminate against any qualified
applicant or employee" is in our opinion the statement of a practical im-
possibility. If, for example, a contractor requires 20 plumbers and is com-
mitted to a goal of employment of at least five from minority gr oups. every
nomninority applicant for employment in excess of 15 would, solely by
reason of his race or national origin, he prejudiced in his opportunity fOr
employment, because the contractor is committed to make every effort to
employ five applicants from minority groups.
In your Solicitor's memorandum it is argued that the "straw man' .
sometimes used in opposition to the Plan is that it "would require a con-
tractor to discriminate against a better qualified white craftsman in favor of
a less qualified black." We believe this obscures the point involved, since it
introduces the element of skill or competence, whereas the essential ques-
tion is whether the Plan would require the contractor to select a black
craftsman over an equally qualified white one. We see no room for doubt
that the contractor in the situation posed above would believe he would he
expected to employ the black applicant, at least until he had reached his
goal of five nonminority group employees, and that if he failed to achieve
that goal his employment of a white craftsman when an equally qualified
black one was available could be considered a failure to use "every good
faith effort." In our view such preferential status or treatment would con-
stitute discrimination against the white worker solely on the basis of color.
and therefore would be contrary to the express prohibition both of the
Civil Rights Act and of the Executive order.
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On September 22, 1969, then Attorney General John Mitchell rushed to
the defense of the Philadelphia Plan." His analysis began with the proposi-
tion that although the Executive's power to determine the terms to be in-
cluded in federal contracts was limited by the Constitution and acts of Con-
gress, "the existence of such power does not depend upon an affirmative
legislative enactment." 71
 In other words, Mitchell reached his conclusion that
the Plan was legal through reasoning grounded in a conception of govern-
ment that was to become a hallmark of the Nixon administration and to play
no small role in its ultimate undoing. Essentially, that conception held that
those powers not expressly denied the Executive by the Constitution or the
Congress were reserved to the Executive and could be exercised freely by it.
Attorney General Mitchell emphasized that contractors were required
under the Plan only to make "every good faith effort" to attain the set numer-
ical goals and were expresSly forbidden to "discriminate against any qualified
applicant or employee" in doing so. He thus found no inconsistency between
the Plan and Title VII." "Unless it can be demonstrated that the hiring
goals cannot be achieved without unlawful discrimination," he opined, "I fail
to see why the Government is not permitted to require a pledge of good faith
efforts to meet them as a condition for the award of contracts.""
The day after Attorney General Mitchell's opinion was released, the As-
sistant Secretary of Labor for Wage and Labor Standards and the Director of
the OFCC issued an order, announcing that a hearing had been held in late
August for the purpose of obtaining data relevant to the establishment of
"ranges" for appropriate levels of minority manpower utilization under the
Philadelphia Plan, and of setting forth the ranges for each of six crafts."
Based on projected vacancies, the predetermined ranges were said to have
been set so that "the lower range figure may be met by filling vacancies and
new jobs approximately on the basis of one minority craftsman for each
non-minority craftsman." 75
 This, however, rather significantly misrep-
Id. at 68. See also Silberman, SUPla note 60 arid Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp.. 563 F.2d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1977), reu'd sub 'Join. United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
7 " 42 OP. ATT'y GEN. 405 (1969).
" Id. at 409. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
585 (1952). For an excellent discussion of the proposition that the Nixon administra-
tion's policies were grounded not merely in such a relatively subtle shift in the balance
of power among the branches, but in outright rejection of the rule of law itself, see P.
KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CoNsTrruTioN 202-04 (1978) [hereinafter cited as P.
KURLAND].
73 42 OP. ATT'Y GEN. at 412.
73 Id. at 412-13 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Although Attorney
General Mitchell was quite firm in his position that there was nothing wrong with the
Philadelphia Plan in theory, he did seem willing to concede that problems might arise
from abuses in practice. Id. at 414.
" The text of the order is reprinted at 115 CoNG. Rnc. 39953 (1969). The
seventh craft, roofers and water proofers, was "temporarily excepted" from the
Philadelphia Plan because the Department of Labor had "determined that minority
craftsmen may be adequately represented in the classification." Id.
75 hi. at 39955. This level was justified on the grounds that "[t]he one for one
ratio in hiring has been judicially recognized as a reasonable, if not mandatory, re-
18	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1
resented the situation, at least in terms of the express provision of the Plan,
for all but the first of the four years over which the standards were to apply.
Even those contractors whose first year "good faith efforts" 71i produced results
within, but at or near the bottom of, the appropriate range had to hire be-
tween 50 percent and 100 percent minorities during the following year to stay
within the appropriate range." Those who failed, however legitimately, to
reach the minimum goal for one year faced the cumulative pressure of the
quiremeni to remedy past exclusionary practices." Id. at 39955 n.5, citing Vogler v.
McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Stipp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967), afrd sub nom., Local 53, Intl Ass'n
of Heat & Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969). Neither the district court nor the court of appeals decision in the cited case
mention anything about quota-type relief being "a reasonable, if not mandatory, re-
quirement." The district court did issue a temporary one-for-one quota to be applied
to union membership admissions until objective standards for membership could be
developed and ihe court of appeals found that this did not "constitute an abuse of
discretion." 407 F.2c1 at 1055.
7 " Perhaps in response to the potential difficulties John Mitchell had per-
ceived in leaving "good faith efforts" undefined (see text and note at 73 supra), the
order expressly provided criteria by which the bona fides of contractors' efforts were
to be measured. 115 CONG. REC. 39955 (1969).
" Taking into account. a 2.5% national average annual attrition due to re-
tirement, a 1% national average disability rate resulting from disability or death, and a
4% "conservative estimate" of the average annual rate of attrition for reasons not re-
lated to death, injury or retirement, the order calculated an aggregate 7.5% non-
growth related annual vacancy rate. Id. at 39954. This figure was added to the pro-
jected "annual growth rate" for each of the six crafts to come up with the following
annual vacancy rates stated as per'centages of total jobs:
Ironworkers 	 11.2
Plumbers and Pipefitters 	 10.4
Steamfitters 	 10
Sheetmetal workers   9.5
Electrical workers 	 9.7
Elevator construction workers 	 9.6
Id. The ranges of minority manpower utilization set by the order for each of the four
years of the Plan were as follows:
1970
Ironworkers
	
5-9
Plumbers and pipe-
fitters 	 5-8
Steamfitters 	 5-8
Sheetmetal workers 	 4-8
Electrical workers 	 4-8
Elevator contruction workers 	 4-8
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deficit for that year and the minimal goal of five percent for the following
year. 78
1971
Ironworkers 	 11-15
Plumbers and pipe-
fitters 	 10-14
Steamfitters 
	
11-15
Sheetmetal workers 	 9-13
Electrical workers 	 9-13
Elevator construction 'workers 
	 9-13
1972
Ironworkers 	 16-20
Plumbers and pipelitters 	 15-19
Steamfitters 	 15-19
Sheetmetal workers 	 14-18
Electrical workers 
	
14-18
Elevator construction workers 
	
14-18
1973
I ronworkers
	 22-26
Plumbers and pipefitters 
	
20-24
Steamfitters 	 20-24
Sheetmetal workers 	 19-23
Electrical workers 	 19-23
Elevator construction workers
	
19-23
Id. at 39955. The range of minority hiring that was required, in 1971, for instance, of
contractors whose minority hiring had reached, without exceeding the minimal level in
1970 was as follows:
Ironworkers 	 53- 89%
Plumbers and pipefitters 	 48-. 87%
Steamfitters 	 60-100%
Sheet metal workers 	 53- 95%
Electrical workers 	 52- 93%
Elevator construction workers 	 52- 94%
" For example, a contractor who was able to raise its percentage of minority
ironworkers to, say, 3% (more than double the percentage of 1969 minority union
members) in 1970, had a deficit of 2% to make up and an additional minimal goal of
6% that had to he reached in 1971. In other words, to stay within the appropriate
range, the contractor had to hire sufficient minorities in 1971 to comprise 8% of its
ironworker workforce. Assuming a vacancy rate of 11,2%, this meant that approxi-
mately 71% of anticipated vacancies had to be filled with minorities if they were avail-
able.
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These remarkable developments did not escape the notice of certain
members of Congress, most notably Senator Sam Ervin. Senator Ervin was
profoundly disturbed by the Philadelphia Plan, and on October 27, 1969, he
convened hearings on the matter before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers, of which he was Chairman." In his opening
statement Senator Ervin expressed the Subcommittee's intention to "examine
the Plan as it relates to the doctrine of separation of powers and try to deter-
mine whether the Labor Department has usurped Congressional authority
and violated legislative intent." "" In the same statement, Senator Ervin ex-
pressed his opinion that the Plan violated both the letter and the spirit of
Title VII and that even if the end were desirable, the means could not be
justified. Citing an earlier statement by former OFCC director Edward G.
Sylvester to the effect that. "affirmative action is anything you have to do to
get results,""' the Senator left, no doubt that he clearly saw the danger posed
by this "emphasis on results at the expense of procedure." 82
 "For if we are
lax today in adhering to the law," he asked pointedly, "what may happen
tomorrow when that practice is adopted by those who would subvert proce-
dure to their own evil purposes.'
Senator Ervin and a substantial number of his colleagues regarded the
Administration's actions on the Philadelphia Plan to have been usurpations of
power in at least two respects. First, as already mentioned, the Plan was
thought to require of federal contractors what Congress, through Title VII,
had expressly forbidden them to do." Second, they saw an even more direct
challenge to congressional power in Attorney General Mitchell's denial of the
Comptroller General's authority to declare the Philadelphia Plan unlawful."
The Attorney General's posture in this regard was in open defiance of con-
gressional enactments conferring on the Comptroller General the authority to
determine whether "financial transactions have been consummated in accord-
ance with laws, regulations or other legal requirements,"" and further pro-
viding that "[b]alances certified by the General Accounting Office, upon the
settlement of public accounts, shall he final and conclusive upon the Executive
Branch of the Government" 87
 In response to both threats, the Senate added
a rider to the supplemental appropriations bill" that expressly proscribed
• BNA Daily Labor Report No. 200, A-I1 (Oct. 27, 1969).
• Opening Statement of Senator Ervin, 115 CONG. REC. 32671 (1969).
"t See text at note 51 supra.
M2 115 CoNG, REC.. at 32671.
83 hi .
" Irl. .See also 115 CONG. REG. 39964-66 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClel-
lan). Senator Ervin also asserted that the Philadelphia Plan was unlawful because it
required contractors to unilaterally alter their collective bargaining agreements in vio-
lation of the Taft-Hartley Act. 115 CONG. Rix:. 39122-23 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Ervin).
M5 115 CONG. REC. 32672, 39949-50 (remarks of Senator Ervin), 90013-39
(documentary materials submitted by Senator Byrd) (1969).
• U.S.C. § 65(d) (1976).
" 31 U.S.C.	 74 (1976). For the major arguments on this issue, see 115
CONG. REC. 40013-30 (1969) (documentary materials submitted by Senator Byrd).
"" H.R. 15209, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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dispensing funds to finance any contract or agreement deemed unlaWful by
the Comptroller General. as
 The magnitude of the issues raised by Attorney
General Mitchell's expansive notion of executive power was clearly perceived
by the proponents of the rider. In its Report on the rider, Senate Appro-
priations Committee declared: "The Committee wishes to emphasize that the
basic issue here is the Constitutional authority of the Congress itself."""
The supplemental appropriations bill, with the rider, passed the Senate
without a single vote cast in opposition."' Since there were a number of
differences between the Senate and House versions (including the rider,
which was omitted from the House version), the bills then went to conference.
In the face of a presidential veto threat," 2
 the Senate reversed itself and voted
"" The rider was known as the "Fannin rider" because it had originally been
introduced by Senator Paul Fannin. S. 931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). It became
section 904 of the Senate version of the Supplemental Appropriations Bill and pro-
vided as f011ows:
Sec. 904, In view of and in confirmation of the authority invested in
the Comptroller General of the United States by the Budget. and Account-
ing Act of 1921, as amended, no part of the funds appropriated or other-
wise made available by this or any other Act shall be available to finance,
either directly or through any Federal aid or grant, any contract or agree-
ment which the Comptroller General of the United States holds to be in
contravention of any Federal statute.
115 CONG. REC. 40013 (remarks of Senator Byrd) (1969). This language was amended
to insert at the end:
Provided, That this section shall not be construed as affecting or limiting in
any way the jurisdiction or the scope of judicial review of any Federal court
in connection with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended,
or any other Federal law.
Id. at 39969, vote on amendment recorded at 39975.
"" S. REP. No, 91-616, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in pertinent part al,
115 CONG. REC. 40013 (1969). A member of the Senate Appropriations Committee
Staff also bluntly stated his position.
While it is true that the basic issue arises from the desire of the Execu-
tive Department to encourage, and possibly compel, the hiring of more
members of minority groups by Government contractors, and at the same
time encourage, and possibly compel, the craft unions to admit to member-
ship more members of minority groups. these objectives are secondary to
the basic question presented: Whether the Congress—acting through its
agent, the Comptroller General—has or does not have the final authority
to determine the legality of obligating or expending appropriated funds.
The question presented must necessarily be answered in the affirma-
tive. To say otherwise is to deny the constitutional authority of Congress
over appropriated funds and Outs limit the congressional function to sim-
ply approving or disapproving budget estimates submitted by the Executive
Branch.
115 CONG. Rec. 40013.
"' The vote was 74 yeas and no nays, with 26 senators not voting. 115 CONC.
REC. 40039.
"= President Nixon issued a statement on December 22, 1969, articulating his
position on the rider. 115 CONC.. REC. 40738 (1969).
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to recede "" from its insistence on the rider, in part because it was argued that.
the question was better left to the courts, in part because a veto would have
resulted in a number of federal employees not getting paid, in part because
there were fourteen federal contracts then in existence in the Philadelphia
area that would have been cancelled, and in part because the senators were
eager to get home for Christmas." 4 During debate on the motion to recede,
it was Senator McClellan who provided the appropriate headline to herald the
event: "Congress Abdicates —The Senate Surrenders."" Senator Hruska had
predicted that allowing the rider to fail would provide a "go ahead signal" to
the Nixon administration, which would "he just piling up and adding to our
troubles and our difficulties.""'' He hardly could have known how prophetic
those words were.
The executive had, in short, tested the mettle of the Congress. The ques-
tion directly posed was whether the legislative branch had the capacity to act
as a check on executive usurpations of legislative prerogatives. At stake, ulti-
mately, was the fundamental notion of separation of powers itself, the concept
employed by the Founding Fathers to prevent the accumulation of power, to
which Madison referred as the very definition of tyranny."' The Congress
had failed the test, clearing the way for the "imperial presidency" to march
on."" If there were to be limits, they would have to be provided by the
COLT rt.S.
At about the time that the Senate expressed its concern regarding the
Philadelphia Plan and the implications it raised, the Secretary of Labor was
promulgating "Order No. 4," which was to be the first step toward imple-
menting the numerical approach of the Philadelphia Plan on a truly national
scale. This Order, which was issued on November 20, 1969, was never pub-
•3 The vote in favor of recission was 39 to 29, with 27 senators not voting. Id.
at 40749.
" 4 See generally, id. at 40740-48.
" Id. in 40743.
" Id. at 40741.
"7 FEDERALIST No. 47, see FEDERAusT, note 10 .supra. Senator Ervin saw this
very clearly. He declared to his colleagues that:
It is clear to me that the Departments of Labor and Justice intend to
implement the Philadelphia Plan despite its illegality by whatever expedient
is nearest at hand. In doing so, they would effectively repeal sections of the
Taft Hartley Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921. Their actions are no more than legislation on
the part of the executive branch of the Government.
1 submit that we cannot allow the executive to be so cavalier with the
law. If' we do so, we shirk the constitutional responsibility of Congress to
maintain control over appropriations. 1 urge that the Senate take action to
remedy this grave violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
115 CONG. REC. 39126 (remarks of Senator Ervin) (1969).
"" The administration's challenge to the constitutional strength of the Con-
gress on the Philadelphia Plan also served as a prelude to further executive usurpa-
tions outside the employment area. Through Exec. Order No. 11605, President. Nixon
later used the same "game plan" to expand substantially the functions and powers of
the Subversive Activities Control Board, eliciting predictable objections from Senator
Ervin. 118 CONG. REC. 672-74 (remarks of Senator Ervin) (1972).
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lished, probably due to the furor then brewing in the Congress over the
Philadelphia Plan." It was also at this time that the Labor Department as-
sured Senator Ervin and other critics that "[On assuring equal employment
opportunity, no one fixed formula has yet been found suitable for every situa-
tion." 11 " The suggestion given by the Labor Department, of course, was that
although the numerical employment policy was necessary under the extreme
circumstances prevailing in the Philadelphia construction industry, there was
no reason to believe that it would he generally necessary or even appro-
priate. 10 '
Once Congress demonstrated its unwillingness to act as a check on ex-
pansive interpretations of executive power in this area, however, it was possi-
ble to "go public" with the next step, which Order No. 4 embodied. Thus, on
January '30, 1970, a new Order No. 4 was issued, and this time it was pub-
lished in the Federal Register.'" This Order extended the obligation for
development of an "affirmative action program" to all non-construction con-
tractors in the country with 50 or more employees and contracts of $50,000
or more. As part of this requirement, contractors were made responsible for
"[i]dentification of problem areas (deficiencies)" and "[e]stablishment of goals
and objectives by organizational units and job category, including timetables
for completion."'" A "utilization analysis" was required, by which contrac-
tors were to determine whether they had "fewer minorities in a particular job
category than would reasonably be expected by their availability."1114 If .. un _
" The only mention of this Order I have been able to find is in the version
of "Revised Order No, 4" that superseded it on January 30, 1970. There, it simply
slated: "This is an amplificalion of and supersedes a previous 'Order No. 4' from this
Office dated November 20, 1969." 35 Fed. Reg. 2590 (1970). So far as I have been
able to determine, the original Order No. 4 was never released.
1 " Labor Department Statement, BNA Daily Labor Report No. 96, A-4 (Oct.
9, 1969). With respect to the Philadelphia Plan, the statement reads as follows:
* * *
3. The Government's basic overriding obligation is enforcement of equal employment
opporlunity.
The Department plans to pursue an insistent course toward this objec-
tive. There are, however, "many roads to Rome. - In assuring equal
employment opportunity no one fixed formula has yet been found suitable
for every situation. So while undeviating in its objective the Department
must be flexible in its methods.
A method like the Philadelphia Plan has one major virtue. It is
definitive—it provides a specific way to measure compliance with the obli-
gations of Federal construction contractors in a city.
Id.
"" In his statement to the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Secretary of
Labor Shultz emphasized that. conditions prevailing in the construction industry jus-
tified "special measures." Statement of Secretary Schultz, reprinted in BNA Daily Labor
Report No. 209, F-I (Oct. 28, 1969). In this regard, the Secretary was echoing the
"findings" that had been set forth in the Philadelphia Plan itself. See 115 CONG. REC.
39951 (Revised Philadelphia Plan) (1969).
102 35 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970).
"3 Id. at 2588.
1 " 4 Id. at 2587.
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derutilization" were found,' 15 then the contractor had to set "measurable and
obtainable" goals and timetables to eliminate the "deficiencies."'" The pur-
pose of affirmative action, it was stated, was "to increase materially the utiliza-
tion of minorities at all levels and in all segments of [the contractor's] work
force where deficiencies exist."'" Nevertheless, the Order directed that
"[gloats may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met, but must
be targets reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith effort
to make all aspects of the entire affirmative action program work."'"
Clearly, Order No. 4 represented several major steps beyond the
Philadelphia Plan. Instead of a limited use of the numerical employment pol-
icy as a "special measure" to meet the unique problems of a limited, local
situation, the Department of Labor had announced that it would employ the
policy on a grand scale as standard operating procedure throughout the na-
tion with a potentially enormous impact on the economy and the labor mar-
ket.'" In addition to the vastly expanded scope, where the Philadelphia Plan
ostensibly had been aimed at correcting the effects of actual unlawful dis-
crimination, Order No. 4 abandoned any pretense that discrimination needed
to have occurred, and substituted disproportional representation as a suffi-
cient criterion to trigger the obligation to adopt "goals and timetables." Al-
though lip-service was still paid to "equal employment opportunity,"'") the em-
phasis unquestionably had shifted to equality of outcome.'"
"5 Actually, "tinderutilization -
 was only one of several factors that made "spe-
cial corrective-action -
 appropriate. Others included disparate selection of minorities fO•
hiring, promotion or transfer (apparently regardless of any legitimate business reason
for the disparity): "[titian specifications'' or test forms that had not been validated in a
manner regarded as acceptable to OFCC (apparently regardless of whether disparate
selection rates were thereby produced): and "[s]eniority provisions [that contributed] to
overt or inadvertent discrimination. i.e., a racial disparity exists between length of ser-
vice and types of jobs held. - Id. al 2589.
roa
' 07
 hi. at 2587.
'" Id. at 2589.
11111
 It has been estimated that in 1974 as many as 40% (approximately 40 mil-
lion) of all workers were employed by institutions subject to the Executive Order pro-
gram. U. S. Comm's: ox Ctvtt. RIGHTS, 5 THE FEDERAL. CIVIL, Ricwrs EFFORT— 1974 at
230 (1975). Other commentators have estimated that fully 50% of' all firms employing
100 or more workers came under the Executive Orders. Goldstein & Smith, The Esti-
mated Impact of the Antidiscrimination Program Aimed at Federal Contracts, 29 !Nuns. LA R,
REL. Rey. 523, 524 (1976).
' 11
 35 Fed. Reg. 2588 (1970) (emphasis added).
11
 Indeed, Order No. 4 in certain respects abandoned equality of opportunity
altogether in favor of preferential treatment. In executing its "affirmative action pro-
gram,-
 a contractor was urged to take sonic steps that would benefit exclusively mem-
bers of minority groups:
(8) Special employment programs should be undertaken whenever- possible.
Sonic possible programs are:
(i) Technical and nontechnical co-op programs with the predominately
Negro colleges.
(ii) "After' school-
 and/or work-study jobs for minority youths.
(iii) Summer jobs for underprivileged youth.
(iv) Summer work-study programs for faculty members of the predomi-
nately minority schools and colleges.
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The next major contribution to the development of the numerical
employment. policy, albeit an indirect one, came in the form of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."' Handed down on March 8,
1971, the decision contributed to the growing momentum of the numerical
policy in at least two ways. First, it endorsed an approach to the allocation of
the burden of proof in Title VII cases that itself had a numerical focus. In
essence, the unanimous Court)" held that when a facially neutral employ-
ment test produces a racially disparate impact, that is, affects adversely grea-
ter proportionate numbers of one racial group than another, then the
employer has the often impossibly heavy burden of demonstrating a statistical
correlation to job performance." 4
 To some, this was tantamount to a decla-
ration that "numerical standards arc an appropriate tool." 15 The second
way in which Griggs advanced the cause of numerical employment was in its
holding that the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures were
entitled to "great deference."'" Just as the congressional failure to stop the
Philadelphia Plan opened the door to further expansions of executive power,
the Court appeared to be stepping aside to permit the agencies to take a
creative (i.e., expansive) approach to the vindication of interests embodied in
employment discrimination legislation. Not surprisingly, this contributed sig-
nificantly to the already substantial head of steam the EEOC and OFCC had
acquired.
Despite its expansive nature, however, the Griggs decision also contained
language calculated to establish limits on the principles it advanced. Signifi-
cantly, the Court, made it quite clear that the decision should not be taken as
an endorsement of the numerical employment policy. The Court stated that.
Title VII prohibits discriminatory preference for any group, and does not re-
quire that any person be hired "simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.- 117
(v) Motivation, training and employment programs for the hardcore un-
employed.
35 Fed. Reg. 2590.
112
 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
113 ch. e ,, ,r Justice Burger wrote (he opinion for an eight man Court. Justice
Brennan did not participate. Id. at 436.
114
 The r`Cae .... , 01.11 . 1 described the employer's burden as follows:
The Act proscribes not only Overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot he shown to be related to job perfOrmance, the practice is prohi-
bited,
/d. at 431. The Court in Griggs did not actually specify precisely the proof that
employers would have to produce in order to carry this burden because Duke Power
Co. had not produced any evidence on this score at all. Four years later, the Court
would provide a good deal more specific: inl'ormation regarding the rigorous statistical
proof to which defendants in "disparate impact - cases were to be put. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
"15 Blumrosen„Strangers In Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept if
Employment Discrimination, 71 Micrt. 1,, REv. 59, 106 (1972) [hereinafter cited at Blum-
rosen, Strangers].
"" 401 U.S. at 433-34. But see General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
140-46 (1976).
17
 401 U.S. at 430-31. See text at note 259 infra.
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Nevertheless, in another less than obvious way, Griggs provided a sig-
nificant element that would help to form the foundation upon which the
Weber decision ultimately could be built. Griggs represented a radical and un-
necessary departure from traditional jurisprudential concepts. It abandoned
intent as a necessary element in the proof of discrimination cases and substi-
tuted a mere showing of numerical disparity. This in itself' is unremarkable,
since numerical disparity, especially of the magnitude involved in Griggs
where the exclusion of minorities had been absolute, ordinarily would imply
foreseeability. The legal concept of' "intent" long has been thought to embrace
not just a specific desire to cause a certain result., but also the necessary con-
sequences of one's actions, regardless of the subjective frame of mind.'"
What was revolutionary about the Griggs decision, however, was the imposi-
tion on defendants of a burden of producing evidence on the narrow issue of
the relationship between the employment practice and job performance. Had
more traditional notions obtained, an employer defendant would have sus-
tained its burden of production by coming forward with any evidence that
might tend to rebut the inference of an intention to discriminate raised by a
numerical disparity.' 19
To justify its embarkation upon this new and theretofore unanticipated
approach to the allocation of the burden of production, the Court first had to
get around section 703(h) of Title VII, 120 which, on its face, immunized
employer actions based upon a "professionally developed ability test" that was
not "designed, intended or used to discriminate. - To that end, the Court
employed an unabashedly revisionist analysis of the legislative history of Title
VII. 121 By thus creating a wholly new legal standard via a thinly veiled, ma-
See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 31-32 (4th ed. 1971). See also J. SALmoNn,
juiuspkenENcE 369-71 (12th ed. P. Fitzgerald 1966). Indeed, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have adopted the use of a "constructive intent" concept under certain limited
circumstances in cases charging discrimination in violation of the fifth or fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
"" For example, one might offer evidence that one had acted out of a legiti-
mate (i.e., nondiscriminatory) motive, much as one now can do in "disparate treat-
ment" cases. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12 " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
121
 During the debates on Title VII there was considerable discussion of an
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission decision which ordered a company to
stop administering'a general intelligence test to prospective employees on the grounds
that it was culturally biased and obsolete. 110 CONG. REC. 5664 (1964). Several
Senators uniformly expressed their disapproval of this case. Id. at 5614-16.(Senator
Bruin), 5999-6000 (Senator Smothers), 9025-26 (Senator Talmadge), 9034-35 (Senator
Stennis), 9599 (Senator Fulbright), 13503 (Senator Case), 13504 (Senator Miller).
Senator Case, one of the bill's co-managers, attempted to deflect the criticism by stat-
ing that, "no court could read Title VII as requiring an employer to lower or change
the occupational qualification he sets for his employees simply because fewer Negroes
than Whites are able to meet them." Id. at 6416. See also id. at 7213. Because sonic
Senators remained nevertheless unsatisfied an amendment containing what is now the
language of § 703(h) was passed to meet this perceived problem.
Against this legislative background, the Griggs Court reasoned: "From the sum of
the legislative history relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that the
EEOC's construction of § 703(h) to require that employment tests be job related com-
ports with congressional intent." 401 U.S. at 436. At no time in the debates on Title
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nipulative reading of legislative history, the Griggs decision sowed some of the
seed from which the Weber decision ultimately would grow. 122
Just six weeks after Griggs was decided, the Third Circuit passed on the
legality of the Philadelphia Plan in Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v.
Secretary of Labor.'" It found that the Plan did not violate Title VII, the
National Labor Relations Act, Executive Order 11246, or the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Central to the court's conclusions
were its findings that "[s]ome minority tradesmen could he recruited ... with-
VII, it should be pointed out, did anyone state or even suggest that the key to the
legitimacy of the test involved in the :11otorola case was its job relatedness. Seeking an
explanation for the Supreme Coon's extraordinary reading of the controlling legisla-
tive history, one commentator has offered the following assessment:
All that can.hc said with certainty about the legislative history of Title
VII is that most legislators accepted the notion that general intelligence or
aptitude tests were nearly always pertinent considerations for determining
. job performance. Current psychometric learning refutes this premise, and
the Supreme Court was therefore presented a difficult problem in Griggs.
Confronted with a situation in which Congress debated and resolved the
issue on au invalid assumption, the Court had two basic alternatives. It
could carry out the legislative intent, no matter how ill-conceived it has
been shown to he; or it could seek to harmonize the statute with current
scientific opinion, either by distorting the legislative history as it did in
Griggs or by attempting to choose a course that the legislature would have
followed had they possessed the correct information. The latter courses of
action must be premised on the assumption that general statutory provi-
sions or legislative intent may override specific provisions designed to cover
the case presented, an argument that flies in the face of established princi-
ples of statutory interpretation. Such an approach is difficult to justify.
Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations -
 on Job Testing, Dis-
oimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. 1.. REV. 844, 857-58 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Wilson].
122
 It may well he that license taken in the decisional technique of Griggs, the
Ivay the decision has been cited as an endorsement of the numerical employment pol-
icy. or both, account for the recent appearance of signs of dissatisfaction with the
decision on the Court, In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), for
example. justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, seemed to go out of his way to
declare:
It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to pro-
vide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without
regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already proportion-
ately represented in the work force. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
at 430; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co„ 427 U.S. 273, 279
(1976).
438 U.S. at 579. Perhaps even more significantly the Court recently affirmed summar-
ily the decision of a three :judge district court that had declined to strictly adhere to
the Griggs standard, proceeding instead along the lines of a more classical "intent'
analysis. United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Stipp. 1094, 1113 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd
sub nom., National Education Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). It may
also be that some dissatisfaction with Griggs and its progeny stems from recognition of
the fact that from an economic perspective, the theory of these cases is unsound. See gener-
ally Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, The Law andiTitle VI!. An
Economist's View, 54 Notre Dame I... 633 (1979). All this may well presage a move to
circumscribe Griggs or even overrule it outright.
' 2" 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854.
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out eliminating job opportunities for white tradesmen, - 124 and that exclusion
from the available labor pool of minority tradesmen is likely to have an ad-
verse effect upon the cost and completion of construction projects in which
the federal government is interested."'" Significantly, although the Comp-
troller General's opinion finding the Plan to contravene Tide VII was men-
tioned by the Third Circuit, 12 " the separation of powers issue was not dis-
cussed. ' 27
 It is ironic that the Senate defeated the rider which would have
sustained the Comptroller General's opinion, in part. at least, on the grounds
that the binding effect of these opinions on the executive branch should be
left. to the courts. 12" The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, although con-
cerned with a quite different issue, clearly influenced the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Contractor's Ass'n. 12 "
Also, at about this time, a number of events were forming the political
backdrop for the next major steps in the development of the numerical
124 Id. at 173.
125 Id. at 175. This point provided an important basis for the court's conclusion
that the Plan fell within the ambit of the President's power to pursue "[Out federal
interest ... in maximum availability of construction tradesmen for the projects in
which the federal government has a cost and completion interest." Id. at 177. The
court did not address and there is no evidence that it considered whether presidential
power to protect the Government's "cost and completion interest" would shield from
attack executive actions that would foreseeably increase the bottom line cost compo-
nent of federal contracts.
' 26
 hi. at 165.
127 It might be said that, by implication, the matter was resolved in favor of the
executive branch, because the court did reach the following conclusion:
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that the Philadelphia Plan
is valid, and the President has continued to acquiesce in the interpretation
of the Executive Order made by his designee. The Labor Department in-
terpretation of' the affirmative action clause must, therefore, be deferred to
by the courts.
Id, at 175 (footnote omitted). The court also concluded, contrary to the Comptroller
General's opinion, that the Philadelphia Plan did not conflict with Title VII. Neverthe-
less, the question of whether the Comptroller General as the agent of the Congress
had the power to make determinations that were binding on the executive—the broad
question that the defeated rider of just over a year earlier had posed—was never
mentioned. Sec notes 71-86 supra, and accompanying text.
12 " See notes 81-84 supra, and accompanying text.
"" The Third Circuit cited the Griggs opinion in support of the former's con-
clusion that §§ 703(h) and (j) were "limitation[s] only upon Title VII, not upon any
other remedies." 442 F.2d at 172. It was mentioned that the Supreme Court in Griggs
had recently construed the portion of § 703(h) having to do with employment tests
and had fOcused upon the "consequence of employment practices, not simply the moti-
vation." Id at 172 n.46, quoting, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(emphasis in original). From this the Third Circuit concluded, apparently through
symmetry of reasoning, that "[n]or can seniority make permanent the effects of past
discrimination. -
 442 E2d at 172 n.46. Subsequent events have shown that, at least in
this last respect, the Third Circuit. was in error. See Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977) where the court stated. "lWie hold that an
otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title
VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." See also United Air
Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (seniority system that perpetuates effects of dis-
crimination not made the subject of a timely charge is not a violation).
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employment policy. By mid-1971, much of the energy and attention of the
Nixon administration, quite naturally had begun to be devoted to the 1972
election. One of the principal concepts to emerge from the planning sessions
of this period was the strategy of dividing the Democratic party. One observer
has described this phenomenon in terms that demonstrate its relevance here:
"With respect to some issues, the formula was simple: the more division the
better. Race was one of these, and the President seemed quite willing to pre-
cipitate a constitutional crisis in order to divide the nation sufficiently."'"
Out of this atmosphere emerged "Revised Order No. 4,"' 3 ' issued on De-
cember 1, 1971. The Revised Order retained the "utilization analysis" and
"goals and timetables" concepts in an essentially unchanged form. 132 The
most significant change, however, was the introduction of an "affected class"
concept.'" This innovation was presented as follows:
Relief' for members of an "affected class" who, by virtue of past
discrimination, continue to suffer the present effects of that dis-
crimination must either be included in the com.ractor's affirmative
action program or he embodied in a separate written "corrective ac-
tion" program. An "affected class" problem must be remedied in
order for a contractor to be considered in compliance.'
Revised Order No. 4 provided no further definition of "affected class" nor a
description of what it would take to remedy an " 'affected class' problem." It
did make it quite clear, however, that failure to do whatever one was sup-
posed to do about an "affected class" could result in the familiar sanctions of
termination, suspension or debarment. 1"5
In late 1971 and early 1972, the Congress again became concerned with
these matters through its consideration of bills that were to become the 1972
13" J. Shell, supra note 54, at 216. The same observer also described another
ominous aspect of the Nixon administration's manipulative approach to government:
The law was already well on its way to being restyled as all instrument for
punishing political enemies. Now federal funding was being diverted to the
same purpose. By late 1971, in other words, the federal government was
being transformed into a machine for punishing and rewarding the whole
American people.
Id. at 191.
131 36 Fed. Reg. 23152 (1971). The present version of Revised Order No. 4 is
codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1979). One thing that Revised Order No. 4 did was to
extend coverage 10 women, who had been left unmentioned in Order No. 4, not-
withstanding the fact that the omission of women from Executive Order No. 11246
itself had been remedied four years earlier in Executive Order No. 11375. January 17.
1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 744 (1969). See also text of note 50 supra.
132
 36 Fed. Reg. 23153.
1 '3
 Other new provisions included a requirement that the work force analysis
he conducted separately for minorities and women, using sonic slightly different fac-
tors in the analysis for each. Id. at 23153-54. Contractors were also put on notice that
"separate goals and timetables . ' for a particular minority group or one sex might be
required if there were found to be "a substantial disparity in the utilization of a par-
ticular minority group or men or women of a particular minority group." Id. at 23154.
"4 Id. at 23153.
133
 These sanctions had been introduced in Executive Order No. 11246. See
note 65 supra.
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amendments to Title VII.'' 11
 Since some have found support for the numer-
ical employment policy in what was clone or, more to the point, what was not
done with respect to this legislation,'" some consideration of the amendments
is necessary. Two of the significant questions raised by the movement to
amend Title VII were whether the EEOC should be given enforcement pow-
ers' and whether all enforcement efforts, including the OFCC's kderal con-
tractors program, should be consolidated in the EEOC." In the House,
essentially two bills were considered. The first was H.R. 1746, 141  which had
been reported out of the Committee on Education and Labor. It would have
empowered the EEOC to hold hearings and to issue cease-and-desist orders,
and it would have transferred to the EEOC all the authority and responsibility
of the Secretary of Labor under Executive Order 11246. 141 The original
Committee bill had been changed somewhat before it reached the floor by
amendments proposed by Congressman Dent, the chairman of the Labor
Subcommittee. These amendments, among other things, would have prohi-
bited the EEOC from "imposing or requiring a quota or preferential treat-
ment with respect to numbers of employees, or percentage of employees of
any race, color, religiOn, sex, or national origin." 142
The second bill considered by the House was an amendment in the na-
ture of a substitute offered by Congressman Erlenborn.' 43 The Erlenborn
substitute conferred enforcement power on the EEOC, but limited it to the
power to bring suit in federal court. There was, however, no provision in the
substitute for the consolidation of powers, and the restrictions of the Dent
amendment to the Committee bill also were omitted. It was the Erlenborn
substitute that prevailed, 144 and it was passed by the House. 145 This action
can hardly be said to evidence implicit approval of the Executive Order pro-
gram. To be sure, there was an occasional observation in the debate on the
Erlenborn substitute to the effect that the Dent amendment was intended to
eviscerate the Philadelphia Plan. 14" The principal issue before the House,
however, was whether administrative or judicial enforcement should be pre-
ferred and this point was emphasized repeatedly in the debate.'" Thus, the
'"" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. I.. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e el seq. (1970).
137 See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459,
467-68 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
n" In the original Act, the EEOC had been given investigatory and conciliatory
powers only. Enforcement actions, if any, were to be brought by the Attorney General
or private parties.
"" See generally 117 CONG. REC. 31718 (statements of Senators Williams and
Kennedy); id. at 31960-61 (remarks of Rep. Perkins) (1971).
14 " H.R. 1746, 92c1 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
" 1
 117 CONG. Rix. at 31960-61.
42 Id. at 31784.
11 " The text of the Erlenborn substitute appears at 117 CONG. REC. 31989-90.
1 " The substitute was adopted by a Committee of the Whole by a vote of 200
to 195 and the amendment of the bill was approved in the House by a vote of 202 to
197. Id. at 32111-12.
143 The amended bill passed by a vote of 285 to 106. Id. at 32113.
1 See, e.g., id. at 32100 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins).
147 See, e.g., id. at 32098. Representative Steiger remarked that, "This issue is
not the smokescreen of setting quotas and it is not the smokescreen of preferential
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rejection of the Committee bill with the Dent amendments, particularly in
light of the fact that the margin in favor of the Erlenborn substitute was a
mere five votes, 148 simply cannot be said to indicate approval of the Executive
Order program by a majority of the voting members.
Those who argue that the 1972 amendments somehow constituted im-
plied congressional approval of the numerical employment policy, although
generally conceding that events in the House were at best "ambiguous",
nevertheless seek support for their conclusion in the events that transpired in
the Senate.'" Principally, the argument derives from the disposition of cer-
tain amendments to the Senate bill (S. 2515) offered by Senator Ervin, who
doggedly continued to fight the usurpations of the executive branch. One
such amendment, designed to combat the evil that arose for the application of
inconsistent "affirmative action" standards by the contracting agencies and the
OFCC, became what is now section 718' 5 " of the Act. That a majority of
Senators agreed with Senator Ervin that this problem should be eliminated
provides weak, if any, support for the notion that the Executive Order pro-
grams were approved. But those who seek to find this approval offer the
rejection of Senator Ervin's Amendment No. 907, which would have revised
section 7030' 5 ' of the Act to expressly proscribe the requirement of prefer-
ential treatment under both the Executive Order and Title VII, 152
 as the coup
treatment, but, rather, what kind of enforcement powers should be granted to the
EEOC." Id.
' 48 See note 144 supra.
"" See, e.g., Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive
Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 754-57 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Philadel-
phia Plan].
15"
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e:17 (1976). This section provides as follows:
No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, shall
he denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency or officer of
the United States under any equal employment opportunity law or order,
where such employer has an affirmative action plan which has previously
been accepted by the Government for the same facility within the past
twelve months without first according such employer full hearing and ad-
judication under the provisions of section 554 of title 5, and the following
pertinent sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated substan-
tially front such previously agreed to affirmative action plan, this section
shall not apply: Provided further, That for the purposes of this section an
affirmative action plan shall be deemed to have been accepted by the Gov-
ernment at the time the appropriate compliance agency has accepted such
plan unless within forty-five days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance has disapproved such plan.
For the record of the debate and vote on this provision, see 118 CONG. REC. 1400-02,
1507-08 (1972).
151
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
152
 Pursuant to the proposed amendment, § 703(j) would have read as follows:
Nothing contained in this title or in Executive Order No. 11246, or in
any other law or Executive Order, shall he interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, lahor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this title or to any other law or Execu-
tive Order to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with re-
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de grace of their argument. The failure to adopt this amendment, it is as-
serted, amounted to a rejection of the "effort to alter the thrust of the
OFCC's program, and at long last [the Senate] unequivocally approved the
affirmative action program of the executive."'" There is, however, much
that this argument chooses to ignore.
It must he noted at the outset that the failure of a later legislature to act.
to correct an administrative interpretation of law is, in any event, a "'weak
reed upon which to lean.' " 14
 Furthermore, the debate on this provision was
extraordinarily abbreviated, leaving us with even less to go on in ascertaining
the meaning of the vote than would normally he the case. Senator Ervin ut-
tered very few words in the proposed amendment's behalf. 155
 Senator Javits
spoke with only slightly less brevity in opposition, arguing that the amend-
ment would "make unlawful any affirmative action plan like the so-called
Philadelphia Plan," that the Senate and the courts previously had permitted
such plans, and that Senator Ervin's proposed amendment "would simply nul-
lify that action." 151
 Senator Javits' mention of previous Senate action was
apparently a reference to the ultimate failure of the 1969 efforts by Senator
Ervin, among others, to stop the Philadelphia Plan. 157
 But, as has already
been discussed, '' "
 the failure of that effort hardly provides unambiguous
support for the conclusion that numerical "affirmative action," or even the
Executive Order itself, had been approved. Moreover, Senator Javits himself
had argued in 1969 that the Philadelphia Plan did not require preferential
treatment.'" Other than Senator Javits, only Senator Williams, who was one
of the co-sponsors of S. 2515, rose in opposition to the proposed amend-
ment.'" He expressed the opinion that the Ervin amendment merely sought
the "transfer of the OFCC to the EEOC," which proposal already had been
rejected by the Senate.''' Senator Ervin replied that the two proposals were
not the same and that his amendment was an effort to make Title VII "apply
specs to the total number Or percentage of persons of any race, color, reli-
gion, sex, on' national origin employed by any employer, referred or clas-
sified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization,
admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admit-
ted m, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in
comparison with the total or percentage of persons of such race. color.
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or-
other area.
118 CONG. REC. 4917 (1972).
Comment, Philadelphia Plan, supra note 149, at 757 (footnotes omitted).
' 4 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 261 (4th ed. 1973)
(a Revision of the Third Edition of Sutherland Statutory Construction).
157' 118 CONG. Rec. 4918 (1972). This, of course, does not include Senator Er-
vin's remarks directed to Senator Williams' continents.
i5I1
"7 See notes 79-96 supra, and accompanying text.
158 See notes 89-94 supra, and accompanying text.
' 5 " See 115 CONG. REC. 39967-68 (remarks of Senator Javits) (1969).
1 "" 118 CONC. REC. 4918 (remarks of Senator. Williams) (1972).
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to the Department of Labor as well as everybody else." 1 " 2
 Without more, the
yeas and nays were ordered and the amendment defeated.
This, quite simply, is hardly the stuff from which a legitimate inference
of Senate approval of anything should be drawn. The first difficulty with such
an inference is that it is unclear that there was any uniform understanding as
to the import of Amendment No. 907. To the contrary, what little evidence
there is in the debates suggests that the Senate may well have been at best
confused, at worst misled. By its terms, the Amendment would not have en-
tirely eliminated a numerical approach, just "preferential treatment." To the
extent that. Senator Javits' remarks may have been influential, they were inac-
curate and make the resulting vote unreliable. Whatever else may be said
about. the defeat of the Fannin rider to the 1969 appropriations bill, it was
disingenuous for Senator Javits to suggest that the vote on the rider was tan-
tamount to approval of preferential treatment in light of the repeated asser-
tions by administration officials and Senate opponents of the rider that the
Philadelphia Plan neither required nor permitted contractors to grant. racial
preferences. Either the Congress had been deluded in 1969, or Senator Javits
was misrepresenting the facts in 1972.
Senator Williams' comments further impeach the reliability of any infer-
ence of approval by evidencing a fundamental, though apparently good faith,
misconception about the thrust of the Ervin amendment. Moreover, Senator
Ervin's response to Senator Williams' comments, far from dispelling the con-
fusion, suggested that without Amendment No. 907 the Department of Labor
was beyond the pale of Title VII. Although the OFCC frequently has con-
ducted itself in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of Title VII's
language, no one, either before or since the debate on Amendment No. 907,
has seriously maintained that the Executive Order programs are not subject to
the Act's proscriptions. In short, if legislative inaction is "a weak reed on
which to lean" in statutory construction as a general matter, the paucity of
evidence on the meaning of the Senate's rejection of the Ervin amendment,
coupled with the fact that the little evidence available is permeated with inac-
curacy and indications of confusion, only further weakens that weak reed to
the point of inevitable collapse.'"
In February of 1974, a bare six months before the fall of the Nixon
administration, the "affected class'.' concept"' was given more elaborate form.
Revised Order No. 4 was amended by the Secretary of Labor to state that
"[r]elief for members of an affected class who, by virtue of past discrimina-
tion, continue to suffer the effects of that discrimination shall be provided in
the conciliation agreement. entered into pursuant to § 60-60.6 of [Revised
I 62. Id .
1 " Indeed, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, it seems likely that at
least some of the votes that defeated Amendment No. 907 reflected the belief, consis-
tent with representations that had been made by the administration, that the Secretary
of Labor was already subject to Title VII and Senator Ervin's amendment was thus
superfluous. Whatever meaning one finds in the Senate's rejection of this amendment,
moreover, no such proposal was ever placed before the House and it can scarcely be
said to have given its imprimatur, implicitly or Otherwise, to any program of preferen-
tial treatment initiated by the Secretary of Labor.
"4
 See notes 124-26 supra, and accompanying text.
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Order No.14]." 1 " 5 Revised Order No. 14 had been promulgated the same
day '" for the stated purpose of establishing "standardized contractor evalua-
tion procedures."' Section 60-60.6 referenced in the newly amended lan-
guage of Revised Order No. 4, provided for a multi-step review of the con-
tractor's practices, culminating in an "exit conference":
This exit conference should itemize the apparent violations that lend
themselves to immediate correction and solicit the contractor's
agreement to take adequate corrective action by specified dates. The
contractor's commitments should be contained in a written concilia-
tion agreement signed at the exit conference.'"
As with many phrases that had preceded it, "apparent violations" was not
given a specific meaning. The connection with the "affected class" concept of
Revised Order No. 4, however, provided a signal that another major expan-
sion in the numerical employment policy had occurred. The "affected class,"
it should be recalled, was defined as any group of people who were suffering
continuing effects of past discrimination. Significantly, it did not appear that
such past discrimination had to have been committed by the contractor or had
to have occurred within any applicable period of limitations.'" Moreover,
the provisions for immediate corrective action, specific dates, and written con-
ciliation agreement all suggested that any contractor might be required to
provide an "affected class" with specific affirmative relief, such as retroactive
1 ":" 39 Fed. Reg. 5630 (1974).
'"'' Id. The present version of Revised Order No. 14 is codified at 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-60 (1979).[67 Id .
1 "' 39 Fed. Reg. 5632 (1974) (emphasis added).
'"" Although Revised Order No. 4 is unchanged in this respect, OFCCP's Con-
tract Compliance Manual, recently revised effective October I, 1979, contains the fol-
lowing provision:
Affected class. One or more employees, former employees, or applicants who
have been denied employment opportunities or benefits because of dis-
aitninatory practices and/or policies by the contractor, its employees, or agents.
Evidence of the existence of an affected class requires: (1) identification of
the discriminatory practices; (2) identification of the effects of discrimina-
tion; and (3) identification of those suffering from the effects of discrimi-
nation.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS DIVISION OFFICE OF FEDERAL.
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL 1-4
(1979) (emphasis added). This would appear to reflect an enforcement policy decision
to limit the remedial responsibilities of contractors to those effects flowing from dis-
criminatory acts that they themselves committed, or that can at least be imputed to
them. Chapter 7 of the Manual, entitled "IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION
OF AFFECTED CLASS PROBLEMS," provides little insight into what, if any, tern-
pond limits there may be to the contractor's responsibility for remedying the effects of
past discrimination. The Manual indicates that back pay liability will be limited to a
period of two years (three years in the case of "willful violations") prior to the contrac-
tor being "notified in writing of this agency's finding of violation" or, where a com-
plaint has been filed, prior to the date the complaint was filed. Id. at 7-27, § 7-130.2d.
It also asserts, however, that "frlemedies other than hackpay (e.g., seniority relief) are
not subject to the 2/3 year limitation." Id. at 7-27, § 7-1302d.
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seniority, preferential consideration for training and promotions, and even
back pay. 17 "
With these developments, the numerical employment. policy as we now
know it had reached maturity. To be sure, there have been some significant
contributions since 1974. The Administrative Conference of the United States
in 1975 criticized the application of uniform standards to all non-construction
contractors and the failure to take account of idiosyncracies of discreet labor
markets,''' but the criticism apparently went unheeded. Instead of relief
from the numerical policy, it was again expanded when the EEOC, Civil Ser-
vice Commission, Department of Labor, and Department of Justice jointly
issued the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures." 2 In
essence, the Guidelines require all employers ' 7 " who have "selection proce-
dures"' that produce "adverse impact"' either to carry a generally impos-
sible burden of demonstrating a statistical relationship to job performance or,
in the alternative, to eliminate the "adverse impact." 176 "Affirmative action"
is expressly encouraged, 177 and the Guidelines clearly indicate that the bottom
line, the numerical representation in the employer's workforce, will control
the enforcement agencies' exercise of "their administrative and prosecutorial
discretion." 178
Furthermore, in response to the lower court decisions in the Weber case
and on the same clay that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in that. case,
1711 Revised Order No. 4 has since been again revised to expressly provide for
the inclusion of hackpay among other forms of relief for an "affected class." 42 Fed.
Reg. 3462 (1977).
' 1
 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF' THE UNITED STATES, 1974-75 REPORT at
40-42 (1976).
172
 43 Fed. Reg. 38290 (1978), codified at, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979), 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-3 (1979), 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1979), 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(c) (1978).
173
 The Guidelines are not only applicable to federal contractors, but to all
employers subject to Title VII as well. 43 Fed. Reg. 38296.
174 T he phrase "selection procedures - is defined in the Guidelines very
broadly, as follows:
Selection procedure. Any measure, combination of measures, or proce-
dure used as a basis for any employment decision. Selection procedures
include the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and
pencil tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods
and physical, educational, and work experience requirements through in-
formal or casual interviews and unscored application forms.
Id. at 38308.
175
 "Adverse impact" is defined in the Guidelines as follows:
Adverse impact. A substantially different rate of selection in hiring,
promotion, or other employment decision which works to the disadvantage
of members of a race, sex, or ethnic group. See section 4 of these
guidelines.
Id. at 38307.
Section 41) explains that a selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group that is
less than 80% of the rate fur the group with the highest rate will generally he re-
garded as presumptive evidence of adverse impact. Id. at 38297-98.
4 " Id. at 38296, 38297, 38299 passim .
3 77 Id. at 38308-09.
178 Id. at 38297.
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the EEOC issued its Affirmative Action Guidelines."'" These Guidelines rep-
resent an overt attempt to shield employers, who succumb to the pressure to
comply with the numerical policy, from liability to whites and males who have
been discriminated against in the process.'""
Although the significance of such changes should not be minimized, the
fact remains that they are simply variations on the theme that was fully de-
veloped during the Nixon administration. Recognition of this fact is important.
for at least two reasons. First,. the origins of the policy strongly suggest that it
is not the necessary or inevitable extension of liberal programs of the Ken-
nedy and Johnson eras. Since the numerical employment policy comes to us
with, at. best, highly questionable liberal credentials, it is hardly the heresy that
some would suggest for those of us who have always been and remain com-
mitted to true equality of opportunity to question the legitimacy , of this innova-
tion. Moreover, the prevailing mentality at critical junctures in the Nixon era
has been well documented. The fact that many actions by the administration
were guided by a purposeful exploitation of divisive issues certainly raises the
possibility that the numerical employment policy itself was conceived out of a
desire to promote something other than the long-range national interest. This
alone compels a reexamination, or possibly an initial examination, of the pre-
mises on which the policy is based. Second, the process by which the policy
was given shape—expansive and loose statutory interpretations by the courts,
an aggressively expansive approach to executive power, an inability or unwill-
ingness of Congress to check usurpations, and a judicial predilection for in-
dulging the executive—is in itself sufficient to warrant lengthy reflection. It is
in this context that the Weber case arose.
111. UNITED STEE1AVORKERS OF AMERICA V. WEBER
A. The Facts and Lower Court Decisions
The circumstances that gave rise to the Weber case were quite simple in
comparison to the issues they raised. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
17" 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1608.
"" The stated purpose of' the Guidelines is to encourage voluntary compliance
with Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1. The three essential components are a "reasonable
self analysis," "a reasonable basis for concluding action is appropriate," and "reasona-
ble action." Id. at § 1608.4. The Guidelines hold that there is a "reasonable basis" if
one or more employment practices are found to have adverse impact, if the effects of
past discrimination are left uncorrected, or if there is disparate treatment. The reason-
ableness of the conclusion is unaffected by a failure to find that Title VII has been
violated or a finding that defenses to a potential Title VII action exist. Id. at §
1608.4(b). "Reasonable action" is defined as follows:
The action taken pursuant to an affirmative action plan or program must
be reasonable in relation to the problems disclosed by the self analysis.
Such reasonable action may include goals and timetables or other appro-
priate employment tools which recognize the race, sex, or national origin
of applicants or employees. It may include the adoption of practices which
will eliminate the actual or potential adverse impact, disparate treatment,
or effect of (sic) past discrimination by providing opportunities for members of
groups which have been excluded, regardless of whether the persons benefited were
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opened its plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, in 1958."' Brian Weber, whose
cultural and educational background had provided little inducement to con-
tinue his schooling past high school, joined Kaiser's workforce as a laboratory
analyst approximately ten years later.'" In 1969, Kaiser, in response to fed-
eral pressure to increase the representation of minority employees at the
Gramercy plant., began to hire new employees on a "one white, one black
basis." 1 " 5
Generally, Kaiser filled all craft positions by hiring craftsmen from out-
side the plant who had fully completed their training. Through the efforts of
the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), the exclusive representative of
Kaiser's employees for collective bargaining purposes, Kaiser agreed to set. up
partial training programs within the plant, thus making craft jobs more acces-
sible to union members already employed by the company. ' "4 By early 1974,
Kaiser faced the threat of sanctions by the OFCCP, including the loss of its
federal contracts, if drastic measures were not employed to increase the rep-
resentation of minorities among the skilled craft positions."'
To avert this prospect, Kaiser bargained for and obtained the incorpora-
tion of a craft, training clause in its nationwide "1974 Labor Agreement" with
USWA.'" Pursuant to this provision, the prior experience requirement for
themselves the victims of prior policies or procedures which produced the adverse
impact or disparate treatment or which perpetuated past discrimination.
Id. at § 1608.4(c) (emphasis added).
The EEOC: sought to shield employer action with these Guidelines through the
operation of § 713(b)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1) (1976), which permits
any employer who has relied in good faith on any "written interpretation ... of the
Commission" to raise such reliance as a defense to liability. Interestingly, the Weber
decision contained no mention of the Guidelines.
"I Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D.
La. 1977).
1X2 See Chase, In Bakke's Wake: Kaiser Aluminum Case May Help in Clarifying
Reverse-job-Bias Issue, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1978, at I, col. 1; Roberts, The Bakke Case
Moves To The Factory, N. V. Times, Feb. 25, 1978 (Magazine), at 37.
I 8" Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (ED.
La. 1977); see also Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228
(5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
1 " Carpenter-Painters with one year of experience were accepted from 1964 to
1971 under this program. General Repairmen were accepted with three years experi-
ence front 1968 to 1971, and with two years from 1971 to 1974. Of the 28 persons
who entered craft positions through these training programs, two (7%) were black.
Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, at 11-13, United Steel
workers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
"5 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 218, 226 (5th
Cir. 1977).
"" Id. at 218. Portions of the 1974 Labor Agreement arc set forth in the dis-
trict court's opinion in Weber, 415 F. Supp. at 763. Not only did the clause apply to
Kaiser's operations throughout the country, but similar provisions were negotiated by
USWA throughout the aluminum industry. 563 F.2d at 218. It appears that the Kaiser
agreement, although concluded somewhat earlier, had been influenced by and there-
fore bore strong resemblance to a provision that was incorporated into national steel
producers' collective bargaining agreements with USWA pursuant to two consent de-
crees. 563 F.2d at 229 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Allegheny-
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the training program was eliminated and a new in-plant training program for
the skilled crafts was created. Goals for the desired minority ratio were to he
established by a "Joint Committee," and 50 percent of the apprenticeships in
the programs were to be reserved for minority employees.'" Under the
programs one black employee and one white employee were to be awarded
positions for every two openings. The employees were to be selected on the
basis of seniority within their respective racial groups until the goals for the
desired ratio were attained. In short, dual plant seniority systems, one for
minorities and one for whites, were to be set up.' 88 Through a "Memoran-
dum of Understanding" the Joint Committee set the goal for minority rep-
resentation in the Gramercy plant at 39 percent for each "craft family."'"
When the first vacancies under the new craft training program were an-
nounced, Kaiser awarded half' of them to the most senior whites and the
other half to the most senior blacks, as the agreement required. IneVitahly,
although none of the blacks selected were less qualified for the training posi-
tions than their white counterparts, 19" all of the blacks awarded positions were
less senior than at least some of the white employees who were denied posi-
tions.'" Among those white employees passed over was Brian Weber, who
promptly filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In due course,
Weber commenced a class action in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging
that he and members of his class had been discriminated against in violation
of their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964 192 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. 19 '3
Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). The consent decrees themselves
are reproduced at FEP MANUAL 431: 125 (BNA). From this, one obtains some idea not
only of the direct successes, but also of the "ripple effects" of the Government's efforts
to implement its national numerical employment policy,
' 87 415 F. Supp. at 764.
88 The dual seniority systems were for purposes of selecting on-the-job
trainees only. All other benefits and working conditions continued to be allocated on a
unified seniority system. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216,
225 (5th Cir. 1977).
El'" The source of the 39% figure is unclear. The district court appears to have
concluded that 39% represented the percentage of minority population in the parishes
of St. James and St. John the Baptist, whence Kaiser drew most of its employees. 415
F. Supp. at 764. The majority in the Court of Appeals appears to have agreed. 563
F.2d at 218, 222 n.11. Judge Wisdom, however, who dissented from the Court of
Appeals decision stated that "Itihe workforce in those parishes was estimated at 39 per-
cent black." Id., at 228 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The majority of the Su-
preme Court also found the figure to be reflective of the relevant workforce. 99 S. Ct.
at 2725. The point may he of some significance. If the figure is strictly a reflection of
population in the area, a significant disparity between the percentage of unqualified
blacks (too young, too old, infirm, etc.) could skew the available workforce, making
39% inordinately high or low. See Hazelwood School District v. United States. 433 U.S.
299 (1977).
"" 563 F.2d at 225.
P"' Petition For Writ of Certiorari on behalf of United Steelworkers of
America, at 7, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
" 2 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2, ci seq. (1970).
1 " 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). This statute provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
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District Judge Jack M. Gordon agreed with Weber's allegations and is-
sued a permanent injunction against any further use of the quota-based pro-
gram.'" He premised this result on two grounds. First, he reasoned, al-
though the authority of the courts to impose quota type relief in Title VII
cases was "well established," the delicacy of the balance of interests that must
underlie such a remedy makes it necessarily the exclusive domain of the
courts.'" Moreover, Judge Gordon found the language of sections 703(a)
and (d), prohibiting discrimination against any individual," to be unequivocal
and controlling. Noting that "the black employees being preferred over more
senior white employees had never themselves been the subject of any unlawful
discrimination [by Kaiser] during hiring,"" he concluded that the remedial
provisions of Title VII 197
 requiring affirmative action in specific instances of
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
The provision has been interpreted to protect both whites and minorities against
employment discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S.
273, 285-96 (1976). The record of the Weber case is unclear as to why the § 1981 claim
was never resolved and the only mentions of the fact that it was filed at all that I have
been able to find are in one of the briefs of milieus curiae and Weber's Brief in Opposi-
tion to Certiorari. Brief of Amicus Curiae For the Committee On Academic Nondis-
crimination And Integrity at 26, Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition For
Certiorari at 7, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). The
only apparent explanation for the neglect of the § 1981 claim arises from the district
court's mention that by stipulation of all the parties the trial was conducted on the
merits of plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction." 415 F. Supp. at 763. It may
be that in order to obtain an expedited determination of Weber's claim for injunctive
relief under Title VII, the § 1981 claim, which could have been tried to a jury, was
waived or the parties stipulated to its being held in abeyance. In any event, as will
appear, the fact that this claim was lost may well have significantly influenced the
outcome of the case. See text at notes 290-300 infra.
194 415 F. Supp, at 770.
"5
 415 F. Supp. at 767-68. fudge Gordon also asserted that sections 703(a) and
(d), 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-2(a) and (d), "do not prohibit the courts from discriminating
against individual employees by establishing quota systems where appropriate. The
proscriptions of the statute are directed solely to employers." 415 F. Supp. at 767. As
for the effect of § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), on the courts' authority in this re-
gard, judge Gordon simply offered the following quotation;
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief
authorization above are read in context with § 2000e-2(j), we believe that
section cannot he construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continua-
tion of effects of past discrimination resulting from present practices (neu-
tral on their face) which have the practical effect of continuing past injus-
tices.
415 F. Supp. at 767, quoting, United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th
Cir. 1970).
'" 415 F. Supp. at 769. Indeed, since at least some of the black employees
awarded positions had less seniority than Brian Weber, it seems likely that some or all
of them began work for Kaiser in 1969 or later. See text at notes 182-83 supra. Some
or all of those preferred over Weber, therefore, would have been double
beneficiaries—first of Kaiser's 50% hiring quota, and later of the training program
quota.
1 " 7 For the text of the remedial provisions in section 706(g) see note 35 supra.
Id.
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discrimination were inapposite. He therefore determined that even the courts
could not. have effectuated Kaiser's quota system under the circumstances."'
Judge Gordon conceded that he was not "sufficiently skilled in the art of
sophistry to justify such discrimination by employers in light of the un-
equivocal prohibitions against racial discrimination against any individual con-
tained in sections 703(a) and (d) of the 1964 Act."'" Judge Gordon refused
to usurp the legislative function by expanding the exceptions to Title VII, and
therefore upheld %Veber's claim.""
A majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
disagreed with Judge Gordon's conclusion that only judges, and not private
parties, may use quotas."' The Fifth Circuit majority, however, firmly
agreed with the conclusion that no quota was appropriate in the absence of
identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination. The important distinction be-
tween judicially imposed quotas and that adopted by Kaiser; reasoned the
court, is that the purpose of a judicial quota is to remedy a specific wrong—to
restore an applicant or employee to the position he or she would have en-
joyed but for the employer's unlawful discrimination."' Non-minority
'"' 415 F. Stipp, at 769 - 70.
1"" Id. at 769 (emphasis in original).
2"" He ended his opinion 1)11 a note that, in the light of subsequent events,
seems prophetic:
Nloreover, if such racial discrimination by employers against individu-
als is to be sanctioned as a benign exception to the prohibitions of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, then it is the opinion of this Cowl that
such exception should be enacted by the Congress, that branch of our gov-
ernment responsible for creation of the national policy reflected in the
prohibitions of Title VII, and not by a life tenured member of the Federal
Judiciary. Numerous policy decisions of monumental importance to the na-
tion necessarily would have to he made in creating exceptions to Sections
703(a) and (d) of the 1964 Act, and the type of Congressional scrutiny and
public debate such as that reflected in the legislative history of the 1964
Act would ensure that competing interests could he balanced in a fashion
consistent with the democratic processes pursuant to which the 1964 Act
itself was adopted.
Id. at 769-70.
21" 563 F.2(1 at 223-24. In this connection, the court noted that there was
"strong authority' . to the effect that courts are not subject to the same restrictions as
employers based on the argument that § 703 only defines unlawful practices, but does
not limit the judicial remedies authorized by § 706(g). In support of this proposition,
the court cited Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), in which
the Supreme Court held that "as with the other provisions of 703, - 7030) was
definitional only and not intended to limit. the scope of . judicial relief. Id. at 758. An
argument can certainly be made, however, that notwithstanding the Franks opinion,
both the language and the legislative history of § 703(j) present a different case. See,
for example, the remarks of Senator Humphrey quoted in note 228 infra.
2112 563 F.2d at 224-26. Under the "rightful place" doctrine, one who has been
the subject of unlawful discrimination at the hands of a defendant employer may ob-
tain an order compelling the thyrettdma to do whatever is necessary—including granting
fictional seniority—to remove the effects of the defendant's unlawful act. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co„ 424 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1976); see al.s.o Local 189, United
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969).
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employees who are disadvantaged by the courts' actions have no legal com-
plaint because the advantages they had acquired were in a sense, taken from
the very minority employee to whom they are now returned.'" For Kaiser
to prefer a minority employee over a non-minority employee, however, in the
absence of unlawful discrimination by Kaiser, even if that preference is born
of a desire to eliminate the effects of past "societal discrimination, ... has no
foundation in restorative justice, and its preference for training minority
workers thus violates Title VII." 214
 The Fifth Circuit majority further found
that Kaiser could not shield its quota system behind Executive Order
11246. 2" The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court.
Judge Wisdom dissented from the Fifth Circuit decision, offering his
view that the court had left employers facing potential liability to minorities
and Government sanctions on the one hand, and the threat of suits by or on
behalf of non-minorities on the other. Thus, to use Judge Wisdom's color-
ful phrase, "[t]he employer and the union are made to walk a high tightrope
without a net beneath them."'" He argued that this, in turn, would inevita-
bly diminish "voluntary compliance" and that "the blight of racial discrimina-
tion would be still further delayed." 217
 The better course, Judge Wisdom
opined, would be to establish a "zone of reasonableness" within which
employers would be "sheltered from liability" to eradicate the effects of dis-
crimination, provided such action was a "reasonable remedy" for an "arguable
violation of Title V11." 2" Using this standard, he felt that Kaiser's quota
system should enjoy immunity because "Nile statistics here constituted a
prima facie case of discrimination," 2 " "the defendants did not present any
evidence in rebuttal," 2 " and Kaiser's plan was "reasonable."'"
703
 563 F.2d at 224-25.
2"1 Id. at 226.
20 ' 563 F.2d at 227. Relying on Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) the court concluded:
Whether Kaiser has already met its affirmative action burden or not,
we are unable to harmonize the more explicit language of section 703(d),
which specifically prohibits racial classification in admission to on-the-job
training programs, with the affirmative action imposed here. If Executive
Order 11246 mandates a racial quota for adinissitm to on-the-job training
by Kaiser, in the absence of any prior hiring or promotion discrimination, the
executive order must fall before this direct congressional prohibition.
Id. (emphasis in original).
20" Id. at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
207 Id.
2(1(4 id.
20" Id. at 231 (footnote omitted),
2111
211 Id. at 232. As to the "reasonableness" of Kaiser's quota, Wisdom noted four
factors. First, it was similar to the sort of relief some courts had provided. Id. Second,
the plan had been negotiated by employer and union and should therefore be "less
suspect." Id. at 232-33. Third, it "reduced the impact on white workers," apparently
meaning that the quota did not require the discharge or demotion of whites. Id. at
233. Finally, Kaiser's plan allowed "significant white participation" although "black
employees receiveId] more than their white colleagues.
-
 Id. at 234. Wisdom also con-
cluded that the plan constituted a "proper response to societal discrimination against
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B. The Supreme Court Opinions
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Supreme Court demonstrates that al-
though judge Cordon may not have been "sufficiently skilled in the art of
sophistry" 12 to evade the clear import of the language and legislative history
of Title VII, Justice Brennan and three of his brethren (justices Marshall,
Stewart and White) 21" were equal to the task. Justice Brennan's opinion be-
gins by viewing Kaiser's quota system as entirely voluntary and involving no
state action, thus ignoring the influential role of the OFCCP noted by both
the District and Circuit Courts.'" This maneuver conveniently eliminated
the necessity of considering the serious statutory and constitutional implica-
tions of the Government's role.
Failing to find state action, Justice Brennan embarked upon an exercise
in "creative" statutory construction that, were it not a phenomenon all too
commonly encountered in the judicial opinions of this unprincipled age,
would leave one breathless. justice Brennan's starting point is not the literal
language of the Act 215 on which he declares Brian Weber's reliance to have
been "misplaced."'" Rather, he prefers to commune with the spirit of Title
VII, from which he learns that, when Congress said that it was to be unlawful
to "discriminate against any individual," 2 " Congress really meant to say that
it was to be unlawful to discriminate against any individual unless such dis-
crimination were in conjunction with "voluntary, private, race-conscious ef-
forts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."'"
We are told that "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII" 2 " was not to eliminate once and for
all arbitrary employment decisions based on the color of an individual's skin,
but to " 'Open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
have been traditionally closed to them.' " 220 Without manifesting so much as
a glimmer of recognition of the fact that he may have identified the legislative
goal but has revealed nothing about the intention of Congress regarding the
appropriate means, Justice Brennan finds "lilt would be ironic indeed if a law
triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice -22 ' were con-
blacks,- essentially because 19 hokl otherwise would leave a "wrong without a remedy."
Id. at 234-36.
212 See text at note 199 supra.
213 justice Blackmun delivered a separate concurring opinion that, as will be
seen, is every hit as ill-reasoned as justice Brennan's, but Justice Blackunun's opinion
can at least claim some candor as a virtue. Chief justice Burger and justice Rehnquist
each wrote dissents. Justice Stevens excused himself from the case. Justice Powell
missed oral arguments because of illness and did not participate in the decision.
214
 415 F. Supp. at 765; 563 F.2d at 218, 226.
215 For the text of' the relevant statutory provisions, sections 703(a) and (d), see
notes 24-26 supra.
21 " 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2726 (1979).
2 " 42	 § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
21 " 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
21 " Id. at 2727.
2211 Id. at 2728, quoting, 110 CONG. Rrc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hunt-
phrey).
221 Id.
November 1979]	 REDISTRIBUTING IN] USTICE 	 93
strued to deprive employers the right to discriminate against persons of all
races. Hence, he asserts that it "plainly appears ... that. Congress did not
intend wholly to prohibit. private and voluntary affir -mative action efforts as
one method of solving this problem." 2 22
Having thus neatly transformed the language of sections 703(a) and (d),
conjuring a meaning of which the drafters' words gave no hint, Justice Bren-
nan turns his attention to section 703(j) of Title VII, the language and legisla-
tive history of which he finds "further reinforced" his interpretation. 223 He
asserts that opponents of the bill that. contained section 703(j) raised two ob-
jections: (1) that it would be construed to require preferential treatment by
employers with racially Unbalanced workforces, and (2) that it would be con-
strued to permit such preferential treatment even where it was not re-
quired, 224 To establish this proposition, however, Justice Brennan cites only
a brief portion of Senator Sparkman's remarks on April 21, 1964. 225 With-
out any further reference to the record of the debates, he concludes that the
use of "require" instead of "require or permit" in section 703(j) evidences a
congressional choice to meet only the first objection and compels the "natural
inference" that "Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom
to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion." 22"
In a footnote, 227 justice Brennan dismisses as inapposite statements by
Senators Clark, Case, Humphrey and Williams, such as the following excerpt
from an interpretive memorandum on H.R. 7152 which was submitted jointly
by Senators Clark and Chase, floor managers of the bill, early in the debates:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain
a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt
to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve
a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an
employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be em-
phasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any indivickal. While
the presence or absence of other members of the same minority
group in the work force may be a relevant factor in determining
222 Id.
223 Id. For the text of section 703(j), see note 34 supra.
224 Id. at 9
 7 98- 9 9.
225 Id. The citation is to Senator Sparkman's remarks at 110 CoNe. REC. 8618-
19 (1964). Examination of the cited passage reveals that the central thrust of the
Senator's remarks was directed toward the prospect that the enforcement posture
might emphasize numerical breakdowns in the workforce to such an extent that.
employers would be forced, as a practical matter, to move "toward a kind of quota
system." Id. at 8618 (remarks of Senator Sparkman). Senator Keating, one of the
proponents of the bill, replied: "Of course, improper administration of the law is a ques-
tion that may he encountered at any time." Id. (remarks of Senator Keating) (emphasis
added). The context of the brief colloquy between Senators Sparkman and Keating
makes it clear that Keating's objective was to establish the fact that although a numeri-
cal approach to employment might he induced through "improper administration," no
such result was either provided for or intended by the anti-discrimination bill. Id.
22F'
	
S. Ct. at 2729 (footnote omitted).
227
 Id. at 2729-30 n.7.•
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whether in a given case a decision 10 hire or to refuse to hire was
based on race, color, etc., it is only one factor, and the question in
each case would be whether that individual was discriminated
against. 22 "
Justice Brennan asserts that these comments, rejecting quota-based hir-
ing, pertained only to efforts to "maintain racial balance in employment" 229
and therefore had no bearing on the propriety of efforts to achieve racial
balance. As tenuous as this argument appears on its face, its weaknesses are
compounded when justice Brennan tells us that "Where was no suggestion
after the adoption of section 703(j) that wholly voluntary, race-conscious, af-
firmative action efforts would in themselves constitute a violation of Title
VII." 23"
22 110 CONG. REC.. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added). In a memorandum respond-
ing to certain questions raised by Senator Dirksen about the effect of the bill, Senator
Clark had also written:
Objection: The bill would require employers tr .) establish quotas for
nonwhites in proportion to the percentage of nonwhites in the labor mar-
ket area.
Answer: Quotas are themselves discriminator .
Id. at 7218 (emphasis added). Similarly, Senator Humphrey remarked:
Contrary to the allegations of sonic opponents of this title, there is
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to
require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial
"quota" or to achieve a certain racial balance.
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexis-
tent. In fact., the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination.
In effect, it says that race, religion and national origin are not to be used as
the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on
the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion.
In title VII we seek to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. We
seek to give people an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit, and to
release the tremendous talents of the American people, rather than to keep
their talents buried under prejudice or discrimination.
Id. at 6549. See also id. at 8921 (remarks of Senator Williams).
22" 99 S. Ct.. at 2729 n.7 quoting from, 110 CONC. REC. 11848 (1964) (remarks
of Senator Humphrey) (emphasis in Supreme Court's quoted version).
23" 99 S. Ct. at 2730 n.7 (emphasis added). justice Brennan cites three excerpts
from the debates on Title VII to show that lalfter § 703(j) was adopted congressional
comments were all to the effect that employers would not be required to institute
preferential quotas . , . ." Id., citing, 110 CoNG. REC. 12819 (remarks of Senator
Dirksen); id. at 13079-80 (remarks of Senator Clark): id. at 15876 (remarks of Rep.
Lindsay). While the remarks of all three legislators cited do indeed limit themselves to
disavowals of required preferential treatment, Brennan's assertion that "all" statements
were so limited is untenable. Two pages before the cited portion of Senator Clark's
remarks, for example. Senator Ervin accused the proponents of the bill of manifesting
"a purpose ... that members of the Negro race should not take their rank as mere
citizens as white people do but. on the contrary, should he made special favorites of
the laws." Id. at 13077. Senator Cooper rose to respond to this and other charges,
saying (in remarks appearing on the page immediately preceding those of Senator
Clark cited by Justice Brennan):
As I understand title VII, an employer could employ the usual stan-
dards which any employer uses in employing—in dismissing. in promoting,
or in assigning tfurse who work for hint. There would be only one limita-
tion; lie could not discriminate, he could not deny a person a job, or dis-
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Such an assertion fairly invites the revelation of Brennan's disingenuous
use of legislative history, and it is an invitation that one should not lightly
decline. First, the statement is literally untrue. There was at least one such
"suggestion after the adoption of section 703(j)" in a document entered into
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Senator Humphrey, the then majority whip
and one of the bipartisan captains who shepherded the bill through the Sen-
ate. The document, was entitled "A Concise Explanation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; Chronology of Congressional Action"; 2:" it was ordered printed
in the Record on July 2, 1964, thirteen days after the Senate passed H.R.
7152 with section 703(j). 232
 Senator Humphrey explained that it was "a re-
vised and updated -233
 version of an explanatory document inserted in the
Record by him on May 25, 1964.2:54 The Senator also recalled that "Rilhe
purpose of the earlier document] was to provide Americans with a short and
understandable explanation of the civil rights bill as it was passed by the
House of Representatives. -2 "' Senator Humphrey suggested "that the
American people may find useful a similarly brief explanation of the act." 2 ""
With respect to the issue of preferential treatment, the later document was
identical to its predecessor:
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in
employment shall he given to Negroes or to any other persons or
groups. It does not provide that any quota systems may be established to
maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit
preferential treatment for any particular group, and any person, whether
or not a member of any minority group, would be permitted to file a
complaint of discriminatory employment practices. 217
This passage makes it clear that the understanding in the Senate both
before and after the adoption of section 703(j), was that preferences were
neither required nor permitted. The earlier explanatory document dem-
onstrates this to have been the understanding of the Senate proponents, con-
curred in by their counterparts in the House. That the wording of the docu-
ment did not change in this regard demonstrates that the addition of section
703(j), to use Senator Humphrey's words, "does not represent any change in
the substance of the title." 238
 This conclusion is only further buttressed by
miss a person from a job, or promote on the sole ground of his color, or
his religion, other factors being equal.
I think this should be made clear, because the Senator's remarks may
frighten people all over the country who do not have the time to study this
bill with the thoroughness it deserves.
Id. at 13078.
2"t Id. at 15865-67.
" 2 The amended Mansfielcl-Dirksen substitute bill, which added § 703(j) to the
House version, was agreed to on _dune 17, 1964. Id. at 14239. H.R. 7152, as amended
by the substitute, was passed by the Senate two clays later on June 19. Id. at 14511.
"" Id. at 15865.
234 Id. at 11846-48 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
235 Id. at 15865.
"'' Id. at 15865.
237 Id. at 11848 (emphasis added). See afro id. at 15866.
Id. at 12723.
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the comments of Senator Saltonstall who spoke in favor of the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute bill, which, among other things, added section 703(j);
Senator Saltonstall stated,
[t]he legislation before us today provides no preferential treat-
went for any group of citizens. In fact it specifically prohibits such
treatment. It seeks to assure that all citizens can exercise their rights
under our laws and can share the equal opportunities guaranteed by
those laws. 23"
Furthermore, not. only had Senator Humphrey's original explanatory
memorandum been "read and approved by the bipartisan floor managers of
the bill in both Houses of Congress," 24 " but the later document was introduced
into the Record both after the adoption of section 703(j) and on the same day
that the House debated and voted to accept the bill as amended by the Sen-
ate.241 Although, with respect to the House debates, Justice Brennan is tech-
nically correct in suggesting that none of the discussions after the Senate's
adoption of section 703(j) contained a representation that preferential treat-
ment was forbidden, neither did any of the House proponents contradict the
unambiguous statements in both Of Senator Humphrey's memoranda. Justice
Brennan's assertion that "nothing" after the adoption of section 703(j) suggests
an intention to proscribe preferential treatment for all groups is, therefore,
another instance of that aspect of his judicial method that elsewhere has been
generously referred to as a "preference for speculation over fact." 242
In the final portion of the opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan in-
forms us that although the Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan "falls on the
permissible side of the line," he is not prepared to tell us precisely where the
"line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans" is. 24  He does, however, enumerate three factors that presumably fig-
ured in the conclusion of the Court. These are as follows: 1) The Kaiser-
USWA plan and Title VII share a common purpose, to wit: "To break down
old patterns of racial segregation and hierari:hy." 244 2) It does not "unneces-
sarily trammel" the interests of non-minorities in that it neither "require[s]
[their] discharge" nor "create[s] an absolute bar to [their] advancement."'" 3)
It is a "temporary measure," which will end as soon as the percentage of
black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force."""
22" Id. at 12691 (remarks of Senator Saltonstall).
"" Id. at 11847 (emphasis added),
241 The House adopted House Resolution 789, which provided for concur-
rence in the Senate's amendments to the House bill, on July 2, 1964. 110 C.oNG. RF.c.
15869-97,
242 Berger, supra note 1, at 92.
99 S. Ct. at 2730.
244 Id.
2-0 Id,
24" Id. Just how "temporary" this arrangement will be depends a great deal on
one's perspective. It appears that there are presently around 300 craft positions at the
Gramercy plant. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228
(Wisdom, J., dissenting). As has already been mentioned, the Supreme Court appa-
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The refusal to more clearly delineate the parameters of permissible be-
havior and the resort, instead, to a listing of factors without any indication of
how they are to be weighed indicates that the Court has not outgrown its
predilection for an "incrementalist approach," which has obscured the mean-
ing of its decisions since the early days of employment discrimination litiga-
tion:2 'u But the failure to discuss the limits on private initiative may reflect
an inability among the four justices - who joined in the Court's ()pinion to agree
upon the necessary and sufficient conditions for permissible "race-conscious
affirmative action." It may even suggest, moreover, a lack of agreement on
whether preferential treatment always would be proper when all the facws
listed at the end of Brennan's opinion were present. That the sweep of the
decision may be therefore substantially more narrow than is apparent on first
reading is also consistent with Justice Brennan's assertion earlier in the opin-
ion that "hit plainly appears ... that Congress did not intend wholly to pro-
hibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts.- 245 This statement ap-
pears to indicate that under some circumstances voluntary "affirmative action"
would be improper.
Another bit of evidence suggesting that the constellation of Justices
might well be realigned in a different case is that. Justice Stewart joined the
Court's opinion. This perhaps would not he remarkable but for the fact. that
Stewart was one of four Justices who joined the opinion of Justice Stevens in
the Bakke case. 24"
 That opinion, it bears mentioning, concluded that the
race-conscious admissions program at the University of California medical
school could not be squared with the plain language of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 25° and that nothing in the legislative history of the Act
rends' reached the conclusion that the relevant workforce was 39% black. See note 189
supra. Prior to 1974, five, or slightly less than 2% of the craftsmen were black. There-
fore, in order to achieve proportional representation, an additional 37%, or 111, black
craftsmen would have to be hired. The Supreme Court's opinion states that in the first.
year there were 13 craft trainee openings, seven of which went to blacks. 99 S. Ct. at
2725. If we assume a black trainee induction rate of 6.5 per year, further assume that
all trainees actually become craftsmen, and Further yet assume that none of the new
craftsmen quit, die, become disabled or get discharged, then it will he 17 years before
the goal of proportional representation is reached. Moreover, Justice Brennan's asser-
tion that the plan was a "temporary measure" is at odds with the record in the case.
Mr. Dennis E English, industrial relations superintendent at the Gramercy plant gave
the following testimony at trial:
Once the goal is reached of 39 percent, or whatever the figure will he
down the road, I think it's subject to change, once the goal is reached in
each of the craft families, at that time, we will then revert to a ratio of what
that percentage is, if it remains at 39 percent and we attain 39 percent
someday, we will then continue placing trainees in the program at that
percentage.
Brief for Respondents, at 4 ti.8, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct.
2721 (1979).
247 See Wilson, note 110 supra, at 846.
24" 99 S. Ct. at 2728 (emphasis added).
249 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408-21
(Burger, C.J. and Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (1978).
25" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, it seq. (1976). The Court was principally concerned with
§ 601 of Title VI, which provides as follows:
4t
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could support the conclusion that the "language misstates the actual intent of
the Congress that enacted the statute.... 251 In construing Title VI to pro-
hibit racial preferences, 252 the Stevens bloc in Bakke relied in part on the close
relationship between Title VI and Title VII:
Title VI is an integral part of the far-reaching Civil Rights Act
of 1964. No doubt, when this legislation was being debated, Congress
was not directly concerned with the legality of "reverse discrimina-
tion" or "affirmative action" programs. Its attention was focused on
the problem at hand, the "glaring ... discrimination against Negroes
which exists throughout our Nation," and, with respect to Title VI,
the federal funding of' segregated facilities. The genesis of the legis-
lation, however, did not limit the breadth of the solution adopted.
just as Congress responded to the problem of employment discrimi-
nation by enacting a provision that protects all races, so, too, its an-
swer to the problem of federal funding of segregated facilities stands
as a broad prohibition against. the exclusion of any individual from a
federally funded program "on the ground of race."'"
If there is consistency in Justice Stewart's joining Justice Steven's opinion
in Bakke and Justice Brennan's opinion in Weber, it. is not readily apparent. At
the very least, the importance of the issues and the general confusion that
continues to permeate this area of the law make it very difficult to charac-
terize as anything but irresponsible Justice Stewart's failure to file an opinion
in either case that would give us some basis for reconciling these apparently
irreconcilable positions. 254
 More to the present point., however, Justice
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, he excluded. from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.
Id. at § 2000d. This language, of course, bears a striking similarity to that of § 703(a)
of Title VII. See notes 24-25 supra.
25i
 438 U.S. at 413.
252
	 be sure, Justice Stevens stated that "the question whether race can ever
be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and ...
discussion of that issue is inappropriate. - Id. at 411. As another commentator has
pointed out, however, the breadth of the opinion's holding effectively rebuts any in-
ference that the quoted language significantly narrowed its scope: "Nonetheless, if one
accepts [Stevens] basic premise, the conclusion that all preferential admissions pro-
grams are illegal (unless ordered by a court as a remedial measure) seems inescapable."
Maltz, A Bakke Primer, 32 OKI.A. L. Rt:v. 119, 123 (1979).
253 438 U.S. at 413 (footnotes and citation omitted).
" 1 Justice Brennan makes the following unconvincing attempt to suggest that
the interpretation of Title VI is a matter entirely different from the interpretation of
Title VII:
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered in University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2722, 57 L.Ed.2cl 750
(1978), contains no provision comparable to § 703(j). This is because Title
VI was an exercise of federal power over a matter in which the Federal
Government was already directly involved: the prohibitions against race-
based conduct contained [sic) in Title VI governed "progratuls1 or activities
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Congress was
legislating to assure federal funds would not be used in an improper man-
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Stewart can hardly be presumed to be solidly in the pro-preferential treat-
ment camp. Indeed, there is at least one arguable basis for distinguishing
Weber from Bakke that may suggest a significant limitation on Justice Stewart's
solidarity with the Weber majority. It could he said that Weber involved the sub-
stitution of one arbitrary (in the sense of being unrelated to qualifications for
performing the work) selection criterion (race) for another (seniority). Bakke,
on the other hand, involved the substitution of an arbitrary selection basis
(race) for one apparently bearing a rational relationship to performance
(qualifications). Although Justice Stewart has given us nothing from which to
do anything but speculate, he may well draw the line at a selection system that
permits the exaltation of the less qualified over the more qualified on the
basis of race.
Justice Blackmun's separate concurring opinion 255
 is somewhat inconsis-
tent and suggests that he, too, joins the majority fairly tentatively. He appar-
endy perceives "traditionally segregated job categories" as the key to justice
Brennan's formulation. 25" This, he finds, is "somewhat disturbing" because
"the Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it was adopting a prin-
ciple of non-discrimination that would apply to blacks and whites alike." 257
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun expresses a preference for the "arguable viola-
tion" approach advocated by Judge Wisdom in the latter's dissent to the Fifth
Circuit decision:258
 Notwithstanding this predilection, and his misgivings
about the Court's expansive approach, however, justice Blackmun ultimately
"conclude[s} that the Court's reading of the statute is an acceptable one." 259
ner. Title VII, by contrast, was enacted pursuant to the Commerce power
to regulate purely private decision making and was not intended to incor-
porate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Title VII and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari
inateria. See 1 10 CONC. REC. 8315 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Cooper). See
also id., at 11615 (remarks of Sen. Cooper).
99 S. Ct. at 2729 n.6. justice Brennan's Citation to legislative history is more than a
little disingenuous. The cited comments of Senator Cooper deal, first., with the fact
that the different Titles of the Act derive from different constitutional bases and, sec-
ond, with his concern that Title VI might be construed to reach discrimination in
employment, which he felt to be more properly the province of Title VII. In neither
case is there the faintest suggestion that discrimination against a particular group may
he unlawful under the one Title, but perfectly acceptable under the other. Even if
such a misinterpretation of Senator Cooper's remarks could otherwise be supported,
any review of the great mass of the debates will clearly show that all Titles were fre-
quently considered in the same breath, or with sentences beginning with a reference to
one Title and ending with allusion to another without any hint that the two were to be
applied differently in respect to the kinds of discrimination they addressed. Finally,
there are very clear indications that the Congress viewed the various Titles alike in this
regard. Senator Humphrey's original explanatory memorandum, discussed in text at
notes 234-37 supra, for example, stated flatly, "It [referring to the whole of H.R. 7152]
does not provide for preferential treatment of any individual or particular group of
Americans." 110 Conrc, REC. at 11848 (1964).
25' 99 S. Ct. at 2730-34.
25" Id. at 2732.
257 Id.
254 See notes 206-11 supra, and accompanying text.
25" 99 S. Ct. at 2732.
CiU	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1
This remarkably candid confession of willingness to depart from both statu-
tory language and legislative intent suggestS a great deal about the point to
which judicial craftsmanship and, more significantly, constitutional limitations
on the judicial function have come. In effect, justice Blackmun concedes that
"Title VII guaranteed equal opportunity for white and black alike," 2 " but
failed to provide whites a remedy for most discrimination, at least where
"traditionally segregated job categories" are concerned. He reaches this result
neither through construction of statutory language, which gives no hint of
differential provision of remedies, nor through the divination of an overrid-
ing purpose in the legislative history. Rather, justice Blackmun tells us that
"[s]trong considerations of equity" counsel the creation of such policy "[a]b-
sent compelling evidence of legislative intent" to the contrary. 2" In other
words, when Congress says that discrimination shall be forbidden as to all
groups on the same basis, the courts are free to lift this protection from cer-
tain groups if that seems equitable, unless Congress has been prescient
enough to anticipate such uneven enforcement of the law and to expressly
forbid it. If that seems rather an unreasonable burden to place upon a legisla-
tive body, justice Blackmun has a ready answer for it: "if the Court has mis-
perceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is
statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses."'"
In a short dissent, Chief Justice Burger clearly identifies at least one of
the problems in the Weber majority opinion. Regardless of the desirability of
the result reached by the majority, "it-is contrary to the explicit language of
the statute and is arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-
established principles of separation of powers:: 2":, 1
 He also raises an admoni-
tion that the beguiling result can be obtained through methods that, in the
final analysis, cost too much:
What Cardozo tells us is beware the "good result," achieved by judi-
cially unauthorized or intellectually dishonest means on the appeal-
ing notion that the desirable ends justify the improper judicial
means. For there is always the danger that the seeds of precedent
sown by good men will yield a rich harvest of unprincipled acts of
others also aiming at "good ends." 2114
Thus, the Chief Justice's objections to the position of the Weber majority and
the process by which the numerical policy developed recall concerns Senator
Ervin had earlier voiced. 2 h'2
Justice Rehnquist's dissent provides a necessarily lengthy catalogue of ex-
cerpts from the legislative debates demonstrating that justice Brennan's "legis-
lative purpose" cannot stand against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Like the Chief Justice, he also ends on an ominous note, predicting that the
21" Id. at 2733.
201 Id
252 Id. at 2734.
2 FI3
2114
 Id. at 2735.
21 ' 5 See text at note 83.
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Court's decision will leave an unwelcome legacy.'" There simply can be no
doubt that. the Weber majority succeeded in rewriting Title VII. The Burger
and Rehnquist dissents suggest that the methods employed by the majority
were too costly and the result, in any event, undesirable. If they are right, it
remains to be asked how costly, how undesirable and what is to be done now?
IV. ASSESSING THE CosTs:
WHAT PRICE PROPORTIONALITY?
A. The Institutional and Constitutional Costs of Weber
The judge addresses himself to standards of consistency, equiva-
lence, predictability, the legislator to fair shares, social utility and
equitable distribution:2 ' 7
I. Departures From Precedent
One of the persistent problems since the early clays of Title VII has been
the extent to which confusion has reigned in this area of the law. Some of this
has been the natural consequence of the comprehensive regulation, for the
first time, of an area of human affairs that previously had been more or less
wholly beyond the pale of regulation. But a substantial portion of the confu-
sion has been attributable to the fact that one day's conventional wisdom has
,too frequently become the next. clay's misapprehension of the law. This
phenomenon has, in turn, derived from frequent legislative activity, truly
massive amounts of regulations and guidelines promulgated by the enforcing
agencies, and most of all, erratic decisions by the judiciary. On past occasions,
both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall have lamented what they perceived
to be departures by the Supreme Court from consistent judicial pronounce-
ments.'" Yet, not only did the position adopted by these two Justices and
2 "" Justice Rehnquist eloquently described the dangers in the majority's ap-
proach to affirmative action and statutory interpretation.
[T]here is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion of equality than
the numerus clauses —the quota. Whether described as "benign discrimina-
tion" or "affirmative action," the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of
castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to prefer
another. In passing Title VII Congress outlawed all racial discrimination,
recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that no action
disadvantaging a person because of his color is affirmative. With today's
holding, the Court introduces into Title VII a tolerance for the very evil
that the law was intended to eradicate, without offering even a clue as to
what the limits on that tolerance may be. We are told simply that Kaiser's
racially discriminatory admission quota "falls on the permissible side of the
line." By going not merely beyond, but directly against Title VII's language
and legislative history, the Court has sown the wind. Later courts will face
the impossible task of reaping the whirlwind.
Id. at 2753 (citation omitted).
257 Freund, Social Justice and the Law, in, Social justice (R. Brandt ed.) (1962).
!"" See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v, United States, 431 U.S. 324,
378-80 (1977) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1976) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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three of their colleagues in Weber take great. liberties with the legislative intent
embodied in Title VII, it also departed dramatically from the spirit, if' not
indeed the letter, of virtually every significant Supreme Court opinion in
employment discrimination cases.
In the fountainhead decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 "" a unanimous
Court remarked that.:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however. to guarantee a job to
every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly
the subject of discrimination .... Discrimi»raory preference for any
group, minority Or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has pro-
scribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, ar-
bitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification. 27"
Five years later, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,'" the Court,
through Justice Marshall, said that "uncontradicted legislative history - com-
pelled the conclusion that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the
while petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would he applicable
were. they Negroes . 2 72 Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v: United States,' the Court rejected the Government's argument that no
seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past. discrimination can qualify
for the exemption in section 703(h) 274 of the Act for "bona fide" seniority
plans. In so doing, the Court emphasized that "Ho the extent that [the senior-
ity system] 'locks' employees into [less desirable] jobs, it does so for all. -275 As
partial support for its conclusion, the Teamsters Court expressed approval of
the following Ic. ► ver court language, stating, lido doubt, Congress, to prevent
`reverse discrimination' meant to protect certain seniority rights that could not
have existed but for previous racial discriminati on.''
 in its earlier decisions the Court clearly indicated that the anti-
discrimination provisions of Title VII apply alike to all employees. It perhaps
could be argued that the generally "color-blind - and "sex-blind'' theme of
these interpretations of Title VII, however, have no application where, as in
Weber, race-conscious or sex-conscious measures are employed to eradicate the
effects of past. discrimination, to break down "traditionally segregated job
categories." Indeed, this seems a fair restatement of Justice Brennan's opinion
in Weber. There are, however, significant difficulties in reconciling such an
emphasis on past discrimination with certain prior decisions of the Court.
2" 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
27 '' Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
27 ' 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
272
 Id. at 280.
27.3
	 U.S. 324 (1977).
274 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(h) (1976).
2 " 431 U.S. at 355-56.
276 Id. at 355 n.40, quoting Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 999
(5th Cir. 1969).
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First, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,' the Supreme Court in an opin-
ion joined by seven justices 278
 stated quite unambiguously:
A discriminator.' act which is not made the basis for a timely charge
[with the EE00 is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which
occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant
background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a cur-
rent practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an
unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences. 27"
this language means anything at all, it must mean that prior discriminatory
acts, no matter how morally reprehensible, cannot provide a legal justification
for present unlawful discrimination. An argument that the Evans holding was
nothing more than a limitation on the availability of judicial relief only leads
to an anomaly. Its necessary implication is that there are some fohns of "be-
nign" discrimination that could not be employed in the exercise of judicial
remedial powers, but Ilia could be indulged by private parties with impunity..
There simply is no evidence in the legislative history of Title VII, however, to
support. the view that voluntary remedial efforts could permissibly employ
means Forbidden the judiciary.'" Thus, the relevance of past. discrimination,
2" '131 U.S. 553 (1977).
"" Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id. at 560-62.
279 Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
2 " It could perhaps be argued that the contrary is suggested by that portion of
the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary quoted in Justice Brennan's Weber opin-
io n :
No hill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities.
There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by
the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome
problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolu-
tion of other forms of discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), at 18, quoted at. 99 S. Ct. 2728 (em-
phasis added by Justice Brennan). Taken from its context this language is rather
suggestive, but die paragraph that billowed the excerpt quoted by Justice Brennan is
revea ling:
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legisla-
tion which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the mos( seri-
ous types of discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve in
a number of related areas. It would reduce discriminatory obstacles to the
exercise of the right to vote and provide means of expediting the vindica-
tion of that tight. It would make it possible to remove the daily affront and
humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensi-
bly open to the general public. It would guarantee that there will he no
discrimination anwng recipients of Federal financial assistance. It would
prohibit discrimination in employment and provide means to expedite
termination of discrimination in public education.. It would open additional
avenues to deal with redress of denials of equal protection of the laws on
account of race, color, religion, or national origin by State or local au-
thorities.
Id. Clearly, the "other forms of discrimination" mentioned in the first quoted para-
graph, as the second paragraph demonstrates, referred to generic categories of dis-
criminatory activity—categories of discrimination in areas other than voting, employ-
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if any, is confined to its role as circumstantial evidence of present unlawful
disLriminatory practices."'
Another fundamental problem with any numerical program comparable
to the Kaiser-USWA plan is that it treats all members of different groups on
an undifferentiated basis. Thus, both disadvantaged and undisadvantaged
minority group members are benefited at the expense of non-minorities, at
least some of whom may have been disadvantaged themselves. In short, the
Court's decision in Weber amounts to an exaltation of the generalized interests
of groups over the specific interests of individuals. Yet, the Court previously
has said Title VII does not allow the employer to paint with this broad brush.
The statute makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
ment, public accommodations. and so forth. 
'
Justice Brennan also makes similarly dis-
ingenuous use of another portion of the Judiciary Committee Report, He asserts that
"legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private bus-
iness demanded as a price for their support [of Title VII] that 'management pre-
rogatives ... be left. undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.' " 99 S. Ct. at 2729,
quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.. Pt. 2 (1963), at 29. From this, he
concludes that Congress intended to preserve a "management prerogative" to employ
"racially preferential integration efforts." Id. Again, however, as Justice Rehnquist
points out in his dissent, when the quoted language is viewed in context it "belie[s] the
Court's conclusion." 99 S. Ct. at 2749 11.25. The language excised by Justice Bren-
nan reads as follows:
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities
to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In
this regard, nothing in the title permits a person to demand employment.
Of greater importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued
existence if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers or
labor unions. Similarly, management prerogatives, and union freedoms are
to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of
employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to
the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices. Its
primary task is to make certain that the channels of employment are open
to persons regardless of their race and that jobs in companies or member-
ship in unions are strictly filled on the basis of qualification.
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2 (1963), at 29.
2" in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the
Court described the significance of pre-Act discrimination in the knowing terms:
This is not to say that evidence of pre-Act discrimination can never
have any probative force. Proof that an employer engaged in racial
discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII might in some cir-
cumstances support the inference that such discrimination continued, par-
ticularl• where relevant aspects of the decisionmaking process had under-
gone little change. Cf. Fed. Rule Evict. 406; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Cusp., 429 U.S. 252, 267; 1 J. Wigmore. Evidence § 92 (3d ed.
1940); 2 id., Pi 302-305. 371, 375. And, of course, a public employer even
befOre the extension of Title VII in 1972 was subject to the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment not to engage in purposeful racial discrimina-
tion.
Id. at 309-10 n.15. Due to, the Court's equation, in United Air Lines v. Evans, of acts
not made the subject of a timely charge with pre-Title VII discrimination, there is no
apparent reason why the quoted language from Hazelwood should not also apply with
equal force to the former situation.
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privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 USG § 2000e-2(a)(I) (emphasis
added). The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It pre-
cludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, re-
ligious, sexual, or national class. If height is required for a job, a tall
woman may not he refused employment merely because, on the av-
erage, women are too short. Even a true generalization about the
class is an insufficient. reason For disqualifying an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply. 2S2
Even more directly to the point, in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,'
the Court declared that is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed
by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless
of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race are al-
ready proportionately represented in the work force."'" But Weber's incon-
sistency with prior decisions does not end with the Court's Title VII cases. As
will be shown, the subordination of individual interests to group interests also
is difficult. to reconcile with previous positions taken by most of the Justices in
constitutional contexts.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 285
 Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, considered the nature of the rights guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment, which provided in part the constitutional basis for Title
VIII:
It is settled beyond question that the "rights created by the first sec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment arc, by its terms, guaranteed to
the individual. The rights established are personal rights." The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it
is not equal.""
Justices Brennan and Marshall also have asserted that "classifications too often
have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype" and that any classification on the
basis of sex or race is offensive to the Constitution, even though it serves a
"compelling governmental interest," if there exists another "feasible, less dras-
tic means." 257
 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 2" justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, found that the fourteenth amendment clue process
clause requires "individualized determination[s]" in the employment context
and that "irrebuttable presumptions" are "disfavored." 28" These and a good
many other expressions by the various Justices might well have led one logi-
'2 City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & l'ower v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978).
28" 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
284
 438 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
2H  438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2" Id. in 289-90, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
247
 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-60 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing) (1974).
2" 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
28" hl. at 644-48. See at m) Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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cally to the conclusion that any statute that fostered undifferentiated treat-
ment of groups at the expense of individuals, that extended one quantum of
protection to the individuals of one racial group and lesser quantum to the
individuals of another, would have been unable to pass constitutional muster.
In addition to these problems of reconciling Weber with the reasoning of
prior Title VII and constitutional cases, another difficulty presented by the
decision is its inconsistency with past pronouncements on other legislative
enactments. Of particular significance in this regard is 42 U.S.C. section 1981,
which derives from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of I866. 21" Enacted to
effectuate the purposes of the thirteenth amendment and to give former
slaves the rights of free citizens, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that
"[al persons shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts
... as is enjoyed by white citizens ...." 291 In the 1975 decision of Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc.,'" the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that
section 1981 reaches racial discrimination in private sector employment. rela-
tionships, and rejected the argument that Title VII and section 1981 are in
any sense mutually exclusive.
One year later the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 2"3 held that the 1866 Act was
part of a "congressional design to protect individuals of all races" and there-
fore protects whites as well as non-whites.'" In coming to this conclusion,
Justice Marshall discussed the legislative history of the 1866 Act at length."'
Among the evidence cited as supporting the Court's conclusion were the fol-
lowing comments made by Senator Trumbull, draftsman of the bill, in re-
sponse to an argument that the bill extended to blacks protection that had not
been accorded whites:
Sir, this bill applies to white men as well as black men. It declares
that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil
rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the right to make
contracts, the right to buy and sell, and enjoy liberty and happiness;
and that is abominable and iniquitous and unconstitutional! Could
anything be more monstrous or more abominable than for a
member of the Senate to rise in his place and denounce with such
epithets as these a bill, the only object of which is to secure equal
rights to all the citizens of the country, a bill that protects a white man
just as much as a black man? With what consistency and with what face
can a Senator in his place here say to the Senate and the country
that this is a bill for the benefit. of' black men exclusively when there
is no such distinction in it, and when the very object of the bill is to break
down all discrimination between black men and white men?""
29" 42 U.S.C.	 1981 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 1866, c.31, §
1,	 14 Stat. 27).
2 "'	 Id.
292 	421	 U.S. 454,
293 427 U.S. 273
459-60
(1976).
(1975).
294 Id. at 289 n.19.
295 Id. at 285-96.
2"" Id. at 290, quoting Coxe. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess„-599 (1866) (remarks
of Senator Trumbull) (emphasis supplied by Justice Marshall).
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Justice Marshall observed that although the bill as it passed the Senate cov-
ered discrimination against whites, the "as is enjoyed by white citizens" lan-
guage was added by amendment of the Senate version in the House. That this
was not. intended to limit coverage to non-whites, justice Marshall asserted,
was amply demonstrated by indications that it was intended as a mere "techni-
cal adjustment." 207 and by a quite pointed statement made by Congressman
Wilson, floor manager of the bill, immediately after he had obtained passage
of the amendment. Wilson stated that the purpose of the bill was to secure "to
citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of' the law... . What-
ever exemptions there may be shall apply to all citizens alike. One race shall
not be more favored in this respect than another."'" After reviewing this
and other material evidence in the legislative history, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that section 1981 can only be construed to proscribe discrimination
against whites and non-whites on the same basis. 2 `0
How can this construction of section 1981 be reconciled with the Weber
majority's construction of Title VII? Implied repeal of the 1866 Act by Title
VII would appear to be foreclosed by the Court's opinion in Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency, Inc. 110 Whatever the merit of the argument in the Title
VII context, it certainly cannot be said that the legislative history of section
1981 reflects any overriding purpose to provide jobs for any one group. Nor
does the 1866 Act contain a provision similar to section 703(j), which could,
even arguably, admit of Justice Brennan's tenuous inference that the explicit
expression of things not required implies that they are permitted. Thus, the
" 7 Id. at 291. Marshall points out that later in the debates Wilson explained
that "the reason for offering (the amendment) was this: it was thought by some per-
sons that unless these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights
might be extended to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors." Id. at
293, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 157 (1866) (remarks of Rep-
resentative Wilson).
2"8 Id. at 292 - 93, quoting CONG. GLom..., 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1117 (1866) (re-
marks of Representative Wilson).
2" Id. at 295-96 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall stated:
This cumulative evidence of congressional intent makes clear, we
think, that the 1866 statute, designed to protect the "same right ... to
make and enforce contracts" of "citizens of every race and color" was not
understood or intended to be reduced by Representative Wilson's amend-
ment, or any other provision, to the protection solely of nonwhites. Rather,
the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the
making or enforcement of" contracts against, or in favor of, any race. Un-
likely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens would en-
counter substantial racial discrimination of the sort proscribed under the
Act, the statutory structure and legislative history persuade us that the 39th
Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader princi-
ple than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and im-
mediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves. And while the statutory
language has been somewhat streamlined in reenactment and codification,
there is no indication that § 1981 is intended to provide any less than the
Congress enacted in 1866 regarding racial discrimination against white
persons.
Id. at 295-96 (citation omitted).
140 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See text at note 292 supra.
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Court distorted statutory meaning in Weber to reach an interpretation of Title
VII that is wholly at odds with another statute equally applicable by the
Court's own interpretation. Paradoxically, it would appear that employers now
are authorized by Weber to discriminate against whites in a way that section
1981 would not countenance. That the Court reached such an absurd result is
made the more inexcusable by the fact that Brian Weber, along with his Title
VII claim, filed a claim for relief under section 1981:31" a fact completely
ignored by both justices Brennan and Blackmun in their opinions.
A final inconsistency between Weber and prior precedent also is reflected
by McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co."' In that, case, the Court
noted that the EEOC "consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial
discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as
racial discrimination against nonwhites ....""" The present interpretation
of Title VII by the Weber Court ignores the Court's observation in McDonald
regarding EEOC policy and, in that regard is at odds with the principle, first
established in Griggs, that the consistent interpretations of Title VII by the
EEOC arc generally entitled to "great deference." 304 The failure of the
Court to even mention the EEOC interpretations leaves us to guess whether
the deference notion is being generally abandoned or whether, like the non-
discrimination principle itself, it has no application where agency interpreta-
tions regarding "traditionally segregated job categories" are concerned.
Viewed from virtually any angle, the Weber decision departs in at least
some significant way from past precedent. The most pointedly articulated
reason for regarding this departure as lamentable was provided long ago by
Blackstone:
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of
" I See text at note 193 supra.
'' 2 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
" 3 427 U.S. at 279. tiling. EEOC Decision No. 75-268, 10 FEP Gas. 1502
(1975); EEOC Decision No. 74-106. 10 FEP Cas. 269, EEOC Decision No. 74-95, 8
FEP Cas. 701 (1974): EEOC Decision No. 74-31, 7 FEP Gas. 1326 (1973).
The Commission in one case, .for example, gave the following observations:
[A]dherence to [the principle that all discriminatory preferences are
proscribed] cannot be accomplished by automatically disqualifying or fail-
ing to consider potentially qualified males and members of the majority
population. Iii this respect we know of no authority which condones the
automatic exclusion of all candidates except members of designated groups
who have suffered the full hrunt of discrimination even in the name of
affirmative action.
EEOC Case No. 75-268, 10 FEP Gas. 1502, 1503-04 (1975). In another case, the
EEOC said that "a basic premise of Title VII is that employment opportunities arc
accorded primarily to individuals as distinguished from groups." EE0C, Case No. 74-
106, 10 FEP Gas. 269, 273-74 (1974).
"" 4
 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall.,]., concurring). But see General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976), in which the Court. declined to follow an EEOC interpre-
tation that conflicted with earlier Commission pronouncements, contradicted a Labor
Department interpretation, and "sharply conflict[ed] with other indicia of the proper
interpretation Id. at 143.
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justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly
declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his
private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to
his own private judgment, but according to the'known laws and cus-
toms of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one."'"
The Weber Court, then, has done a disservice, if in no other respect than in its
wholesale abandonment of precedent in favor of the uniquely legislative end
of repealing and replacing "known laws." By thus contributing chaos to an
already chaotic area of the law, the Court has further complicated the task of
lawyers and judges who wish to anticipate, as one commentator put it, "which
way the winds will be blowing in the future in the Supreme Court."""" In its
eagerness to legislate, the Weber majority turned its back on its fundamental
judicial responsibility to provide for the orderly development of the law. The
cost of this extravagance in terms of confusion, increased litigation and the
Court's own institutional credibility is difficult to calculate.
2. The Sacrifice of Fundamental Notions Regarding the Separation of Powers
As disruptive and frustrating as the Court's departure from precedent
and the inevitably resulting confusion are, we should be willing to tolerate this
confusion if it were necessary to correct earlier misconceptions of Title VII's
meaning. It. must he asked therefore whether previous majorities had strayed
somehow from the "true way" of Title VII, especially in their application of
the statute in a "color-blind" fashion. Perhaps, in other words, the method of
construction employed by the Weber majority was the proper method for as-
certaining the statute's meaning, while other methods were deficient in sonic
respect. This argument., however, would make a virtue of that which can he
tolerated only at the expense of both democracy and the rule of law. To
appreciate the improper aspects of the Weber majority's method, it is necessary
first to identify with precision the manner in which that method departed
from the proper approach to statutory construction. If we also are able to
recognize how departure From proper method carries certain necessary impli-
cations for the performance of the judicial function within a constitutional
framework, we can begin to appreciate what it is about the method of the
Weber Court that is objectionable.
At the outset, it should be noted that justice Blackmun, who provided
the fifth vote of the Weber majority, abandons all pretense of reliance upon
legislative intent when he concedes that "affirmative action" involves "a practi-
cal problem in the administration of Title VII not anticipated by Congress.'"
::°' I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 159 (W. Lewis ed. 1902).
3" Finley, The Courts and Affirmative Action, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC
SociExY 123 (1... Theberge ed. 1979).
99 S. CA. at 2732 (emphasis added). For further discussion of justice
Blackmun's opinion, see lext and notes at notes 255-62 supra.
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He chooses, rather, to draw upon "additional considerations, practical and
equitable, only partially perceived if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, [to]
support the conclusion reached by the Court ...."" 8
 I n short, Justice
Blackmun tells us that the judiciary is free to infuse a statute with any mean-
ing it deems consistent with "considerations, practical and equitable," irrespec-
tive of whether that meaning comprised any part of the legislative intent. For
those, who may harbor concern about the breadth of discretion this approach
would abrogate to life-tenured judges, effectively beyond the reach of the
political accountability, Justice Blackmun offers the consolation that "if the
Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the
question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses."'"
The technique utilized by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the Court,
on the other hand, lacks Justice Blackmun's rather startling candor; it is more
circumspect, more subtle. justice Brennan begins by hurdling the literal lan-
guage of the statute, which he apparently recognizes would compel the
measuring of discrimination against all races and sexes by the same standard.
He cites Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States I" as support. for his conclu-
sion that "§§ 703(a) and (d) must be read against the background of the
legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act
arose." 3"
 The language from Holy Trinity which Justice Brennan quotes and
on which he relies to rationalize ignoring the words of the statute states, "a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, .
nor within the intention of its makers." 312
One of, the most fundamental rules of statutory construction, however, is
that if the language of the statute bears a plain and unambiguous meaning,
the interpreter must abide by that meaning. An interpreter of a statute
should not, presented with unambiguous language, search for other indices of
legislative intent. An early authority on statutory interpretation, John Austen,
eloquently stated this rule and its raison d'elre:
[Ilf [the interpreter of the statute] he able to discover in the literal
meaning of the words any definite and possible purpose, he com-
monly ought to abide by the literal meaning of the words, though it
vary from the other indices to the actual intention of the legislature.
For, the statute being framed for the very purpose of laying down a
rule to guide the tribunals, it. must be assumed that the terms in
which the law is expressed were carefully measured. If the inter-
preter might ad libitum desert the literal meaning, it would be impossible
for the legislator to express his meaning in terms which would cer-
tainly attain their end..
30H Id. at 2731 (emphasis added).
3" Id. at 2734.
31 " 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
"" 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
3'2
	 quoting 143 U.S. at 459.
313
 2 AUSTEN'S JURISPRUDENCE 94-95 (R. Cambell ed. 1875). This same notion,
which has long enjoyed the respect of scrupulous judges and commentators, also
found expression in the writings of Mr. justice Story:
The only sound principle is to declare ita lex scripta est, to follow and
to obey; nor, if a principle so just could be overlooked, could there be well
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If sections 703(a) and (d) are unambiguous, and Justice Brennan nowhere
suggests otherwise, then the Supreme Court's inquiry should have ended with
the statutory language.
But it might be argued that in the Holy Trinity case the Court indicated
that the intention behind a statute controls over the statutory language itself,
and that justice Brennan simply was following the Holy Trinity mandate.
There are, however, two problems with this argument. First, it is one thing
for a court to reach a result. beyond the specific contemplation of the enacting
legislature; it is quite another to reach a result consciously rejected by the
legislature. Second, in the 1978 case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 3'9
Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by all four of the Justices who joined Jus-
tice Brennan's Weber opinion, noted that the Court had "explained Holy Trinity
as applying only in 'rare and exceptional circumstances.... And there "must
be something to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the stat-
ute is not to prevail.' " 3 ' 5 That justice Brennan failed to point. to any evi-
dence that Congress so intended should surprise no one. There is no such
evidence. In fact, a great deal of the debate on Title VII concerned itself
directly with the need to employ precise language in the statute that would
not engender an unintended construction by the courts."'"
The plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, and the related
limited application of the Holy Trinity exception are firmly grounded in
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Disregard for the narrow
parameters within which the Holy Trinity principle properly may be applied
leads inevitably to judicial incursions into the realm of legislative power. 317 It
was for precisely this reason that. Chief Justice Marshall cautioned:
found a more unsafe guide or practice than mere policy and convenience.
Men on such subjects complexionally differ from each other. The same
men differ from themselves at different times.... The policy of one age
may ill suit the wishes or the policy of another.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES '303 (3d ed.
1858) [hereinafter cited as Story]. See also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 214 (1975).
314
 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
335
 437 U.S. at 187 n.33, quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
See note 318 infra.
al" 110 CONG. REC. 6421-22 (remarks of Senator Morse); id. at 6445-51 (re-
marks of Senator Dickson) (1964).
317 The dangerous path from interpreting statutes in terms of a judicially dis-
covered purpose to the exercise of legislative authority by the Court was clearly de-
scribed in Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60:
Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of ingenuity in the
effort to find justification for wrenching from the words of a statute a
meaning which literally they did not bear in order to escape consequences
thought to he absurd or to entail great hardship. But an application of the
principle so nearly approaches the boundary between the exercise of the
judicial power and that of the legislative power as to call rather for great
caution and circumspection in order to avoid, usurpation of the latter. It is
not enough merely that hard and objectionable or absurd consequences,
which probably were not within the contemplation of the framers, are pro-
duced by an act of legislation. Laws enacted with good intention, when put
to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker himself, turn
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It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic cir-
cumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument ex-
pressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation. Where words
conflict, with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument
bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural
and common import of words be varied, construction becomes
necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is
justifiable. Rut if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not
contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be
disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could
not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and
injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so mon-
strous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting
the application. •°
Putting Chief justice Marshall's formulation with that reaffirmed by the Court
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, it can be seen that there are only two "rare
and exceptional circumstances" in which the Holy Trinity exception to the basic
maxim—that. the literal language of statutory enactments is controlling—
properly may be applied. The first is where Congress has made plain its in-
tention "that the letter of the statute is not to prevail." As already mentioned,
all of the evidence indicates that the 88th Congress was without any such
attention.'; " ' The second circumstance that would make the application of
the Holy Trinity exception proper is where adherence to the literal terms of
the statute would produce a result that would be, to use Chief Justice Mar-
shall's term. "monstrous." Even those who applaud the Weher decision, how-
ever, generally characterize the ultimate issue of the case as "whether
employers may move 'rapidly' or must go 'slowly' in improving employment
opportunities for minorities and women ...." 32" If it be assumed that appli-
cation of sections 703 (a) and (d) according to their terms would require re-
sort to the slower of two methods of redressing traditional forms of discrimi-
nation," 2 ' it hardly seems that this is a result "so monstrous, that all mankind
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. -
tan. 10 be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable. But in such case
the remedy lies with the law making authority, and not with the courts.
Id. See text and notes at notes 332-43 infra.
'"" Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat.] 122, 202-03 (1819).
"1" Indeed, Senator Dirksen in urging (unsuccessfully) that H.R. 7152 he re-
ferred to the Senate judiciary Committee to permit "the most careful deliberations and
the most careful scrutiny, - said: "The courts will take a look at the language in the bill
and out of it they will finally come to a conclusion as to what was the intent.'' 110
Come. REC. 6445 (19(14). See also id. at 64[7-27 (remarks of Senator Morse).
"2" Address by Professor Alfred Blumrosen (June 29. 1979), reprinted in BNA
Daily Labor Report No. 128, F-1 (July 2, 1979).
321 As the ensuing discussion will show, I am not at all convinced that the
application of a uniform anti-discrimination standard to minorities and nonminorities
alike would necessarily result in "slower- progress toward the goal of the elimination
of discrimination on the basis of arbitrary criteria such as race. See text accompanying
notes 362-78 infra.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that where there is am-
biguity in the legislative history of a statute, courts have no choice but to rely
solely upon the language of the statute. 322
 As the previous discussion of the
liberties taken in Justice Brennan's opinion 323
 demonstrates, the most that the
proponents of the policy of numerical employment can say about the legisla-
tive history of Title VII is that it is ambiguous. 324
 Indeed, Justice Brennan's
resort to the legislative record is largely for the ostensible objective of ascer-
taining "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial
discrimination in Tide VII 325
 He finds that "it was clear to Congress
that the crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them,' and it.
was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in
employment was primarily addressed." 32 "
It cannot be disputed that Justice Brennan correctly identifies an objec-
tive of Title VII, There is evidence that there quite likely were others—the
reduction of interracial strife, maximization of the productive potential of the
national work force, and the like. But the Fact that one of the ends of Title
VII was that of opening job opportunities that had been arbitrarily denied to
minorities, however, tells one little about other, equally critical aspects of
statutory meaning such as the method approved for the accomplishment of the
adopted purpose. Justice Brennan's analysis fails to consider that the legisla-
tive prerogative embraces the determination of means, as well as ends. Rather,
"" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29
(1971). It should be noted that Justice Marshall wrote the Court's opinion. The opin-
ion and, presumably, the principle of statutory construction for which it is here cited
(and which was important to the Court's decision in Overton Park), were joined by
Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Stewart. White and Powell. Justice Blackmun con-
curred separately, but "fully join[edl the Court in its opinion and in its judgment." Id.
at 422. With the exceptions of Justice Powell and the Chief Justice all of the Justices
who, at least implicitly, approved the rule of statutory construction in Overton Park
were among the Weber majority.
'1" See text and notes at. notes 212-42 supra.
32' The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the subject of a legislative process that one
commentator has referred to, with particular reference to the more than 70 days of
maneuvering and debates in the Senate, as "titanic and protracted." Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative Ilis. tory, 7 B.C. INnus. & Cost. L. Rev. 431, 443 (1966). Senator Holland at.
one point briefly discussed the 65 changes made by the Senate in the House version
and "regarded by the professional stair of the Judiciary Committee as being most sub-
stantial amendments. - 110 CONG. REC.:. 14219. At another point he included in the
record a list of 106 amendments that had been rejected. Id. at 14460-62. This massive
work was also undertaken in the Senate without the benefit of committee consideration
or reports. Id. at 6455. Notwithstanding the extensive changes, the House, which had
debated the original bill for only six days (adopting in the process 16 of 40 proposed
amendments), voted to accept the bill as amended by the Senate after only a half clay's
debate, much of which was cursory and singularly unelucidating. Id. at 15869-97.
Under the circumstances, at least sonic ambiguity in the legislative history was virtually
assured. Nevertheless, on the issue of equal application of the Act to all races, the
proponents of the bill both in the House and in the Senate consistently disputed the
point, raised by some opponents that minorities would be entitled to special treatment.
325 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
"" Id. at 2728.
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implicit in his opinion is the notion that adoption of the goal of increasing
opportunity for the members of certain groups necessarily implies that any
means conducive to that end is legitimate, even in the face of statutory lan-
guage and other evidence strongly indicating that the legislature chose to ap-
prove quite specific and limited means. In this regard, it is rather ironic that
in support of his conclusion that Title VII was intended to increase minority
job opportunity, justice Brennan quotes briefly from President Kennedy's
message to the Congress introducing the legislation."" In the same message,
the President. indicated that the principal means for progress toward that goal
were: the creation of more jobs through the stimulation of economic growth
"until the total demand for labor is effectively ... headed toward a level of
full employment,"" 28 the enhancement of education and training because
"even the complete elimination of racial discrimination in employment.... will
not put a single unemployed Negro to work unless he has the skills required
and unless more jobs have been created,"""" and the elimination of employ-
ment discrimination because "Mt. is doubly unfair to throw lithe burden of the
denial of employment] on an individual because of his race or color.'" The
President's message clearly shows that he envisioned limitations on the means
to be employed in attaining the desired goal.
By failing or refusing to recognize that. Congress, consistent with the late
President's words, chose the proscription of discrimination against all racial
groups on the same basis as the sole means for accomplishing its goal, the
Weber majority has left behind the constitutional limitations on the judicial
function and has entered the realm of uniquely legislative prerogative. As
clear as this usurpation is, some may assert that where the Congress has failed
adequately to confront the problem, we should rejoice, rather than criticize,
when the Supreme Court steps in to advance the national interest. Perhaps,
after ail, where the objective is a "good" one, such an invasion of the legisla-
tive domain is a matter of no moment. Before reaching such a conclusion,
however, one does well to consider precisely what is lost in the process. This
examination necessarily entails further consideration of the sometimes subtle
relationship between the established rules of statutory construction and the
Constitution, the provisions of which were adopted in large part to check
what Madison referred to as the "encroaching nature" of power."'
The performance of all governmental functions, including those per-
formed by the Supreme Court, must be evaluated against the Founders' un-
yielding commitment to limited government, a product in part of their bitter
experiences with usurpations by officers of the Crown. 332 Many of the litni-
32 7 Id. at 2727-28.
' 2 " 109 CoNG. REC. 11159 (1963). President Kennedy also emphasized that
"Hut- concern with civil rights must not cause any diversion or dilution of our efforts
for economic progress—for without such progress the Negro's hopes will remain
unfulfilled, - Id.
329 Id. at 11160.
330 Id.
331 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, reprinted in Federalist, supra note 10, at 217.
332 See Berger, supra note 1, at 252-54. See also Story, supra note 313, at 144.
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unions they imposed on the Government were express, such as the proscrip-
tion against bills of attainder, but some of the limitations were inherent. in the
structure of the Government itself."'" Governmental power was separated
into three distinct branches, intended to perform distinct functions."a The
legislative branch, to which was conferred .the sole power to create law, was
structured to retard the exercise of that power in all but the most compelling
circumstances. In part, the law-making power was limited through the obsta-
cle of factiousness inherent in large assemblies whose members derive from
diverse regions and circumstances. The provision for sharing such power be-
tween the two houses—"different bodies,. actuated by different motives and
organized upon different principles"" 5
—provided another occasion for the
occurrence of disagreement and, thus, erected an additional obstacle to the
exercise of legislative power. Yet another obstacle to the creation of law was
set up by subjecting the exercise of such power to high political accountability.
Under the system conceived by the Founders, the entire House of Representa-
tives and one-third of the members of the Senate are, at any given moment,
no more than two years away from having to account to their electorates for
their actions. This, as Madison explained it, was specifically calculated to in-
hibit any impulse toward promiscuous lawmaking."" In addition, in those
cases where the formidable obstacles to the accomplishment of a concurrence
of majorities in both houses could be overcome, the framers reposed in the
"" See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 and 48, reprinted in Federalist, supra
note 10, at 211-20.
"4 Justice Brandeis once explained the basic conception as follows:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevit-
able friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also W.
Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers, in IN TULANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1965).
" 5 Story, supra note 313, at 203. J. Story commented that one of the effects of
dividing legislative power was that:
lilt interposes delay between the introduction, and final adoption of a mea-
sure; and thus furnishes time for reflection; and for the successive deliber-
ations of different bodies, actuated by different motives, and organized
upon different principles.
Id. at 202.
""" THE FEDERALIST No. 57, reprinted in Federalist, supra note 10, at 246.
All these securities, however, would he found very insufficient without
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, ... the House of Representatives
is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of
their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their
minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of
power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power
is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must
descend to the level from which they were raised: there forever to remain
unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to
a renewal of it.
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presidency the power to require an even greater consensus through the exer-
cise of the veto power.
In short, the system was calculated to engender in most legislators a hesi-
tancy to act except where the will of the people was clearly articulated or was
otherwise capable of clear perception. The genius of this approach lay in its
utilization of inertia to inhibit the creation of law and, hence, the evils that
flow from the too ready use of legislative power—government expansion,
shrinking personal liberty, ill-considered legislation, demagoguery and so
forth.
When the Supreme Court usurps the legislative function as it did in
Weber, it turns this intricate, carefully conceived and balanced system on its
head. It. is considerably easier for five Supreme Court Justices to agree than it
is for 200 Representatives and over 50 Senators to concur on any given sub-
ject. Moreover, in contrast to the ready political accountability of legislators,
the only effective means enforcing political accou ntability with life-tenured
judges are impeachment 337 and revolution. A cursory consideration of the
issues involved demonstrates that Justice Blackmun's invitation to the Con-
gress to overrule the Court in this matter is an inadequate answer. A 1977
Gallup poll showed 81 percent of those polled to be opposed to preferential
treatment in both jobs and education."" Such widespread popular opposi-
tion likely would make passage of an amendment to Title VII expressly pro-
viding what the Court has "inferred" impossible. Yet, for the Congress to
mount a successful initiative to legislatively overrule Weber, it would have to
overcome the very same impediments to legislative action that almost certainly
would have precluded legislative enactment of the numerical employment pol-
icy in the first, place.
Undoubtedly, there are those who would argue that the complexity of
society and the task of government are much greater than they were in 1789.
Professor Blumrosen, for example, has conceded that "the legislature rather
than the courts should be the prime policy maker in [the employment dis-
crimination] field.""" He has nevertheless castigated those who advocate the
application of Title VII according to its literal terms as operating on "too
33 ' while this may seem a bit extreme, it appears that Hamilton thought the
impeachment of judges for usurping the powers of the legislature an entirely appro-
priate remedy:
There never can be clanger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usur-
pations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united re-
sentment of the body entrusted with it, while this body was possessed of
the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their
stations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, reprinted in Federalist, sopro note 10, at 348.
American Institute of Public Opinion, 2 The Gallup Poll: PUBLIC OPINION
1972-1977 at 1057-60 (C. Gallup ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Gallup]. The pollsters
recorded the following observations about the extraordinarily uniform opposition to
"affirmative action": "Rarely is public opinion, particularly on such a controversial is-
sue, as united as it is over this question. Not a single population group supports
affirmative action. Attitudes are fairly uniform from region to region and among all
age gomps." Id. at 1059.
339 Blumrosen, Strangers, supra ante 115. at 63.
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simple a notion." 4 ° More recently, he has suggested that courts are at liberty
to supply the legislative details where they encounter congressional "use of
generalities to avoid sharp issues... 341
 This sort of reasoning reflects either a
failure to appreciate the genius of the Founders' plan for the separation of
functions and the dispersion of power, or a willingness to pervert it.
Justice Powell, in a recent case, flatly rejected this "fill-in-the-blanks" con-
cept of the interpretation of statutes. According to Justice Powell, this concept
encourages Congress to avoid controversial questions, by use of generalities,
leaving the hard policy decisions to the courts. 342
 On the most fundamental
level, of course, when the Court undertakes to exercise powers committed by
the Constitution to the Congress as it did in Weber, it not only has rewritten
Title VII, but also the Constitution. We have been doubly deprived—first
with respect to our right. to have only politically accountable agents make law,
and then with respect to our right to amend the Constitution only through
the political process prescribed in Article V of the Constitution. Irrespective
of one's views on the merits of "affirmative action," it is important that one
recognize just how much has been sacrificed to five justices' view of expe-
diency. There is much lost. in such usurpations including, ironically, the re-
spect that. is essential to the Court's institutional effectiveness. As Professor
Raoul Berger has forcefully argued: "Respect for the limits on power are the
essence of a democratic society: without it the entire democratic structure is
undermined and the way is paved from Weimar to Hitler." 343
B. The Social and Economic Costs of the Numerical Employment Policy
The institutional costs are not. the only results of the Court's decision in
Weber. Our economy and social framework also suffer greatly from this aber-
ration in announced policies. There is substantial evidence that the numerical
employment policy, in the name of which the Weber majority was willing to
subvert. the Constitution, departs from the precepts that underlay the Ken-
nedy Administration's support of the proposal that became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and is inimical to the long range interests of all groups, including
minorities and women. Early in the message to Congress in which he recom-
mended passage of the Administration's bill, President. Kennedy set forth the
objective as "making it clear to all that race has no place in American life or
law." 34 '1
 Toward the end of the message, he emphasized a desire to "end the
" 4 " Id. at 100-01.
" 41
 Address by Professor Alfred Blumrosen (June 29. 1979), reprinted in RNA
Daily Labor Report No. 128, F-1 (July 2, 1979).
" 2 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1981-82 (1979) (Powell. J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell observed,
It	 invites Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial
question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through pri-
vate litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political choices involved.
Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the
issue to the courts to decide.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
t4" Berger, supra note 1, at 410.
"" 109 CoNG. REC. 11157 (i963).
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kind of racial strife which this Nation can hardly afford," and then para-
phrased Lincoln, saying: "In giving freedom to the Negro, we assure freedom
to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve.'" His
was a vision of an America in which jobs would be awarded on the basis of
training and ability, and the color of a man's skin would he irrelevant. He
expressed strong interest in improving the economic lot of minorities, but he
was equally unequivocal in the expression of his conviction that the key to
such improvement lay in the maintenance of a healthy economy. President
Kennedy stated, "[o]ur concern with civil rights must not cause any diversion
or dilution of our efforts for economic progress—for without such progress
the Negro's hopes will remain unfulfilled."'" It is against this vision of an
America where color is irrelevant in employment Opportunity, and the
economy expands to provide jobs for all that the merits of the numerical
employment. policy should be measured. When this is done, it becomes appar-
ent that the numerical employment policy does not produce a net benefit for
the society as a whole or, indeed, for the long range collective interests of the
groups that supposedly comprise its intended beneficiaries. Moreover, he saw
very clearly and specifically how progress in minority employment is linked to
national economic progress and the steps that would have to be taken to ad-
vance both interests.""
I. Social Costs
One of the most obvious social costs of any system in which the members
of one group are favored over those of another, solely on the basis of group
membership, is, to borrow the apt phrase of the Fifth Circuit in its Weber
opinion, "the seeds of racial animus such affirmative relief inevitably
sows." 3" In another recent case, it was observed: "The polarization of races
that quotas exhibit creates a divided police department—instead of unifying
and strengthening it, the quota underscores differences and sows seeds of
internal hatred." 3 a" With the advent. of numerical employment programs,
346 Id. at 11161.
346 Id. at 11159.
317 In this regard President Kennedy said:
More jobs must be created through greater economic growth. The
Negro—too often unskilled, too often the first to he fired and the last to
be hired—is a primary victim of recessions, depressed areas, and unused
industrial capacity. Negro unemployment will not be noticeably diminished
in this country until the total demand for labor is effectively increased and
the whole economy is headed toward a level of full employment. When our
economy operates below capacity, Negroes are more severely affected than
other groups. Conversely, return to full employment yields particular ben-
elks to the Negro. Recent studies have shown that for every 1 percentage
point decline in the general unemployment rate there tends to be a
2-percentage-point reduction in Negro unemployment.
Prompt and substantial tax reduction is a key to achieving the full
employment we need.
Id.
3" 563 F.2d at 227.
3" Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Stipp. 979, 1015 (E.D. Mich.
1978), reTid, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Bakke v. Regents of University of
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one must expect whites excluded by a racial preference to respond with a
resentment very much akin to that experienced and expressed by the tradi-
tional victims of such preferences. Supervisors, shop stewards, personnel of-
ficers, labor lawyers and all who have any significant contact with rank and
file workers can attest that this expectation currently is being fulfilled. At trial,
Brian Weber described the effect produced by the Kaiser-USWA plan by not-
ing, "the racial relations of the white workers toward their black countet'parts,
black employees at Kaiser, have progressively gotten worse because of the fact
that they realize that the company and the Union have a program in effect
which uses race to promote employees ahead of themselves."""
If this reaction were to be encountered only among the remaining unen-
lightened souls who still harbor the last vestiges of bigotry in their breasts, it
might be dismissed as a regrettable effect of an otherwise defensible and
necessary policy. Unfortunately for those who would so readily dismiss the
matter, however, much the same reaction is to be found among those who
were firmly committed to the cause of equal opportunity (as opposed to equal-
ity of result)."' Even among the staunch adherents to the policy of numeri-
cal employment, there has appeared a dawning recognition that the "affirma-
tive action" question has been producing disaffection and division among the
ranks of the "liberal-labor-minority-female-Jewish coalition," which has fig-
ured so prominently in political developments throughout the broad range of
civil rights issues." 52 Intended or 110L, 353 the weakening of this coalition very
California, , 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978), where the California Supreme Court said: "The
divisive effect of such preferences needs no explanation and raises serious doubts
whether the advantages obtained by the few preferred are worth the inevitable cost to
racial harmony." Id. at 61-62, 553 P.2d at 1171, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (footnote omit-
ted).
3" Brief for Respondent at 11, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99
S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
351 A commentator repenting his former liberal beliefs noted that,
Many of my friends, comrades in political philosophy and causes ex-
pressed surprise and dismay over my new found "conservatism." The en-
tire affair provoked the following reflections.
Too much of so-called liberal or progressive thinking today is in fact illib-
eral, unprogressive, and unintelligent. The essence of liberalism has always
been concern with the welfare, rights and responsibilities of individuals qua
individuals, not the masses or classes or other such linguistic abstractions.
Furthermore, although there has been disagreement among liberals as to
what social arrangements might best liberate individual capacities, no dis-
agreement exists with the thesis that illiberal means, means that impose
avoidable injustices on individuals, cannot achieve just ends.
Nisbet, Affirmative Action—A Liberal Program? REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 50, 52 (B.R.
Gross ed.) (1977) (emphasis in original). Judge Wisdom in his Weber opinion also rec-
ognized that the "reverse discrimination" issue has "caused heated debates, some be-
tween former allies." 563 F.2d at 238 (Wisdom, j., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
352 See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Di-
mensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 678 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen, Quotas].
The possibility that this was a calculated political result has been raised by,
among others, Thomas Sowell:
7(1	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:1
well could prove costly to future efforts to obtain legitimate, truly desirable
political objectives. Only time will tell the full extent of these costs, but recent
events certainly suggest that the bill is not yet fully paid.
Another expense that should not be overlooked is the countereducative
impact of governmental endorsement of a policy of preferential treatment. In
effect., the Government is telling employers that they may not use certain "ar-
bitrary" standards that are disadvantageous to certain groups (such as the
high school diploma requirement disapproved in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 354), but they can, indeed must, 355 use another arbitrary standard (external
labor market proportions) that is generally disadvantageous to certain other
groups. The lesson that many can and are taking from this policy is that it is
not arbitrariness itself that is objectionable, but those kinds of arbitrariness
that do not give the advantage to governmentally favored groups. a 5 `'
In addition to this suggestion of Government sponsored arbitrariness,
there is a clear implication in the proportionality principle that something is
inherently illegitimate in heterogeneity itself. Buried just beneath the surface
of the 111./ merical employment policy is the notion that human groups, and the
individuals who comprise them, are fungible entities. Before we permit this
attitude to become as ingrained among the populace as it apparently is in the
federal government, we would do well to consider the many cultural and so-
cial benefits that heterogeneity has produced. We also should recall that the
abhorrence many of us felt for discrimination in the first place sprang from a
conviction that it was fundamentally irrational and morally wrong to measure
any individual by a standard that presumed him to possess a characteristic
Who were the gainers from "affirmative action . ' quotas? Politically, the
Nixon Administration, which introduced the program, gained by splitting
the ethnic coalition which had elected liberal Democrats for decades. slacks
and Jews, for example, were immediately at each other's throats, after hav-
ing worked together for years on civil-rights legislation and other socio-
political goals. Whether the architects of Watergate had any such
Machiavellian design in mind is a question on which each can speculate for
himself.
Sowell, "Affirmative Action" Reconsidered, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 47, 64 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Sowell]. See also notes 130-31 supra.
354
 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
155 Shortly after the Supreme Court handed clown its decision in Weber, Wel-
don Rouge, Director of OFCCP, was quoted as saying that "there's just no question
they [contractors] have to do it [affirmative action)" or risk being barred from federal
contracts. In Weber's Wake: Government job-bias enforcers ready a crackdown, Wall St. j.,
July 10, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
3" Professor John Hart Ely has put the matter this way:
government's intentional and explicit use of race as a criterion of
choice is hound—no matter how careful the explanation that this is a
"good" use of race—to weaken the educative force of its concurrent in-
struction that a man is to be judged as a man, that his race has nothing to
do with his merit. Citizens, thus besieged by what will understandably be
taken to represent two conflicting government endorsed principles, are
likely to listen to the voice they wish to hear. (footnote omitted).
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE	 1205,
1259 (197(1). See also Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. C.T. REV, 1, 22-23.
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(stereotype) that was further presumed to be shared by all members of the
group with which he was associated. The presumption of capability, after all,
is but the reverse side of the coin on which the presumption of incapability is
stamped. To borrow the eminently fitting aphorism of Professor Philip Kur-
land, "[i]t is, I submit, one thing for Gertrude Stein to tell us: 'A rose is a rose
is a rose is a rose.' It is another for the courts and bureaucracies to tell us that
a black is a black is a black."'
Another undesirable social consequence of race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion is what. has been referred to as the "balkanization" of the country "by
fostering the dangerous notion that. ethnic, racial or religious groups are enti-
tled to proportional representation in all occupations.' " 3 " This phenome-
non manifests itself in a number of unfortunate ways, one of which is the
perceived (or in many cases real) thrusting of those minority group members
who have attained desirable positions into the role of representative for their
respective groups. Consequently, it often happens that these individuals suffer
under the dual handicaps of polarized relations with their non-minority co-
workers and ever-mounting pressures from their fellow group members who
urge them to "push" for greater allocations of positions and other benefits for
their group.
Finally, the devaluation of accomplishment is perhaps the unkindest
product of this policy that "cannot be generalized or gentle." 359 As a result,
minorities are robbed of the satisfaction accompanying the certainty that one
got where one is because one was judged truly worthy on the merits. There is
also a collateral detriment to non-minorities who are passed over and either
told or encouraged to believe that their failure was due, not to some defi-
ciency that they should work to overcome, but to the immutable, governmen-
tally created fact of life: "affirmative action." It thus becomes too difficult for
minorities justifiably to take the credit for accomplishment and too easy for
non-minorities to reject their responsibility for failure. The devaluation of
minority accomplishment, moreover, works both prospectively and retrospec-
tively, introducing doubt as to the true merit of past achievements.""
157 Kurland, Ruminations On The Quality of Equality, 1979 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L.
121w, 1, 19 (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Kurland].
358 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 11.17 (5th
Cir. 1977), quoting Silberman, supra note 60, at 12, col. 5.
3 '" Silberman, supra note GO, at. 12, col. 5.
31"' The impact of' affirmative action on subjective notions of merit has been
well established!:
During the 1960's—before "affirmative action"—black incomes in the
United States rose at a higher rate than white incomes. So too did the
proportion of blacks in college and in skilled and professional
occupations—and along with this came a faster decline in the proportion
of black families below the poverty line or living in substandard housing.
When people ask why blacks cannot pull themselves up the way other op-
pressed minorities did in the past, many white liberals and black "spokes-
men" fall right into the trap and rush in to offer sociological "explana-
tions." Hut there is nothing to explain. The fact is that blacks have pulled
themselves up—from further down, against stronger opposition—and
show every indication of continuing to advance.
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It may well be for some or all of these reasons that among blacks, the
group that proponents of the numerical employment policy claim most "need"
its benefits, there is substantial disagreement as to its desirability. In one re-
cent survey, for example, fully 53 percent of the blacks polled expressed dis-
approval of the proposition that, there should be a federal law giving blacks
special advantages over whites in college entrance and employment.'" Even
more dramatically, in a March. 1977, nationwide Gallup poll, 64 percent of
the non-whiles and 82 percent of the females in the sample indicated that
blacks and women should not be given preferential treatment in employment
and college admissions." 2 These statistics suggest that the "beneficiaries" of
the numerical employment policy recognize a good deal more about the social
costs of "affirmative action" than those who are so eager to foist it on them.
2. Economic Costs
The social costs of the policy of numerical employment are certainly
great, but as with most well-intentioned Government programs, this one also
comes with a tangible, if not precisely ascertainable, economic price tag. The
proponents of the policy argue that it is necessary, in part, because in a de-
clining economy minorities and women are the hardest hit. Assuming the ac-
curacy of the premise, there is an obvious question that must he asked, but
that is omitted from the discussions: Are efforts toward proportional rep-
While this advance is the product of generations of struggle, it accel-
erated at an unprecedented pace in the 1960's, once the worst forms of
discrimination had been outlawed and stigmatized. Black income as a per-
centage of white income reached its peak in I 970—ihe year Inju re numeri-
cal `goals and titnetables." That percentage has gone down since. 1,Vhat
"affirmative action" has done is to destroy the legitimacy of what had al-
ready been achieved, by making all black achievements look like questiona-
ble accomplishments, or even outright gills. Here and there, this program
has undoubtedly caused some individuals to be hired who would otherwise
not have been hired—but even that is a doubtful gain in the larger context
of attaining self-respect and the respect. of others.
Sowell, supra note 353, at 63-64. At least one other commentator goes so far as to
suggest that the failure of blacks to make greater progress may itself' be attributable
the interference of the Government in unprecedented ways:
The most tragic thing about the failure to recognize that is that the
failure of a large percentage of Negroes and other minorities to "melt" into
America's melting pot is viewed by many members of society as group in-
competence. Hardly anyone lays the responsibility for this problem where
it belongs: to the excesses of government controls. I would guess that if we
• abolished the minimum wage law, reduced licensing restrictions, changed
labor legislation and reorganized the delivery of education, in twenty to
thirty years hence there would be no "Negro problem" as there is no
Japanese, Chinese, Jewish or other earlier-immigrant problem. These
people were able to start off poor and progress because they did not face
the market restrictions that today's minorities face.
Williams, Government Sanctioned Restraints . that Reduce Economic Opportunities for
Minorities, 2 POLICY REVIEW 7, 30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
111
 l olce & Gray, Blacks, Whites and "Race Politics," The Public Interest 61, 64
(1979).
' 2 See Gallup, supra note 338, ai 1057.
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resentation of minorities and females the "cure," or will they inevitably
exacerbate the disease? Even cursory examination of the facts suggests that
their effect far more likely will be the latter.
At. the outset, it should be recalled that President Kennedy set forth the
premise in 1963 that "Negro unemployment will not be noticeably diminished
in this country until the total demand for labor is effectively increased and the
whole economy is headed toward a level of full employment." 3 " 3 He based
this notion on "[decent. studies [that] have shown that for every one percent-
age point decline in the general unemployment rate there tends to be a
2-percentage point reduction in Negro unemployment." 3 " 4
A recent report of the Joint Economic Committee states that "the
solution [to our economic ills] lies in the adoption of longer run policies
aimed at expanding the supply side of the economy; that is, at expanding our
Nation's productive potential in a manner that raises dramatically the growth
of American productivity."""'' How, it may well be asked, does "race-
conscious affirmative action" relate to productivity? Again, for insight at the
most fundamental, and hence most significant, level Brian Weber's testimony
is quite instructive:
[I]t. [the Kaiser/USWA Plan] takes away from the initiative of the
individual employee to do more, to do one step further, to do all of
his job in the best way he knows how, because he knows that even no
matter how well he does it, he won't be able to be promoted, because
of this 50 percent minority requirement of the company."""
At the same time that the rancor bred by numerical employment policy
works to reduce the productivity of those who, rightly or wrongly, perceive
themselves as having been its victims, it may also be producing a similar effect
among its beneficiaries. To the extent that employment decisions are made on
a basis other than the ability to produce, there may be engendered something
of a "social insurance mentality" that encourages one to view one's job as an
entitlement, rather than as a reward for performance. In addition, to the ex-
tent that the employer is either required or permitted to hire, promote, trans-
fer or increase wages for anyone other than those who are the most qualified
and productive of the available labor pool, productivity will he diminished in
direct, relation to the failure to maximize productive potential at each position.
The numerical employment policy deprives the employer of both objec-
tive and subjective means of predicting productivity potential where racial
groups are affected adversely and the employer is able to demonstrate "valid-
ity" through a very complex and often prohibitively expensive procedure. 3"
3"
 109 CoNc.. Ric. 11159 (1963).
3" Id. See note 347 supra.
"" 5 JOINT ECONOMIC Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Midyear Review Of
The Economy: The Outlook For 1979 at 28 (Comm. Print 1979).
3"" Respondent's Brief at 12, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S.
Gt. 2721 (1979).
107 See generally text and notes at notes 172-80, supra. Professor Blumrosen
apparently endorses this notion: "Thus, during the period of adverse effect, all criteria,
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This practical compulsion to choose employees on the basis of race is quite
likely to have its most profound impact on productivity in entry level jobs,
which generally will attract younger applicants. The labor pool from which
the applicants come will generally contain a predominance of minority work-
ers as a result of the extraordinarily high rate of minority teenage un-
employment, a phenomenon that has been quite convincingly tied to recent
rapid increases in the minimum wage.'" Add to this the evidence of high
functional illiteracy rates, especially in the South, and it is easy to see that. an
employer may have a difficult time acquiring a functional, let alone produc-
tive, workforce.'" This "crunch" could be expected to be especially acute in
labor intensive industries, where the additional cost. to the employer of less pro-
ductive workers, coupled with the administrative cost of compliance with federal
regulation, often will provide the incentive to resort to labor saving capital
investment.'" This effect is, of course, doubly unfortunate in that it raises
short run unemployment and elirinnates a "feeder-industry," 371 wherein many
minority workers would be able to acquire the training and experience neces-
sary for advancing to more highly skilled and more desirable jobs.
In addition to these problems, another form of economic impact, making
itself felt, principally among the more highly skilled jobs, results from "affirm-
ative action's" distortion of the labor market for the already limited supply of
qualified minorities. It was the unavailability of skilled black craftsmen, it
bears noting, that provided a major stimulus for the Kaiser/USWA plan. In-
deed, a recent. article in the New York Times indicates that N.A.A.C.P., itself,
has had difficulty obtaining and retaining qualified minority employees.'"
objective and subjective. arc suspect if' they do not contribute to the expeditious elimi-
nation of the adverse effect." Blumrosen, Strangers, supra note 115, at 104 (emphasis
added). f' "all criteria" carry the potential for legal liability, the employer is clearly put
to the choice of racial (or sexual) preferences or random selection. Elsewhere, Profes-
sor Blumrosen expresses his concern "that both subjective judgment and objective
standards may fail to improve the opportunities of minorities and women, - and reveals
that the idea is to "help channel the discretion of the employer so that tic does not, in
the exercise of his discretion, perpetuate the exclusionary pattern." Blumrosen, Quotas,
supra note 352, at 687 (footnote omitted). He also declares his disdain IDE a productiv-
ity criterion by indicating that this is precisely the employer "discretion' . he would
"help channel": "For example, the uncritical assumption that hiring and promotion
decisions are normally made on the basis of maximum productivity has been shown
again and again to be a vast oversimplification which conceals within it a wide range of
employer discretion." Id, at 683 (footnote omitted).
"'" Brozen. The Effect if Statutory Minimum Wage Increases on Teenage Unemploy-
ment, J. LAW	 Ecox. 109. 117-21 (1969): Williams. supra note 360, at 10-19.
31i" See McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47
FORD. L. RE.v. 651, 653-54 (1979).
37° G. Tur.t.ocK & R. OAGNEK. POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING
117-18 (1978).
" 71
 For a brief discussion of the "feeder-industry" concept and how it relates to
employment discrimination laws, see Munne11, The Economc Experience of Blacks, 1978
NEW ENG. Edo`. REV. 5, 17.
372 Delaney, The Struggle to Rally Black America, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1979, § 6
(Magazine), at 20, 29, col. 2. One commentator has graphically illustrated the problems
created by this "Balkanization - of the job market in the higher education field:
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Because of the pressure to meet "goals and timetables," the unnatural de-
mand for qualified minority employees practically compels the employer to
pay a premium in order to compete with other employers who face the same
pressure." 73 Obviously the more capital that is consumed in the payment of
premium wages, the less there is available for job creation at the entry level. It.
also must be recognized that. this capital is consumed in a way that does noth-
ing to enhance productivity.
Finally, governmental regulation itself diverts capital to the non-
productive purpose of "compliance"—drafting "affirmative action plans," fil-
ing required reports, and paying lawyers to work through the bewildering
mass of federal regulations. In its most recent report, the Joint Economic
Committee refers to this cost as "a significant deterrent of productivity
growth." 74 The Committee also estimates that compliance with governmen-
tal regulations cost $100 billion for 1979 alone. t'' The total price tag on the
numerical employment policy probably will never be known. That it costs a
great. deal appears quite certain. 37 " Most importantly, it diverts resources
that otherwise would be available to stimulate the economy, help in job forma-
tion, and thus create the expanding labor market that John Kennedy over 16
years ago told us would be essential.
If the counterproductive effect of the numerical employment policy were
not already evident, it surely would become so upon review of the tables set
forth in the appendix to this article. As the figures in the tables demonstrate,
the ten year period beginning the year before the Philadelphia Plan was im-
plemented hardly was one of the sort, of numerical "progress" for minorities
that the proponents of "affirmative action" purport to have as their goal. In
every age group, both male and female minority group members suffered an
erosion in the percentages of their group in the workforce able to find work.
Except for minority females between the ages of 25 and 44, every age group
[These charades take the place of meeting quotas which no one seriously
expects to be met. For example, if American colleges and universities were
to hire every black Ph.D. in the United States, active or retired (or indeed,
living or dead)—a 100 percent drain from industry, government, and
other institutions—the result would still he less than three black faculty
members per institution. Given the hard facts of the situation, it is not
surprising that colleges and universities do not fulfill their employment
"goals.- but instead go through a costly and demoralizing process called
"good faith efforts- -a process equally embittering to supporters and op-
ponents of "affirmative action." This produces few johs and much anguish.
Sowell, supra note 353 at 58.
" 73 See id. at 63.
" 74 JoixT EcoNomic CONIN1., 96th Cong., 1st Sess.. Report on Midyear Review of
the Economy: The Outlook for 1979 at 34 (Comm. Print 1979).
375 JOINT ECONOMIC Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Summary 11) . Midyear Report and
Staff Study 27 (Comm. Print 1979).
For example, the University of Michigan spent $350,000 in connection with
its "affirmative action - program just to compile the necessary statistics. Sowell, supra
note 353, at 57. For some further indications of the regrettable effects of this kind of
governmental regulation upon the in slit li t ii ms of higher education in this country, see
Plastering College With Federal Paper Work, 87 U.S. News and World Report 49-50 (Dec.
24. 1979).
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in both sexes suffered similar reductions in the percentage of the total popu-
lation employed." 77
 Perhaps most significantly. losses were concentrated
among those who were new to or just entering the work force. Minorities also
have significantly ffillen off their previous pace for acquiring new jobs created
by expansion of the labor market.. Between 1963 and 1968, before "affirma-
tive action," 12.6 percent of over eight million new jobs went to minorities.
Between 1968 and 1977, however, when they were "benelitting" from the
policy of numerical employment., minorities were able to acquire only 11.2
percent of the just over fourteen and a half million new jobs created during
that period." 78
It would stretch credulity to suggest that employers began discriminating
more during this period. Nor would it be sensible to ascribe the phenomenon
to suddenly intensified present. effects of past discriminatory acts. If this had
been the case, the effects should not have been concentrated, as they were,
among the most youthful age groups. In the declining rate of new job acquisi-
tion, we can see the vindication of President Kennedy's theory. In an expand-
ing, healthy economy there is greater opportunity generally, and minority op-
portunity in particular improves at a more accelerated rate. We need to
return to President Kennedy's original insight: "Our concern with civil rights
377 The total • population for a given group (e.g., minority males aged 20-24)
includes those who are "fpiersons not in the labor force" as the Bureau of Labor
Statistics uses that phrase. This means "all civilians 16 years of age and over who are
not classified as employed or unemployed. -
 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1978, at 2 (1979). "Employed persons" and "un-
employed persons" are defined as follows:
Employed persons comprise: (a) all those who, during the survey week,
worked at all as paid employees, in their own business or profession or on
their own farm, or who worked 15 hours or more as unpaid workers in an
enterprise operated by a family member; and (b) all those who were not
working but who had jobs or businesses from which they were temporarily
absent because of illness, bad weather, vacation, labor-management dispute,
or personal reasons, whether or not they were paid by their employers for
the time off, and whether or nor they were seeking other jobs.
Each employed person is counted only once. Those who held more
than one job are counted in the job at which they worked the greatest
number of hours during the survey week.
Included in the total are employed citizens of foreign countries, te ► -
porarily in the United States, who are not living on the premises of an
Embassy. Excluded are persons whose only activity consisted of work
around the house (such as own home housework and painting or repairing
own home) or volunteer work for religious, charitable, and similar organi-
zations.
Unemployed persons comprise all persons who did not work during the
survey week, who made specific efforts to find a job within the past 4
weeks, arid who were available for work during the survey week except for
temporary illness. Also included as unemployed arc those who did not
work at all, were available for work, and (a) were waiting to be called back
to a job from which they had been laid oil; or (h) were waiting to report to
a new wage or salary job within 30 days.
Id. at I (emphasis added).
3713 These figures are derived from, id., Table 3 at 28-32, and Table 58 at 177-
180.
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must not cause any diversion or dilution of our efforts for economic
progress—for without such progress the Negro's hopes will remain unful-
filled."" 7 " Anything, including the numerical employment policy, that tends to
retard economic progress is also destructive of the end of increased minority
employment.
V. CONCLUSION
The simple fact of the matter is that the policy of numerical employment
emerged from an era of highly questionable motivations, was developed
through highly questionable means, and produces highly questionable results.
It is a legacy of the administration that gave us Watergate, but also a good
deal more. It may go too far to assert as fact that "affirmative action" was a
product of the same mentality that yielded the more notorious characteristics
of the "Imperial Presidency," but experience with these other characteristics
counsels the awakening of doubt." 80 Of course, even the most pernicious of
regimes may be capable of the right deed for the wrong reason. The fact that
the Nixon Administration, with its demonstrated proclivity for resort to calcu-
lated divisive action as a strategy for its political perpetuation, fathered "race-
conscious affirmative action" does not necessarily mean that the policy itself is
evil. It does, however, demand that we call into question its basic premises
and scrutinize closely its effects. On doing so, we find that the policy of num-
erical employment is substantially counterproductive of even its purported
ends. Even if it were clear that it increased the relative percentage of
minorities and females among those who are employed, any quota system that
artificially adjusts these percentages must do so at the expense of sound
economic policy. Thus, although the relative percentages of minorities and
females in the workforce may rise, the absolute number of employees from all
groups, and hence the total number of minority and female employees will
expand less rapidly than would be the case without the economically retarda-
tive effects of "affirmative action."
There is also a sense in which even the advantage gained by the "ben-
eficiaries" of numerical employment is, economically speaking, more appar-
ent than real. True, the minority employees who were promoted over Brian
Weber now occupy a job, at presumably higher pay, that they would not have
109 CoNG. REC. 1 1159 (190) (message of President Kennedy).
38" Professor Kurland, among others, has admonished that it is probably prema-
ture for us to pronounce ourselves cured of the disease that produced Watergate:
The crisis of Watergate was a crisis of cumulated power. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines crisis as "the point in the progress of a disease
when an important development or change takes place which is decisive of
recovery or death." In this instance, death was avoided....
The notion that because we have conic through one critical period we
have been restored to health is more wish than reality. Perhaps we have
removed a cancerous growth that could have killed us. We have not rid the
system of the disease.
P. Kurland, supra note 71, at 4.
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gotten when they did but for the color of their skin. But the economic com-
ponent of the cost of numerical employment generally must be passed along
one way or another if the employer is to stay in business. One way to do this
would be to increase the amount of bids submitted for federal contracts. Since
some companies (especially relatively small businesses) will be less able than
others to absorb the administrative expense of "affirmative action" their bids
will become non-competitive, effectively diminishing competition for reasons
unrelated to quality of performance. This anti-competitive impact, coupled
with the "affirmative action" cost. component incorporated in the remaining
competitive bids, results in an increased overall cost of goods and services
obtained by the Government.
The Government, in turn, can deal with the increased cost factor in
either of two ways. The first. is to increase taxes and the second is to increase
deficit spending, thereby fueling inflation. In the former case all of us, includ-
ing the "beneficiaries" of numerical employment, end up with fewer spenda-
ble dollars; in the latter, the dollars we receive are worth less. But it is not
likely to end there. Under Labor Department Regulations, federal contractors
are obliged to implement the numerical employment policy not just as to
those employees who work on the Government contract, but as to all their
employees."' Since it would generally be difficult. to pass all of this expense
on to the Ggvernment and maintain a competitive bidding posture, at least
some of it will be passed along to consumers. This, in turn, will tend to make
it more difficult for the government. contractor to compete in the private sec-
tor market with those who either have eschewed or have been forced to
forego participation in the federal contract market. Moreover, this sort of
governmental regulation can only make more difficult the task of competing
against foreign business interests, and to the extent it does so the balance of
payments will be adversely affected.
There are two particularly remarkable things about such considerations.
First, there is no indication that they occurred to the Weber Court. Second,
even if they had, they raise issues, the proper assessment of which is well
beyond the peculiar competence of courts. These are, in a word, legislative
issues. The pragmatic problem with the Court's incursion into this realm is
that it placed itself in the position of having to do what it could only do
poorly, if at all. Nevertheless a majority of the Court proved itself quite will-
ing to make the policy judgment, however superficially, that. "affirmative ac-
tion" was in the national interest. The only strand of judicial restraint to be
found in the opinions for the majority is in Justice Brennan's refusal to "de-
fine in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible
affirmative action plans." 382
 As Professor Bernard Meltzer has pointed out,
however, this just. "adds another ironic twist. to a decision preceded by argu-
ments that something had to be done to alleviate the uncertainties resulting
3" 29 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1979) requires a federal Contractor to "develop a writ-
ien affirmative action compliance program for each of its establishments. -
 (Emphasis
added).
"" 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
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from discordant regulations."'" The Court, it seems, is all too eager to gov-
ern, but reluctant to guide. The upshot. of this is that those of us who work in
this area of the law are left with more questions than we had before the Weber
case was decided. °
The Fact that questions remain, however, leaves some hope that the dam-
age may yet be mitigated. Indeed, the pervasive impropriety in the Court's
judicial method, the fact that two key justices (Stevens and Powell) did not
participate in the decision, and the lingering question of "Mhich wisdom will
befall Mr. Justice Stewart," "" all contribute to the possibility of a sub-
sequent opinion that would substantially narrow Weber's scope."" Indeed,
the fact that the excessive zeal of the Weber majority is so clear may itself
provide much of the impetus for its moderation or early reversal. It was this
sentiment that Judge Gee, who wrote the Fifth Circuit majority opinion in
Weber, expressed when he took the extraordinary step of dissenting to the
order remanding the case to the district court pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision. 387
Regardless of the ultimate fate of the numerical employment policy,
however, there are larger issues that must concern us more. As unwise as
"affirmative action" surely is, the significance of that unwisdom pales beside
the philosophy of government that gave the policy birth and sustains it. It is a
philosophy that springs from an impatience with democratic processes and a
lack of faith in the ability of people to regulate their own conduct. It is a
383 Meltzer, The Weber Case: Double Talk and Double Standards, 3 REGULATION 34,
41 (1979).
"84 For a listing of at feast some of the questions that remain, see Connolly,
Legislative, Case History Support "Dishonesty" Cries In Court's "Weber" Ruling, The Legal
Times of Washington 42, 46 (August 13, 1979).
"85 Id. For a discussion of Stewart's enigmatic and unexplained shift from the
Stevens bloc in Bakke to the Brennan bloc in Weber, see text at notes 249-54, supra.
"s" As this article was in its final stages of preparation for publication, the Su-
preme Court handed down its decision in Fullilove v. Klutznik, 48 U.S.L.W, 4979 (July
2, 1980), rejecting a constitutional challenge to the 10% minority set-aside provision in
103(0(2) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. 6705(f)(2) (Sapp. 1
1977). Although the decision in that case makes it clear, for the first lime, that a
majority of the Court regards the interest in ameliorating the effects of past discrimi-
nation as a "compelling governmental interest," the opinions shed lin le fight upon
most of the issues with which this article is concerned. Chief Justice Burger, who deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court (concurred in by Justices White and Powell), heavily
emphasized the fact that the "broad remedial powers - of the Congress, as opposed to
the less expansive powers of the other branches, compelled the Court. to give the stat-
ute a reading that accorded due regard to the constitutional scope of congressional
authority. 48 Li.S.I„W. at 4986, 4988. The opinion of the Chief Justice and the sepa-
rate concurring opinion of Justice Powell both underscored the fact that § 103(0(2)
and the regulations promulgated thereunder had been carefully crafted to assure that
only those mnmrity businesses that. had been actually disadvantaged by past discrimina-
tion were made the beneficiaries of the set-aside provision. Id. at 4989-90, 4997, In-
terestingly, Justice Stewart., who along with Justice Rehnquist dissented, declared flatly:
"Linder our Constitution, the government may never•act to the detriment of a person
solely because of that person's race." Id. at 5000 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"" 611 E.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge Gee referred to the Court's decision as
"profoundly wrong" and its statutory interpretation message as "a grievous thing."
Judge Gee wrote:
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philosophy that regards the electoral and legislative system prescribed by the
Constitution as rather bothersome obstacles to efficacious government, the
way to which appears only to those on whom wisdom magically descends
upon their appointment to the Supreme Court or Government agencies. it is
to them alone that falls the weighty responsibility for perceiving and imple-
menting the "true meaning- of our national values, even if in doing so they
must sacrifice logical and linguistic consistency with statutory and constitu-
tional articulations of the public will.
A case could perhaps be made that processes conceived in the eighteenth
century are simply no longer viable in the twentieth, and we therefore have
110 choice but to resort. to other means for the regulation of a complex mod-
ern society. F..ven if there were a consensus on this point, however, and there
is considerable evidence that there is not, there remain the questions of who
shall make the necessary changes and what form should they take. What the
Nixon Administration and the Weber Court share, if nothing else, is a pre-
sumption that. those who occupy the seats of government may themselves as-
sume the power to accomplish its revision. But George Washington, who had
perhaps more occasion than any of his successors to face both the temptation
and the opportunity to indulge the same presumption, left us in his farewell
address with an admonition against precisely that course:
If', in the opinion of the people the distribution or the modifica-
tion of the constitutional powers be, in any particular wrong, let it be
corrected by an amendment, in the way which the Constitution de-
signates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this,
in one instance, may be the instrument_ of good it is the customary
weapon by which free governments are destroyed.""
Like so many other government policies today, the numerical employ-
ment. policy demonstrates once again the incapacity of government for doing
much of anything in the way of social regulation well. There is much evidence
But sadder still—tragic, in my own view—is the Court's departure
from the long road that we have traveled front Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 LEd. 256 (1896), toward Making good Mr.
justice Harlan's anguished cry in dissent that [olur Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559,
16 S. Ct. at. 1146. I voiced my profound belief that this present. action, like
Plessy, is a wrong and dangerous turning, and my confident hope that we
will soon return to the high, right road on which we disdain to classify a
citizen, any citizen, to any degree or for any purpose by the color of his
skin.
Id. at 113.
"" THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 a. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940) (foot-
notes indicating changes in Washington's final text omitted).
Thomas Paine was even more pointed. He expressed the conviction that the as-
sumption of the power of revision is utterly incompatible with the constitutional form:
A government on the principles on which constitutional governments,
arising out of society are established, cannot have the right of altering it-
self. If it had, it would be arbitrary. It might make itself what it pleased;
and wherever such a right is set up, it shows that there is no constitution.
E. BURKE & T. PAINE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REIvoLuTioN IN FRANCE & THE Rican's OF
MAN 310 (Dolphin Books Ed. 1961).
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of a dawning recognition of this incapacity among the people of this country,
and even among some of our politicians." 8 • In this there is hope, but we
must not lose sight. of the fact that the more fundamental question is not
whether the Government is performing its assumed tasks well, but whether -
the tasks should have been assumed in the first place. We must, begin to resist
the impulse to look t.o government for the solutions to our problems, it is
from that quarter that many of our problems come. The ultimate issue is, as
Judge Learned Hand once put. it; "whether the ultimate value shall be this
wistful, cloudy. errant You or I, or that Great Beast, Leviathan."'
•`"" See, e.g.. Flint, "... A System Thal fia,t Rim Wild, - Forbes 38 (Nov. 12, 1979).
"" I.. HAND, Tin: SPIRIT Or I JaERTY 173 (Phoenix ed. 1977).
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APPENDIX
Percentage of Minority Male Workforce
Employed By Age
Total
(16 & 65
over) 16-17 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 & Over
1968 94.4 73.4 81.0 91.7 96.2 97.1 97.5 96.4 96.0
1969 94.7 75.3 81.0 91.6 96.6 97.6 97.6 96.8 96.8
1970 92.7 72.2 76.9 87.4 93.9 96.1 96,7 96.6 96.2
1971 90.9 66.6 74.0 83.8 92.6 95.1 95.5 95.3 96.6
1972 91.1 64.9 73.8 85.3 93.2 95.2 96.2 95.4 93.1
1973 92.4 65.6 77.9 87.4 94.2 96.0 96.8 96.9 96.4
1974 90.9 61.0 73.4 84.6 92.8 95.9 96.0 96.4 94.4
1975 86.3 60.1i 67.1 77.1 88.1 91.7 91.0 93.9 90.5
1976 87.3 62.3 66.0 79.3 89.0 92.7 92.8 93.8 90.7
1977 87.6 61.3 65.9 78.3 89.4 93,9 94.8 93.0 91.7
Net per-
centage
gain or
loss 1968-
(-9.8) (-12.1) (-15.1) (-13.4) (-6.8) (-3.2) (-2.7) (-2.8) (-4.3)
1977
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978, Table 58 at 177-180.
Ratio of Employed Minority Males to
Total Minority Male Population By Age
Total
(16 & 65
over) 16-17 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-414 & Over
1968 73.3 27.8 51.3 77.9 91.4 90.7 87.8 76.7 25.5
1969 72.8 28.4 51.1 77.3 91.2 90.5 87.3 75.4 25.3
1970 70.9 25.1 47.5 73.0 88.0 89.6 85.3 76.5 26.3
1971 68.1 21.6 43.6 68.3 86.0 87.5 83.0 74.1 23.7
1972 67.1 22.1 44,3 69.5 86.4 87.0 82.8 70.2 22.0
1973 68.2 21.9 47.8 71.5 86.4 87.6 85.2 68.5 21.8
1974 06.6 21.1 45.8 69.4 85.6 87.1 81.3 67.7 20.5
1975 (11.7 18.7 38.6 60.4 80.5 82.5 77.0 64.5 18.9
1976 (11.7 18.8 36.7 62.2 80,6 84.0 77.4 61.6 17.9
1977 62.2 18.9 38.1 61.2 80.8 85.8 78.4 62.7 17.7
Net per-
centage
gain or
loss 1968-
(-11..1) (-8.9) (-13.2) (-16.7) (-10.6) (-4.9) (-9.4) (-14.0) (-7.8)
1977
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978, Table 3 at 28-32,
Table 4 :II 33, and Table 58 at 177-180.
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Percentage of Minority Female Workforce
Employed By Age
total
(16 & 65
over) 16-17 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 & Over
1968 91.7 66.3 73.8 87.7 91.6 95.0 96.8 97.2 97.6
1969 92.2 68.8 74.3 88.0 93.4 95.5 96.3 97.1 98.9
1970 90.7 63.1 67.1 85.0 92.1 95.2 96.0 96.8 98.1
1971 89.2 61.5 66.3 82.7 89.3 03.1 95.8 96.5 96.1
1972 88.7 61.7 61.3 82.6 89.8 02.8 95.3 96.0 98.{)
1973 89.5 63.5 66.7 82.4 90.3 94.7 96.3 96.8 96.1
I974 89.3 63.8 66.3 82.0 01.4 93.3 95.7 96.7 98.5
1975 86.0 61.1 61.7 77.5 87.1 91.4 93.3 94.7 96.9
1976 86.4 54.0 65.0 78.3 87.0 91.9 93.9 04.5 97.4
1977 86.0 55.3 62.6 76.4 87.1 91.5 94.4 95.1 96.4
Net per-
centage
gain or
loss 1968-
(-5.7) (-11.0) (-11.2) (-11.3) (-4.5) (-4.0) (-2.4) (-2.1) (-1.2)
1977
Source: U.S, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978, Table 58 at 177-180.
Ratio of Employed Minority Fern ales
To Total :Minority Female Population By Age
Total
(16 &
over) 16-17 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
65
& Over
1968 45.2 15.4 34.6 51.2 51.8 56.3 57.9 45.7 11.6
1969 44.9 15.3 30.0 49.0 53.0 57.0 57.8 45.6 12.0
1971 43.9 13.5 27.4 46.3 52.9 56.8 56.9 45.4 11.0
1972 43.2 13.2 26.9 46.8 54.0 56.3 54.6 42.1 12.5
1973 43.9 15.4 30.1 47.4 55.1 57.5 54.3 43.3 10.7
1974 43.8 10.0 29.6 47.7 55.5 57,4 54.4 42.1 9.8
1975 42.3 16.2 27.8 43.5 53.5 56.4 53.0 41.5 10.2
1976 43.4 12.9 28.1 45.3 56.8 57.2 53.8 41,0 10.9
1977 43.8 12.5 28.0 45.4 57.9 58.3 55.4 40.6 9.5
Net per-
centage
gain or
loss 1968-
(-1.4) (-2.9) (-6.6) (-5.8) (+6.1) (+2.0) (-3.1) (-5.1) (-2.1)
1977
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978, Table 3 at 28-32,
Table 4 at 33, and Table 58 at 177-180,
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